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l)EMPIRICAL ESSAYS IN CORPORATE FINANCE AND FINANCIAL REPORTING
This thesis consists of four studies in the areas of corporate finance and financial
reporting. The first study in the area of corporate finance analyzes CEOs’ familiarity with
business segments and how that familiarity affects their divestiture decisions. Though
managers’ characteristics play an important role in the areas of investment, financial, and
organizational practices, relatively few (behavioral) corporate finance studies examine the
CEO’s perspective. This chapter aims to fill this gap by making the connection between
CEOs’ working experiences with firms’ divestment decisions. The subsequent corporate
finance study empirically examines a firm’s selection procedure of financial advisors,
including the choice of advisor nationality and experience, when making a cross-border
acquisition. The selection of a financial advisor is an important determinant of the value
created in cross-border deals, particularly in case acquirers need the experience and skills
of their advisors to navigate the foreign economic and regulatory practices and conditions.
In the area of financial reporting, the first study investigates the impact of a cross listing in
the United States or United Kingdom on managers’ forecast specificity choice and the ex
post forecast errors of management earnings forecasts disclosed by Dutch firms. A
relatively large number of Dutch firms have a cross listing in the United States or United
Kingdom, which brings about greater legal exposure and greater scrutiny by regulators,
analysts, and investors. This setting provides an opportunity to investigate whether legal
and reputational bonding have an impact on a firm’s voluntary information disclosure. The
final chapter investigates analysts’ preferences for firms’ corporate financial reporting
practices by means of a survey. Analysts’ preferences are confronted with the perceptions
and actions of CFOs. Since analysts play a key role in a firm’s reporting and disclosure
practices, this comparison provides more insight in the similarities and discrepancies
between the demand side and supply side of corporate financial information.
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Voorwoord 
 
Wat een heerlijk gevoel om het voorwoord te schrijven! Dat is niet alleen omdat dit 
betekent dat ik mijn AiO periode afsluit, maar ook omdat ik in een nieuwe fase 
terechtkom, waarin ik als Universitair Docent start bij de Rotterdam School of 
Management. Dit proefschrift is het resultaat van ruim vier jaar werk dat ik met veel 
plezier heb gedaan. Het had echter niet tot stand kunnen komen zonder de steun van 
collega’s, vrienden en familie. Daarom wil ik graag een aantal personen in dit 
voorwoord bedanken. 
Als eerste wil ik mijn begeleiders Abe de Jong en Gerard Mertens bedanken. Toen 
ik als studentassistent voor hen werkte, hebben zij me overgehaald om te gaan 
promoveren op het gebied van Finance en Accounting. Ik zou dit carrièrepad niet 
gekozen hebben als zij mij niet bewust hadden gemaakt van de mogelijkheden in de 
academische wereld. Ik wil Abe graag bedanken voor zijn inzet en enthousiasme, 
waardoor ik altijd gemotiveerd werd om zoveel mogelijk uit de projecten van mijn 
proefschrift te halen. Ook als ik een vraag had, kon ik altijd bij hem terecht om deze te 
bespreken (zelfs als het een vraag was waarvan ik stiekem het antwoord al wist, maar 
de realiteit niet onder ogen wilde zien). Verder wil ik Gerard graag bedanken voor 
zijn steun. Ook hij stond altijd klaar wanneer ik hem nodig had.  
I’m greatly indebted to James Ang, who is a co-author of the second chapter of my 
thesis and made it possible for me to visit the Finance Department of the College of 
Business at Florida State University (FSU). I learned a lot from the cooperation with 
him and greatly enjoyed to listen to his inspiring views during our discussions and 
during the course that he taught. He further taught me how to deal with difficult issues 
in research and tricks of how to respond to referee reports. I would also like to thank 
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all the people who helped me to have a pleasant stay in Florida, with special thanks to 
Ansley, Mary Anne, and Saskia.  
Verder wil ik graag naast Abe, Gerard en James mijn andere coauteurs, Steven 
Ongena en Ronald van Dijk, bedanken voor hun samenwerking. Ik heb veel van de 
samenwerking met Steven geleerd, ondanks dat we veelal op afstand via Skype 
hebben gecommuniceerd. Ronald wil ik vooral bedanken voor zijn inzet om de 
managers van equity analisten te benaderen. Zonder deze inzet hadden we niet van zo 
een hoge respons van analisten durven dromen.  
Ik ben tevens Hans Degryse, Peter Roosenboom en Jeroen Suijs van de kleine 
commissie dankbaar voor de erg bruikbare commentaren en suggesties.  
Voorts wil ik graag alle (ex-)collega’s van zowel de Finance als de Accounting 
Vakgroep bedanken. Ik beleef nog altijd veel plezier aan onze lunches, het 
reisgezelschap tijdens conferenties en waardeer de hulp en kritische inbreng van 
iedereen. I am especially grateful to Jana and Guillermo, who used to be my office 
mates and have become good friends. Both Jana and Guillermo have always been 
willing to share their views and discuss about work-related as well as personal issues. 
Apart from these conversations, Jana was a very competitive opponent with squash 
games. As for Guillermo, I didn’t know that I would come to appreciate an “event 
time” person in such a way as I came to appreciate him. Apart from that, he’s a great 
traveling companion, especially when having spare time during conference trips such 
as the ones in New Orleans and Orlando. Bovendien ben ik Anna dankbaar voor al 
haar advies en de gezellige tijd tijdens en naast het werk. Martine, ik heb enorm 
genoten van de menige kilometers die we hebben hardgelopen. We waren begonnen 
met een groep collega’s, maar het kwam er snel op neer dat wij samen overbleven. 
Als laatste gaat mijn dank uit naar Ben, Erik, Gerard, Maarten, Marie, Marta, Miriam 
en Patrick. 
Natuurlijk hebben mijn vrienden en vriendinnen ook een waardevolle bijdrage 
geleverd aan dit proefschrift. Zij zorgden voor veel afleiding en waren een luisterend 
oor voor wanneer het nodig was. Ik ben erg dankbaar voor het plezier met hen, hun 
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advies en hun steun. In het bijzonder wil ik Alexandra, Angela, Clara, Elianne, Jorien, 
José en Simone hiervoor bedanken.  
De steun van mijn familie is ook enorm waardevol voor me geweest. Ze zijn altijd 
geïnteresseerd en hebben me altijd gesteund in de keuzes die ik maak. Vooral de 
aanmoediging van mijn ouders om te doen wat we kunnen (maar wel zolang we nog 
van het leven kunnen genieten) hebben mij altijd erg gemotiveerd om het beste uit 
mezelf te halen. Ik heb veel geluk om in zo’n liefdevol en warm gezin te zijn 
opgegroeid. Pa, Ma, Suus en Jeroen, Wouter en Michiel, bedankt! 
En dat brengt me tot de laatste en meest bijzondere persoon die ik enorm dankbaar 
ben, John. Zijn liefde en support zijn ontzettend waardevol voor me. Hij kan me vaak 
tot nieuwe inzichten brengen en is een ster in relativeren. Daarnaast heeft hij voor veel 
afleiding en plezier gezorgd, die ik vooral erg goed kon gebruiken in de tijd dat ik aan 
mijn proefschrift werkte. Bedankt hiervoor! 
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Chapter 1 
 
Introduction 
 
This thesis consists of four studies in the areas of corporate finance and financial 
reporting. The first study in the area of corporate finance analyzes the impact of 
CEOs’ background characteristics on their divestment decisions. The subsequent 
corporate finance study examines a firm’s selection procedure of financial advisors 
when making a cross-border acquisition. In the area of financial reporting, the first 
study focuses on a firm’s voluntary disclosure decision in terms of management 
earnings forecasts. The final chapter investigates analysts’ preferences for firms’ 
corporate financial reporting practices. The remainder of this chapter discusses the 
motivation and main results for the two corporate finance studies (Section 1.1) and the 
two financial reporting studies (Section 1.2). 
 
 
1.1   Corporate finance 
 
Chapter 2 empirically investigates the impact of CEOs’ background characteristics on 
corporate decisions. Though managers’ characteristics play an important role in the 
areas of investment, financial, and organizational practices (Bertrand and Schoar, 
2003), relatively few behavioral corporate finance studies examine the CEO’s 
perspective (Baker, Ruback, and Wurgler, 2004). We focus on CEOs of multi-
segment firms and examine whether familiarity with their firm’s business segments 
makes them less likely to divest assets from these segments relative to non-familiar 
segments. CEOs classify segments as being familiar based on their previous working 
experience. We provide three arguments for the familiarity effect. First, CEOs’ more 
comprehensive and deeper knowledge of their familiar segments makes them less 
likely to divest assets from these segments. Second, CEOs’ greater familiarity with a 
segment enhances their illusion of having control over exogenous events, leading to 
an overestimation of the familiar segment’s returns and an underestimation of its risks. 
Third, CEOs can entrench themselves by increasing the proportion of assets that are 
complementary to their skills, and hence divest from their non-familiar segments.  
14
 
 
The chapter further argues that divestiture decisions are part of a negotiation 
process between CEOs and segment managers in an internal capital market. Empire-
building tendencies provide segment managers incentives to bargain against 
divestitures from their segments. They derive their bargaining power from their 
private information and human capital. Since managers of non-familiar segments have 
the strongest bargaining power at the beginning of a CEO’s tenure, we expect that 
CEOs mainly exhibit a familiarity effect later during their tenure.   
The analysis among divestments from 1,182 business segments in the period 1996 
to 2004 shows that longer-tenured CEOs divest assets about half as often from 
familiar segments as from non-familiar segments. The evidence supports both rational 
and non-rational bases for the familiarity effect in the form of superior knowledge and 
illusion of control. The chapter also confirms that the divestiture decision is a political 
process between a CEO and his segment managers, where segment managers with 
greater bargaining power manage to hold on to their assets. The results on an event 
study suggest that the familiarity effect can be costly, as the highest abnormal returns 
are generated by longer-tenured CEOs who are willing to divest from their familiar 
segments. 
Chapter 3 of the thesis examines firms’ selection procedure of financial advisors 
when making acquisitions. The selection of a financial advisor is an important 
determinant of the value created in cross-border deals, particularly in the case 
acquirers need the experience and skills of their advisors to navigate the foreign, 
economic, and regulatory practices and conditions. We consider three steps in the 
decision process. Firms first decide whether or not to hire an advisor. If they hire an 
advisor, they then decide on the advisor nation, i.e., firms can choose between 
advisors from the target, the acquirer or a third country. Finally, depending on the 
choice of advisor nation, firms decide on the experience of the advisor, i.e., whether 
the advisor has global and/or target country experience. 
In this third chapter, we empirically examine 3,537 cross-border 
transactions across 92 target and 46 acquirer nations between 1995 and 2005. The 
results indicate that the decisions to hire an advisor are similar to previous studies on 
domestic acquisitions. Both target- and acquirer-nation characteristics, such as 
formalism, financial sophistication, investor protection, and openness to foreign 
acquisitions, influence the acquirer’s choice of advisor nationality. Global- and target-
country experience of an advisor serves as a substitute for the acquirer’s own cross-
border acquisition experience, but advisors from either the target or acquirer country − 
even when less experienced − create most value. 
2 Chapter 1
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1.2   Financial reporting 
 
Chapter 4 studies the impact of a cross listing in the US or UK on managers’ forecast 
specificity choice and the ex post forecast errors of management earnings forecasts 
disclosed by Dutch firms. A relatively large number of Dutch firms have a cross 
listing in the US or UK. Such a cross listing can take the form of a listing on an 
exchange or a listing on the OTC market. An exchange listing in either country brings 
about greater legal exposure, while both types of cross listings bring about greater 
scrutiny by regulators, analysts, and investors. These implications allow us to 
investigate whether legal and reputational bonding, as proposed by Coffee Jr. (1999; 
2002), have an impact on a firm’s voluntary information disclosure.  
The empirical results of 1,896 press releases that contain management earnings 
forecasts show that Dutch cross-listed firms disclose less precise forecasts than non-
cross-listed firms. The analyses on the ex post realization of forecasts show that cross-
listed firms disclose more accurate and less optimistic forecasts. These results hold for 
exchange listings as well as for OTC listings, indicating that a firm’s legal exposure 
and reputation concerns have a strong impact on the content of voluntarily disclosed 
information.  
Chapter 5 investigates analysts’ preferences for firms’ financial reporting 
practices by means of a survey among 306 sell-side analysts that follow US firms. We 
confront their views with the perceptions and actions of CFOs, as surveyed by 
Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal (2005). Since analysts play a key role in a firm’s 
reporting and disclosure practices (Brennan and Tamarowski, 2000; Graham, Harvey, 
and Rajgopal; 2005), this comparison provides more insight in the similarities and 
discrepancies between the demand side and supply side of corporate financial 
information. 
Although the results show that analysts’ views frequently correspond with that of 
CFOs, we also find some remarkable differences. Analysts tend to focus on long-term 
reporting strategies, while CFO’s tend to make reporting decisions, and related 
investment and financing choices, with short-term consequences. Only 13% of the 
analysts recommend firms to make a moderate or large value sacrifice to get a smooth 
earnings path, while in the sample of CFOs of public firms, 61% assert to make such a 
sacrifice. At the same time, if a firm falls short of the desired earnings targets, CFOs 
do not consider to repurchase shares, while analysts regard a share repurchase as a 
value-enhancing signal.  
Introduction 3
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Chapter 2 
 
Does CEOs’ familiarity with business 
segments affect their divestment 
decisions?1 
 
 
 
2.1   Introduction 
 
In this chapter, we study the impact of a CEO’s relation with business segments to the 
fund allocation process in internal capital markets of multi-segment firms. Within the 
internal capital markets, CEOs face two related allocation decisions, the first of which 
is the positive allocation of funds in the form of capital budgeting and acquisitions. 
The second issue is the negative allocation in the form of divestments of assets from 
one or more business segments.  
We concentrate on CEOs’ divestment decisions and approach these decisions 
from the perspective of a political process. Most studies regard divestments mainly as 
economic decisions2 , but neglect the political process within the firm. Corporate 
divestment processes involve more intense politicking than investment processes, 
because for the segment managers, having to divest assets means losing assets that 
                                            
1 This chapter is based on Ang, De Jong, and Van der Poel (2008). We are grateful to Malcolm Baker, 
Guillermo Baquero, John Doukas, Marie Dutordoir, Denys Glushkov, Nancy Huyghebaert, Ulrike 
Malmendier, Gerard Mertens, Peter Roosenboom, Len Rosenthal, Jack Stecher, Jeroen Suijs, Mathijs van Dijk, 
participants at the 2005 ERIM Conference Financial Management Track, participants at the 2006 EFMA 
conference (Madrid), participants at the 2007 EFA conference (New Orleans), participants at the 2007 EFA 
conference (Ljubljana), participants at the 2007 FMA conference (Orlando), seminar participants at RSM 
Erasmus University, at the University of Antwerp, at the Norwegian School of Economics and Business 
Administration, at the Catholic University of Leuven, at Florida State University, and at Tilburg University for 
providing helpful comments and suggestions. We are also grateful to the Vereniging Trust Fonds for providing 
financial support and to Sandra Sizer for her excellent editing. 
2 See Jain (1985), Hite, Owers, and Rogers (1987), Lang, Poulsen, and Stulz (1995), John and Ofek (1995), 
and Bates (2005). 
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they already own. Based on prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979), an 
endowment effect prediction says that individuals place a higher value on something 
they own compared to the value of the same object that they do not own (Thaler, 1980; 
Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler, 1990).  
We examine whether CEOs are less likely to divest assets from familiar segments 
relative to non-familiar segments. CEOs’ familiarity with segments comes from their 
prior working experience in these or related segments. We provide three arguments 
for the familiarity effect. First, we argue that even when the objective of the CEOs is 
to maximize firm value, the CEOs’ divestment decisions could show a familiarity 
effect, because CEOs have more comprehensive, deeper knowledge of familiar 
segments.  
Second, a part of the greater knowledge of familiar segments is assumed 
knowledge. CEOs’ greater familiarity with the segments makes them more prone to 
indulge in the behavior known as the illusion of control (Langer, 1975). The illusion 
that they have more control over exogenous events could lead CEOs to overestimate 
returns and to underestimate risk of the familiar segments.  
Third, agency concerns may reinforce the CEOs’ desires to be entrenched. To 
increase the proportion of assets that are complementary to their skills (Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1989), CEOs may be more likely to divest assets from non-familiar segments, 
i.e., segments in which they do not have working experience. This divestment strategy 
facilitates their entrenchment by making them less dispensable and thus more 
powerful within the firm.  
CEOs are not always able to exhibit their familiarity effect, since the divestment 
decisions are part of a negotiation process between CEOs and segment managers. 
Segment managers derive their bargaining power from their private information and 
their specific human capital in terms of expertise and internal political clout (Stein, 
2003). Given these characteristics, bargaining power is likely to be stronger for 
segment managers of non-familiar segments. Their empire-building tendencies and 
loss aversion will cause them to use their power to prevent divestitures in their 
segment against newly appointed CEOs in their first two or three years.  Later, CEOs 
have gained substantial knowledge from different sources of information and more 
political freedom to take actions that are not in accordance with their initial mandate 
(Hambrick and Fukutomi, 1991). As a result, the relative bargaining power of 
managers of non-familiar segments weakens and CEOs are more likely to make 
decisions in line with their own preferences. Thus, we expect CEOs to gain bargaining 
power and prevail with their familiarity bias later in their tenure.  
To make the notion of familiarity operational, we develop a three-level proxy. The 
first level is direct working experience, which indicates that a CEO was previously 
employed within the segment. We refer to this segment as the CEO’s home base. 
6 Chapter 2
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CEOs are familiar with their home base because of their previous hands-on working 
experience and their acquaintance with the segment’s personnel. We add two levels of 
familiarity that represent knowledge of a segment’s industry only. The first of these is 
whether the CEOs have industry working experience with segments inside the firm 
that operate in the same two-digit SIC industry as the home-base segments. The 
second is based on outside industry experience, which indicates whether the CEOs 
have prior working experience at another company that operates in the same industry 
as a segment in the current firm. We consider outside industry experience as the 
weakest form of familiarity, compared to home-base and inside-industry experience. 
We investigate the presence of familiarity bias by analyzing business segments of 
multi-segment firms that announce a divestment in the period from 1996 to 2004. Our 
sample consists of 338 multi-segment firm years, comprising 443 segments with 
divestments, and 739 segments that are fully retained. As the foundation for our 
empirical model we use that of Schlingemann, Stulz, and Walkling (2002). Their 
model explains the likelihood that a segment is divested based on economic motives. 
We extend their model to incorporate our various familiarity proxy variables.  
Since the choice of which assets to divest is conditional on these firms’ decision 
whether or not to divest assets, we analyze firms’ divestment decisions in two stages. 
In the first stage, i.e., the decision to divest, we compare our sample of divesting firms 
with equally diversified but non-divesting firms. In the second stage, we input the 
resulting estimate of the probability to divest to the second stage analysis on which 
assets to divest.  
Our results support both the existence of a familiarity effect and a moderating 
impact of the segment managers’ bargaining power. In particular, the effect interacts 
with tenure, as only longer-tenured CEOs exhibit the familiarity effect. These CEOs 
divest assets about half as often from home-base segments as from non-familiar 
segments.   
For a sub-sample of newer CEOs our findings are consistent with the results of 
Xuan (2006), who examines the change in fund allocation after a CEO change and 
finds that newly-hired CEOs increase the allocation of funds to non-familiar segments 
to induce cooperation from these segments’ managers. In our case, newly-hired CEOs 
accept non-familiar segments’ fund requests as these segment managers have stronger 
bargaining position that comes from their segment specific information and human 
capital. Nevertheless, once CEOs have gained sufficient bargaining power vis-à-vis 
the segment managers of non-familiar segments, these longer-tenured CEOs are more 
likely to divest assets from these segments and retain familiar segments.  
We test alternate explanations for familiarity bias among longer-tenured CEOs. 
We fail to find statistical significance to support the entrenchment hypothesis, but our 
evidence is consistent with the knowledge explanations that can be derived from true 
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superior knowledge, and from assumed knowledge. Our findings remain robust after 
including additional control variables in the regression and they remain robust with 
different sub samples. We find evidence against self-selection as an alternative 
explanation for our results. 
Finally, we conduct an event study around divestiture announcements. The results 
suggest that CEOs create shareholder value for both home-base and non-home-base 
divestitures, supporting the superior knowledge explanation. However, longer-tenured 
CEOs exhibiting a familiarity bias create less wealth gain to their shareholders. Their 
divestitures from non-home-base segments (i.e., familiarity effect) generate 1.7% 
lower abnormal returns than divestitures from home bases. This figure is significant as 
it allows us to add to the scarce quantitative evidence of the costs to shareholders from 
a behavioral bias committed by top management (Malmendier and Tate, 2007; Ben-
David, Graham, and Harvey, 2007).  
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 discusses the development of our 
hypotheses. Section 2.3 describes the data selection procedure and variables. We 
discuss the results in Section 2.4 and present additional evidence and robustness tests 
in Section 2.5. Section 2.6 concludes.  
 
 
2.2   Hypotheses development  
 
Here, we develop hypotheses on the motives and constraints that induce CEOs to 
exhibit a familiarity effect. We also provide a brief discussion of how our topic relates 
to the literature. 
 
 
2.2.1   What are CEOs’ motives to show a familiarity effect? 
 
We provide three explanations for why CEOs would be less likely to divest assets 
from familiar segments: superior knowledge, assumed knowledge, and entrenchment. 
The superior knowledge explanation could be derived from assuming that CEOs 
maximize shareholder value. CEOs have more comprehensive knowledge of familiar 
segments relative to non-familiar segments. In the period that the CEOs worked in the 
familiar segments, they came to know the values and growth opportunities of these 
segments’ assets. They further established relationships with their personnel, both as 
conduit of information and for political support. These relationships can be valuable 
for CEOs, as they are aware some segment managers have empire-building tendencies 
and might have the incentive to communicate inaccurate information to receive a 
8 Chapter 2
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more favorable budget. 3  This agency problem is especially severe between non-
familiar segment managers and CEOs, as CEOs have the least segment-specific 
knowledge of non-familiar segments and do not have connections in these segments 
that are as well established as in the familiar segments.  
Given CEOs’ superior knowledge of familiar segments, they will associate 
familiar segments with risks for which the probability distribution is known, and non-
familiar segments with uncertainty for which the probability distribution or the states 
are not known.4 A greater discount for uncertainty leads to a lower present value for 
non-familiar segments. As a result, everything else equal, the higher valuation of 
familiar segments decreases the likelihood that CEOs choose these segments for 
divestment. 
A second explanation for higher valuation of the familiar segments is a CEO’s 
illusion of control, which leads an individual to overestimate the likelihood of a 
successful outcome of their decisions (Langer, 1975) and to be too optimistic about 
the likelihood of both positive and negative events (Weinstein, 1980). CEOs who 
regard themselves as having deeper knowledge of their familiar segments are more 
likely to assume they have true knowledge and commit illusion of control (Langer, 
1975) regarding the familiar segment. Their presumption of true knowledge induces 
them to underestimate the familiar segments’ risks and overestimate their future 
returns, leading to overvaluation. In addition, uncertainty leads to the focus on worst-
case scenarios and therefore to pessimism about the unfamiliar (Cao, Han, Hirshleifer, 
and Zhang, 2007). Both optimism about familiar segments and pessimism about non-
familiar segments predict a lower likelihood to divest from familiar segments 
If we relax the assumption that CEOs aim to maximize firm value and instead 
allow them to maximize their own utility, then the CEOs might exhibit a familiarity 
bias that is based on agency theory. One way for CEOs to maximize their utility is by 
facilitating their entrenchment. CEOs can entrench themselves by investing in assets 
that are complementary to their skills, thus becoming more valuable to the 
shareholders and making it more costly to replace them (Shleifer and Vishny, 1989). 
CEOs can achieve the same end by divesting assets from non-familiar segments and 
increasing the share of familiar assets. 
 
 
                                            
3 See Milgrom and Roberts (1988), Jensen (2003), and Wulf (2007). 
4 See Knight (1921) for the distinction between risk and uncertainty. 
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2.2.2   What are the constraints on CEOs that mitigate a familiarity 
effect? 
 
CEOs have limited power over segment managers by giving them access to critical 
resources, such as the segment’s funds and assets (Rajan and Zingales, 1998; Rajan, 
Servaes, and Zingales, 2000).  Even though CEOs tend to favor familiar segments, the 
bargaining power of non-familiar-segment managers may deter CEOs from such 
behavior. Segment managers derive their bargaining power and incentive to resist 
divestitures from several sources. Private information on the segment’s assets and 
specific human capital in the form of expertise and internal political clout provide 
segment managers bargaining power vis-à-vis the CEO (Stein, 2003). Since CEOs 
cannot completely contract their exact investment decisions, segment managers can 
choose investments that are more favorable for themselves than for the firm as a 
whole (Rajan, Servaes, and Zingales, 2000). Segment managers’ empire-building 
tendencies give them the incentives to use their power to bargain for a greater share of 
the budget. Moreover, when CEOs plan to divest assets, the non-familiar-segment 
managers’ loss aversion will make them reluctant to provide unbiased information on 
divestment opportunities.  
We argue that the bargaining position of CEO relative to non-familiar segment 
managers changes over the course of a CEO’s tenure. New CEOs initially lack 
specific knowledge of the non-familiar segments, which compel them to depend on 
the information provided by the non-familiar segment managers. As a result, they 
might have to give the non-familiar-segment managers benefit of the doubt, and not 
challenge their reasoning that assets not be divested. Alternatively, the segment 
managers might also view a more equitable treatment as an attempt by CEOs to 
induce cooperation and become allies, as in the bridge building hypothesis of Xuan 
(2006).  
Hambrick and Fukutomi (1991) argue that longer-tenured CEOs are likely to 
make decisions such that their background characteristics are increasingly associated 
with the characteristics of their firm. CEOs’ familiarity effect could reflect such a 
decision. The authors also argue that within two or three years of tenure, CEOs have 
acquired considerable knowledge from different sources and gained more political 
leeway to deviate from their original mandate. In a similar vein, after this period, 
CEOs have gained more knowledge about non-familiar segments’ assets, industry, 
and the source of its segment-managers’ bargaining power. Note that their knowledge 
of non-familiar segments will never be as thorough as that of their home-base 
segments. CEOs’ gain in knowledge reduces the relative bargaining power of non-
familiar-segment managers, which in turn enable CEOs to challenge these segment 
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managers on divestment choice, and to prevail. Therefore, we expect that CEOs are 
better able to make decisions reflecting familiarity effect later in their tenure.  
 
 
2.2.3   Relation to current literature 
 
We describe an internal capital markets process in which CEOs negotiate with 
segment managers on the funds that can be allocated to these segments. Earlier studies 
on internal capital markets show that these markets differ from external capital 
markets in the sense that CEOs are the only providers of funds (Stein, 2003). 
Moreover, CEOs have total and unconditional control rights over the segment’s 
physical assets (Gertner, Scharfstein, and Stein, 1994), i.e., making actual decisions 
on the investment and divestment activities within segments.  
Other studies find that greater influence and political power of segment managers 
relative to their CEOs and other segment managers can distort capital budgeting 
decisions.5 The study that has the most direct connection to ours is that of Xuan 
(2006). His results, from a sample of new CEOs, are consistent with his explanation 
that CEOs find it expedient to increase investments in non-familiar segments to create 
a perception of justice and to induce cooperation. In our case, since non-familiar 
segment managers have a better bargaining position due to their private information 
and human capital, newly-hired CEOs are less likely to challenge them, and these 
segments suffer fewer divestitures. Thus, our prediction for newly-hired CEOs 
parallels that of Xuan’s prediction. However, in contrast to Xuan, we also analyze 
longer-tenured CEOs and predict a reversal, in which CEOs would exhibit a 
familiarity bias and be partial to familiar segments.  
Another related paper is that of Landier, Nair, and Wulf (2007), who find 
empirical evidence that is consistent with the arguments that CEOs perceive their 
familiar segment’s personnel as their dependable allies and are therefore less likely to 
divest assets from these segments. They suggest that, due to information constraints 
and social interactions, CEOs are less likely to dismiss people or divest divisions that 
are more proximate to their headquarters.  
 
 
2.3   Data description and variables 
 
In this section, we describe our sample. We also present our data, proxy for familiarity, 
and control variables.  
 
                                            
5 See Rajan, Servaes, and Zingales (2000), Wulf (2007), and Xuan (2006). 
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2.3.1   The sample 
 
We construct our initial sample from the Compustat Business Information File and the 
Securities Data Corporation (SDC) file. We select data for firms with at least two 
business (or operating) segments for our sample period, 1996-2004. As in 
Schlingemann, Stulz, and Walkling (2002), we select firms with sales of over $20 
million or assets above $100 million, and we exclude American Depository Receipts 
(ADRs) and firms that are not incorporated in the US. We also omit firm years with 
segments that operate in regulated industries (SIC 4900 – 4999). Like Berger and 
Ofek (1995) and Schlingemann, Stulz, and Walkling, we require that the sum of 
segment sales does not deviate more than 1% from total firm sales. These selection 
criteria result in a sample of 5,251 firm years for 1,009 firms for our sample period.  
Next, we search the SDC database for all completed divestments for the 1996-
2004 sample period. We require that more than 95% of the divested division’s assets 
be acquired by the buying firm after the transaction (as in McNeil and Moore (2005)). 
(However, we note that because segments can consist of more than one division, a 
divestiture of at least 95% of the division does not mean that at least 95% of the 
reported segment is divested.) This procedure gives us a data set comprising 1,317 
firm years for 530 firms that have a divestiture during our sample period. We link the 
divested assets with the business segments reported by Compustat by using the SDC 
synopsis on the divestiture, the SDC SIC codes, and the SDC business description of 
the divested assets. If the link remains ambiguous, we check the annual report and 
search for descriptions of segments and discontinued operations. If we still have no 
clarity in classification, we exclude the divestiture’s firm year from our sample. 
Multiple divestitures can occur within one segment in the same year. Since our unit of 
observation is either a firm year or a segment year, we treat multiple divestitures 
within one segment year as one observation. We require segments to have at least two 
years of data prior to the divestment, otherwise we exclude the firm year of this 
segment.  
During our sample period, which includes the introduction of SFAS 131 in 1997, 
several firms change their segment reporting6 Compustat provides revised historical 
financial information for the new segments for the two years prior to the new segment 
reporting, based on firms’ annual reports. If this information is not available, we 
delete the firm year. We derive CEO work experience information from the Marquis 
Who’s Who database and from Hoover’s. If necessary, we check details in the SEC 
10-K and proxy filings. We exclude firm years for which CEO work experience 
information is not available. We also exclude firm years with two different CEOs, and 
                                            
6 For a detailed analysis of the impact of SFAS 131 on segment reporting, see Berger and Hann (2003, 2005). 
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firm years in which firms divest assets acquired from a merger in the previous year. 
Similar to Lamont (1997), we exclude segments with corporate financial information 
and segments tagged as “elimination”.  
We control for the first-stage decision of firms (i.e., whether or not to divest 
assets), since the second stage of the process (i.e., the decision on which assets to 
divest) is conditional on the prediction from the first stage. Therefore, we construct a 
matched sample of firms that do not divest assets and investigate whether our sample 
of divesting firms makes decisions that are consistent with previous divestiture studies.  
We derive the benchmark firms from our sample of 3,934 non-divesting firm 
years (i.e., our initial sample of 5,251 firm years minus 1,317 divesting firm years). 
We use requirements for our benchmark firms similar to those of Schlingemann, Stulz, 
and Walkling (2002). We require that during year t-1, the benchmark firm be 
operating in the same number of business segments and be in the same sales decile as 
the divesting firm. We base the sales deciles on the sales of the 5,251 firm years. 
When we have a choice among possible benchmark firms, we choose the firm with a 
primary SIC code that is closest to the divesting firm primary SIC code. Appendix 2A 
provides more details on our matching procedure. 
 
 
2.3.2   CEO familiarity measure 
 
We construct proxy variables for familiarity that differentiate the three levels of 
CEOs’ relevant experience in a segment prior to being appointed as CEOs. First, the 
strongest form of familiarity is direct working experience within a segment that serves 
as the CEOs’ home base. We include the next two proxies that only represent industry 
knowledge of the segment. CEOs that only have industry experience in a segment are 
less likely to have their connections in these segments and will have less specific 
knowledge on assets, procedures, and developments within the segment. The second 
level of familiarity is inside-industry working experience within the same firm, i.e., 
CEOs are familiar with segments that operate in the same two-digit SIC industry as 
the home base. The third level of familiarity is outside-industry working experience, 
i.e., CEOs are familiar with segments operating in the same two-digit SIC industry as 
those outside firms where they were previously employed. We classify all other 
segments as non-familiar segments. Appendix 2B provides an example of our 
classification method. 
In our study, we need to segregate familiar segments from non-familiar segments 
for CEOs who decide to divest. This required segregation imposes two additional 
requirements on our sample. First, sufficient detailed information about the working 
experience of the CEO should be available, leading to the exclusion of 49 firm years.
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Table 2.1  
Sample selection procedure 
The table presents our sample selection procedure. We obtain the selected firms and firm years from 
Compustat, and derive divestitures sample from the Thomson’s SDC database. We exclude firm years with 
incomplete historical Compustat data and incomplete CEO information; firm years in which it is not clear to 
which segment the divestiture belongs; firm years in which the divestiture belongs to the corporate segment; 
firm years in which two different CEOs announce a divestiture in the same year; and when the divested assets 
come from a merger in the previous year. We also exclude corporate segments from our data set and firm years 
with no variance in familiarity between segments in that firm year.  
  
Firms Firm 
years 
Segments Segment 
years 
Total Compustat information after selection 1,009 5,251 5,403 18,948 
     
Selected Compustat firms with divestitures derived from 
SDC 530 1,317   
- Incomplete historical Compustat data 192 589   
- Incomplete CEO information 21 49   
- Not clear to which segment divestiture belongs, divestiture 
belongs to corporate segment, firm years with two CEOs, 
assets are from merger in previous year 
15 71     
Total 302 608 1,393 2,394 
 - Corporate segments     237 393 
Total 302 608 1,156 2,001 
- No variance in familiarity between segments in a firm year 146 270 511 819 
Total 156 338 645 1,182 
          
 
Second, we need variations in a CEO’s degree of familiarity among segments. As a 
result of the second requirement, we exclude firm years in which CEOs have no 
familiarity with any of the segments, and firm years in which CEOs only have 
experience in overseeing all segments, like presidents and founders. This second 
requirement results in excluding 270 firm years from our data set.7  
Table 2.1 summarizes the selection procedure of our divesting firm-years sample. 
Our final sample consists of 1,182 segment years, of which 443 are divested segments 
and 739 are retained segments. The sample contains 338 firm years from 156 firms 
and 177 CEOs. 
 
 
2.3.3   Control variables 
 
To examine the type of segment that is selected for divestiture, we include several 
control variables. For each business segment we obtain information on sales, assets, 
                                            
7  The 270 excluded firm years consist of 61 firm years with founders (including CEOs who started as 
executive officers after a spin-off), 14 firm years with internal hires and all segments are home bases, 26 firm 
years with internal hires and all segments are outside industry experience segments, 77 firm years with internal 
hires without any familiar segments, 41 firm years with external hires and all segments are outside industry 
experience segments, and 51 firm years with external hires without any familiar segments. 
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cash flows (which we calculate as operating profit plus depreciation and amortization), 
net capital expenditures (calculated as gross capital expenditures minus depreciation 
and amortization), and primary and secondary SIC codes from the Compustat 
Business Information File. We obtain financial firm-level variables; variables to 
calculate the segments’ Tobin’s q, segment industry-adjusted measures, and the firm’s 
primary SIC code from the Annual Compustat File. We use CRSP for segment 
industry returns and segment industry return volatility. We obtain information on 
CEO remuneration and ownership data from the Execucomp and governance 
information from the IRRC.  
We classify a segment as a core segment if the primary two-digit SIC code of the 
segment corresponds with the primary two-digit SIC code of the firm. To facilitate 
comparability, we apply the same method as Schlingemann, Stulz, and Walkling 
(2002) for the industry measures. We calculate these measures as the median of all 
Compustat firms with the same two-digit SIC code in the fiscal year prior to the 
divestiture announcement. For more reliable industry measures, we require that at 
least five firms operate in the same industry. The Tobin’s q of a segment is the 
industry ratio of the market value of assets to the book value of assets, for which we 
use similar data items as Malmendier and Tate (2005, 2007).8 We use item 12 for the 
calculation of median industry sales, item 13 for median industry cash flows, and 
items 128 and 14 for median industry net capital expenditures. As in Ahn and Denis 
(2004), we estimate cross-subsidization as the segment’s industry-adjusted investment 
minus the firm’s sales weighted sum of industry-adjusted investment. We follow 
Schlingemann, Stulz, and Walkling in calculating segment liquidity: we divide the 
total value of acquisition transactions by the total assets in that industry. We exclude 
values higher than one and industries with less than ten firms from the sample.  
Segment return volatility is the natural logarithm of one plus the variance of the 
industry holding-period return times 253 (the typical number of trading days in a 
fiscal year). We calculate both segment industry returns and firm level returns as the 
natural logarithm of the relative change in stock price. The stock price (adjusted for 
stock splits) is item 199 divided by item 27. At the firm level, we calculate leverage as 
total debt (item 181) divided by total assets (item 6).9  
We derive our financial constraint measure from the Kaplan-Zingales (1997) 
index:10 
                                            
8 We calculate the market value of assets as book value of total assets (item 6) plus market equity minus book 
equity. The market equity=(item 25 * item 199); the book equity=(item 216 - item 10 + item 35 - item 336).  
9 We note that our sample contains 16 observations in which the firm’s leverage exceeds one, which is 
theoretically not possible. Therefore, we set these values to one. Not setting these observations to one does not 
influence our results. 
10 Kaplan and Zingales (1997) define the accounting ratios as follows: cash flow to capital=(item 18 + item 
14)/item 8; Q=(item 6 + (item 24 * item 25) – item 60 – item 74)/item 6; leverage=(item 9 + item 34)/(item 9 + 
item 34 + item 216); dividends to capital=(item 21 + item 19)/item 8; cash to capital=item 1/item 8.  
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A higher score on the Kaplan-Zingales (1997) index indicates that firms are more 
financially constrained.  
To calculate the firm’s diversity in q, we follow Rajan, Servaes, and Zingales 
(2000) and Schlingemann, Stulz, and Walkling (2002):  
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where Salesi refers to segment i’s sales, n to the number of segments, qi to the median 
q of all Compustat firms with the same two-digit SIC code as segment i, and q  to the 
sales-weighted average imputed q across the n segments of the firm.  
We follow Berger and Ofek (1995) in calculating excess value, which is the 
percentage difference between a firm’s total value and the sum of imputed values of 
its segments as stand-alone firms. We define excess value as equal to ln(V/I(V)), 
where V is the total firm value calculated as the market value of equity (item 199 * 
item 25) plus book value of debt (item 181) and I(V) the imputed value of the sum of 
a firm’s segments as stand-alone firm.  
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where AIi is segment i’s sales, n the number of segments and Indi(V/AI)mf the 
multiple of total capital to sales for the median single-segment firm with at least $20 
million sales in segment i’s industry. We follow Berger and Ofek (1995) and 
Schlingemann, Stulz, and Walkling (2002) by basing the industry median ratios on the 
narrowest SIC grouping with at least five firms within that industry, and by excluding 
from our sample and considering as outliers any values larger than 1.386 or smaller 
than -1.386. 
We use the governance index constructed by Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003), 
which is a score for the number of takeover defenses and other anti-shareholder 
provisions. The percentage of independent directors is the number of independent 
directors divided by the total number of directors, as derived from IRRC. Total 
compensation is the CEO’s salary, bonus, and other annual compensation. The value 
of options granted is the Black-Scholes value as derived from Execucomp. We follow 
Core, Holthausen, and Larcker (1999) in our calculation of excess total compensation, 
which is total compensation, including the value of options granted and restricted 
stock granted, minus predicted total compensation. We calculate a predicted total
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Table 2.2  
Firm and CEO summary statistics 
The table shows the means, standard deviations, minimum, and maximum values of firm level and CEO level 
variables. Leverage is debt divided by total assets. Net capital expenditures are the gross capital expenditures 
minus depreciation and amortization. We define cash flows as operating profit plus depreciation and 
amortization. Tobin’s q is the ratio of the market-to-book value of assets, as calculated in Malmendier and Tate 
(2005, 2007). We calculate the financial constraint measure following Kaplan and Zingales (1997); the 
diversity in q as in Rajan, Servaes, and Zingales (2000); the excess value measure as in Berger and Ofek 
(1995); and the governance index as in Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003). We define total compensation as a 
CEO’s salary, bonus, and other annual compensation not categorized as salary or bonus. The value of options 
granted is the Black-Scholes value. Excess total compensation is the actual total compensation, including 
options and restricted stock granted, minus the predicted total compensation estimated from a regression 
model.  
  Mean St. Dev. Minimum Maximum N 
Panel A. Firm summary statistics      
Sales t-1 ($M) 9,849 16,860 141 153,627 338 
Assets t-1 ($M) 12,852 30,163 173 279,097 338 
Leverage 0.652 0.149 0.251 1.000 337 
Capx t-1/sales t-2 0.017 0.077 -0.228 0.755 338 
Cash flow t-1/sales t-2 0.183 0.097 0.006 0.859 338 
Tobin’s q 1.785 0.985 0.241 7.302 338 
Ln(1 + return) t-1 0.086 0.335 -1.758 1.287 334 
Financial constraint -2.059 4.271 -22.286 7.745 335 
Diversity in q 0.118 0.110 0.000 0.492 335 
Excess value 0.091 0.496 -1.386 1.386 312 
Governance index  10.441 2.432 3 16 331 
      
Panel B. CEO summary statistics      
CEO age 56.355 6.016 38 74 338 
Years employed as CEO 5.571 5.481 0 30 338 
Years worked for firm  20.533 11.622 0 47 330 
Number of titles (CEO, president, 
chairman) 2.192 0.517 1 3 307 
Total compensation ($ thousand) 2,216 1,760 144 14,719 307 
Value of restricted stock granted ($ 
thousand) 528 1,500 0 11,469 307 
Value of options granted ($ thousand) 3,588 11,591 0 193,532 307 
Excess compensation ($ thousand) -751 11,764 -10,551 191,085 305 
Percentage of stock owned 0.020 0.071 0 0.570 307 
Inside CEO 0.870 0.337 0 1 338 
 
compensation by first regressing total compensation on economic variables derived 
from Core, Holthausen, and Larcker, using 1,009 divesting and non-divesting firms 
(see Table 2.1). The economic variables are the natural log of sales, cash flows 
divided by beginning of the year sales, Tobin’s q and firm return. We use the 
coefficients of this regression for the estimation of the predicted total compensation. 
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2.3.4   Sample description  
 
Table 2.2 provides the statistics for our sample of divesting firm years. Panel A shows 
the firm statistics. The sample firms have average sales of close to $10 billion and 
average assets of close to $13 billion. The leverage level is relatively high (65%), 
which may be a result of our selecting only divesting firm years. Our average sample 
firm performs well, with positive cash flows and positive returns prior to the 
divestment year. The average Tobin’s q is 1.785, which is somewhat higher than those 
reported in previous studies (e.g., Schlingemann, Stulz, and Walkling, 2002; Ahn and 
Denis, 2004). The average diversity in q across segments equals 0.118, which is 
slightly higher than that of the divesting firms in Schlingemann, Stulz, and Walkling. 
Next section discusses these differences in more detail. Our sample of divesting firm 
years further shows a positive average excess value of 0.091, indicating that the 
average firm in our sample does not underperform its single-segment counterparts. 
The governance index ranges from three to 16, with an average of 10.441. 
Panel B shows the characteristics of the CEOs in our sample. The average CEO is 
56 years old, and has been employed by the firm for 20.5 years and as CEO for 5.6 
years. Of our sample of CEOs, 87% are hired from inside the firm. Panel B also 
shows that the CEOs in our sample have from one to three titles. CEOs with three 
titles are also president and chairman of the board, which is an indication of the 
formal authority of the CEO (Finkelstein, 1992).  
In terms of remuneration, CEOs receive on average $6.332 million per year, 
which is composed of $2.216 million in salary, bonus, and other annual compensation, 
$528 thousand in restricted stock, and $3.588 million in stock options. The average 
excess compensation is negative, with a value of $751 thousand, which is a result of a 
small number of CEOs, who receive extremely large raises. On average, CEOs own 
2% of the firms’ shares outstanding. One CEO owns more than half of the firm’s 
shares (57%).  
 
 
2.4   Results 
 
As noted earlier, we approach the divestiture decision in multi-segment firms as a 
two-stage process. The first stage is the decision by firms to divest or not. The 
probability that a firm is predicted to divest may have a bearing on which assets it 
chooses to divest. We present the empirically estimated logistic regressions for both 
stages below. We also compare the statistics of divested, retained, familiar, and non-
familiar segments.  
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2.4.1   Which firms divest assets? 
 
Firms’ motives to divest influence their selection of assets to divest. Divestiture 
studies provide three major motives for divesting assets: firms divest to reallocate 
assets to higher-valued users (Jain, 1985; Hite, Owers, and Rogers, 1987), to obtain 
funds when external financing is too expensive and internal financing is insufficient 
(Lang, Poulsen, and Stulz, 1995), and to increase the focus of the firm’s business 
(John and Ofek, 1995).  
 
Table 2.3 
Binary logit regression explaining which firms divest 
This table presents the results of binary logit regressions with a dependent variable that takes the value of one 
for divesting firms and zero for the benchmark firms. Regressions (1) and (3) contain all divesting firm years 
and their benchmark firm years. Regressions (2) and (4) contain only firm years in which segments get fully 
divested and their benchmark firm years. We base our regression on Schlingemann, Stulz, and Walkling 
(2002). We define cash flows as operating profit plus depreciation and amortization. Net capital expenditures 
are the gross capital expenditures minus depreciation and amortization. Leverage is debt divided by total 
assets. We calculate the financial constraint measure following Kaplan and Zingales (1997); the excess value 
measure as in Berger and Ofek (1995); the variation in Q as in Rajan, Servaes, and Zingales (2000); and the 
governance index as in Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003). The subscripts refer to the year relative to the year 
in which firms announce their divestment. P-values appear in parentheses and are based on Huber/White 
standard errors. 
  (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   
Intercept -1.913 *** -1.453  -2.616 *** -2.559 ** 
 (0.000)  (0.129)  (0.000)  (0.041)  
Cash flow t-1/sales t-2 1.287  0.381  1.297  0.482  
 (0.165)  (0.812)  (0.169)  (0.779)  
Capx t-1/sales t-2 1.340  0.433  1.588  1.036  
 (0.298)  (0.901)  (0.224)  (0.777)  
Leverage 2.311 *** 2.088 * 2.435 *** 2.259  
 (0.000)  (0.099)  (0.000)  (0.107)  
Excess value -0.001  -0.103  -0.050  -0.116  
 (0.995)  (0.803)  (0.774)  (0.785)  
Variation in Q 2.171 *** 0.831  2.012 *** 0.693  
 (0.005)  (0.658)  (0.010)  (0.705)  
Financial constraint     -0.022  -0.045  
     (0.265)  (0.407)  
Governance index     0.058 * 0.088  
     (0.072)  (0.322)  
         
Number of observations 676  106  676  106  
McFadden R-squared 3.53%   1.92%   4.00%   3.22%   
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%           
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We estimate binary logit regressions in which the dependent variable takes the 
value of one for divesting firms and zero for our matched sample of non-divesting 
firms. For comparability, we include variables in the regressions similar to those in 
Schlingemann, Stulz, and Walkling (2002). These variables are performance, capital 
expenditures, leverage, excess value, and diversity in q to test for firms’ main reasons 
to divest.11 Table 2.3 reports the results the binary logit regressions.  
Consistent with the financing explanation, the results of Regression (1) suggest 
that firms with a higher leverage ratio are more likely to divest assets. As 
Schlingemann, Stulz, and Walkling (2002), we find that firms with a higher diversity 
in Q are more likely to divest assets, which is in line with the argument that firms 
divest to focus their business. Cash flows, capital expenditures and excess value do 
not significantly influence a firm’s decision to divest assets.  
In comparison with our results, Schlingemann, Stulz, and Walkling (2002) find 
excess value to have a significantly negative impact on the probability to divest at a 
10% significance level. However, these authors examine only firm years with fully 
divested segments, while we examine both fully divested segments and partially 
divested segments. We note that some segments are so large and contain such 
different activities and divisions that a partial divestment of these segments can 
actually be a major resource reallocation decision. Therefore, firms might divest 
substantial assets, in dollar and percentage of firm’s assets, from large segments. By 
also including partially divested segments, we avoid the arbitrary classification of 
segments to drive our results. 
To compare our results with that of Schlingemann, Stulz, and Walkling (2002), in 
Regression (2) we estimate the same regression as Regression (1), but exclusively for 
firm years in which divestitures of full segments take place and their benchmark firm 
years. Leverage has again a significantly positive impact on the likelihood to divest. 
Yet, the firm’s variation in Q loses its significance. The difference between our results 
and theirs may be due to a different sample period12, our use of smaller sales deciles, 
or our additional requirement that matched firms do not divest assets, even though 
these matched firms do not reduce the number of reported segments.   
Regressions (3) and (4) include two additional variables, i.e., financial constraint 
and the governance index. Regression (3) covers the whole sample and Regression (4) 
only considers the divestitures of whole segments. Firms that are financially 
constrained and require funds for investments or to meet debt obligations might have
                                            
11 We set the missing values for excess value and diversity in q to the median value. The reason for this 
replacement is that we will use the predicted value of this regression in the second stage regression, in which 
we examine from which segment firms divest assets. We also replace missing values of the Kaplan Zingales 
index and the governance index in Regression (3) and (4) of Table 3 to median values. 
12 We examine divestitures in the period 1996-2004, while Schlingemann, Stulz, and Walkling (2002) examine 
divestitures during 1979-1994. 
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Table 2.4 
Characteristics of divested and retained segments 
The table presents means, standard deviations, and mean differences for segments of the fiscal year prior to the 
divestiture announcement. The dummy core segments equals one for segments with the same primary two-
digit SIC code as the primary two-digit SIC code of the firm. Cash flows are the segment’s operating profit 
plus depreciation and amortization. We define net capital expenditures as the gross capital expenditures minus 
depreciation and amortization. The segment’s Tobin’s q, the natural log of industry returns, and the industry 
return volatility represent the median industry q of all Compustat firms with the same two-digit SIC code as 
the segment. Tobin’s q is the ratio of the market-to-book value of assets, as calculated in Malmendier and Tate 
(2005, 2007). Segment’s industry liquidity is the liquidity index at the two-digit SIC code level, as calculated 
by Schlingemann, Stulz, and Walkling (2002). We define the industry-adjusted variables as the segment 
variable minus the median of all Compustat firms with the same two-digit SIC code. We define the firm-
adjusted variables as the segment variable minus the firm level variable, except for the cross-subsidization 
variable, which we calculate as in Ahn and Denis (2004). The subscripts refer to the year relative to the year in 
which firms announce their divestment. As in Schlingemann, Stulz, and Walkling, we truncate ratios at -1 and 
+1, and growth variables at -100% and +200%. The sales numbers are in US $ millions. 
  Divested (1)  Retained (2)   Mean difference 
  Mean St.dev. N  Mean St.dev. N  (1) -(2) p-value
Panel A. Segment descriptives           
Divestment dummy 1.000 0.000 443 0.000 0.000 739   
Fully divested segment dummy 0.125 0.331 440 0.000 0.000 739   
           
Ln (sales) t-1 7.078 1.638 443 6.754 1.604 738 0.324 0.001
Sales t-1/ firm sales t-1 0.329 0.238 443 0.260 0.196 738 0.070 0.000
Size<10% dummy 0.149 0.356 443 0.199 0.399 739 -0.050 0.031
Dummy core segment 0.510 0.500 443 0.522 0.500 739 -0.012 0.686
(Sales t-1/ sales t-2) -1 0.084 0.290 440 0.105 0.323 727 -0.021 0.242
(Sales t-2/ sales t-3) -1 0.093 0.286 391 0.101 0.320 638 -0.009 0.645
((Sales/firm sales)t-1/(sales/firm sales)t-2) -1 0.023 0.263 440 0.046 0.318 727 -0.023 0.211
((Sales/firm sales)t-2/(sales/firm sales)t-3) -1 0.031 0.263 391 0.049 0.315 638 -0.018 0.325
Cash flow t-1/sales t-2 0.180 0.202 440 0.200 0.191 727 -0.020 0.096
Cash flow t-2/sales t-3 0.187 0.204 391 0.200 0.173 638 -0.013 0.292
Cash flow t-1/cash flow t-2 0.060 0.493 440 0.116 0.550 726 -0.056 0.071
Cash flow t-2/cash flow t-3 0.108 0.491 386 0.103 0.536 631 0.005 0.886
Capx t-1/sales t-2 0.013 0.130 440 0.015 0.135 727 -0.002 0.837
Capx t-2/sales t-3 0.021 0.133 391 0.021 0.148 638 0.000 0.985
(Capx t-1/capx t-2) -1 0.009 1.014 439 -0.048 0.938 716 0.057 0.333
(Capx t-2/capx t-3) -1 -0.031 0.941 388 -0.054 0.962 626 0.023 0.707
Segment’s Tobin’s q 1.612 0.523 441 1.578 0.528 734 0.034 0.282
Segment’s industry liquidity 0.125 0.103 437 0.115 0.100 731 0.010 0.104
Segment’s industry stock return -0.041 0.252 441 -0.050 0.259 735 0.009 0.566
Segment’s industry return volatility 0.522 0.205 440 0.516 0.197 734 0.006 0.629
           
Panel B. Firm- and industry-adjusted segment descriptives        
Industry-adj. ln (sales) t-1 0.022 0.602 440 0.104 1.860 734 -0.083 0.268
Firm-adj. cash flow t-1/sales t-2 0.001 0.182 440 0.019 0.182 727 -0.018 0.100
Industry-adj. cash flow t-1/sales t-2 0.056 0.203 437 0.088 0.199 722 -0.032 0.008
Firm-adj. capx t-1/sales t-2 0.003 0.134 440 -0.002 0.133 727 0.005 0.577
Industry-adj. capx t-1/sales t-2 0.006 0.130 437 0.012 0.135 722 -0.006 0.460
Cross-subsidization -0.007 0.145 407 -0.008 0.154 643 0.000 0.970
Firm-adj. segment’s Tobin’s q -0.193 0.891 441 -0.232 1.043 734 0.039 0.515
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to rely on assets sales, as it is more expensive and difficult for these firms to acquire 
external funds. We include the Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) governance index 
to control for the level of takeover defenses and anti-shareholder provisions. Firms 
with fewer defense mechanisms are more exposed to the market of corporate control, 
which could have a disciplinary effect on CEOs to divest assets (Boot, 1992). We find 
that after controlling for related variables, such as performance, leverage, and excess 
value, our measure of financial constraint does not significantly contribute to the 
firms’ decisions to divest all or part of a segment. However, firms with more defenses 
against takeovers are more likely to partially sell segments.  
 
 
2.4.2   Descriptive statistics of divested and retained segments 
 
Table 2.4 provides statistics for divested segments and retained segments. Panel A 
describes the segment statistics and Panel B describes the industry- and firm-adjusted 
statistics. The table shows that in 338 firm years, firms divest assets from 443 
segments and fully retain 739 segments. Of all divestitures, 12.5% are fully divested 
segments. In contrast to the results of studies that focus exclusively on fully divested 
segments (e.g., Schlingemann, Stulz, and Walkling, 2002; Dittmar and Shivdasani, 
2003), we show that partially divested segments are larger in terms of absolute size 
(the difference of the natural log of sales is 0.324; p equals 0.001) and relative size 
(the difference between sales ratios is 7%; p is less than 0.001) compared to fully 
retained segments, indicating that they are too important to be ignored. Larger 
segments often consist of a collection of smaller divisions, thus increasing the 
likelihood that a separable portion of a segment gets divested.  
Furthermore, consistent with efficiency and financing explanations, divested 
segments have lower cash flows compared to retained segments. This difference is 
even more significant when we adjust the segment cash flows for industry cash flows.  
 
 
2.4.3   Descriptive statistics of familiar segments and non-familiar 
segments 
 
Our sample consists of divesting multisegment firms for which the number of 
segments differs per firm and firm year. Table 2.5 provides an overview of the 
number of divested segments relative to the number of reported segments per firm 
year. The results indicate that most multi-segment firms divest assets from only one 
segment within a firm year, and that fewer firms divest from more than one segment.
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Table 2.5 
Overview of the number of divestitures 
This table shows the number of segments from which firms divest assets. We split the sample into firm years 
with two, three, four, five, six, and seven reported segments (excluding corporate segments). 
  Firm years with X number of segments     Divestitures in N 
segments within firm year   X=2 X=3 X=4 X=5 X=6 X=7   All firm years
N=1  49 110 50 29 7 4  249
N=2  11 29 18 10 7 0  75
N=3   3 1 5 3 0  12
N=4    0 2 0 0  2
N=5     0 0 0  0
N=6      0 0  0
N=7             0   0
All firm years   60 142 69 46 17 4   338
 
 In our sample, 249 firm years divest assets from one segment, 75 from two segments, 
12 from three segments, and two from four segments. 
 Table 2.6 describes the mean values and mean differences of familiar and non-
familiar segments. We divide our total sample of 1,182 segments among 762 familiar 
segments and 420 non-familiar segments. CEOs have an average of 8.5 years of direct 
working experience (i.e., in the home-base segment) in 354 segments, 8.91 years of 
inside industry experience in 234 segments, and 14.95 years of outside industry 
experience in 174 segments. Although the difference is not significant, the percentage 
of divestitures among non-familiar segments (i.e., 39.5%) is higher than that of 
familiar segments (i.e., 36.4%). If we consider only fully divested segments, the 
percentage difference is statistically significant (i.e., 3.3% compared to 7.1%). We 
also see that the percentage of fully divested segments decreases with the level of 
familiarity. 
Our results indicate that familiar segments are larger compared to non-familiar 
segments. Although CEOs have working experience in familiar segments or in the 
same industry as the familiar segment, we find no significant difference in 
performance between familiar and non-familiar segments in terms of sales growth and 
cash flows. Moreover, familiar segments receive more capital expenditures relative to 
the firm’s budget, which supports the prediction that CEOs allocate a more favorable 
budget to familiar segments. 
Table 2.6 also shows that familiar segments are more often core segments, and 
that they operate in industries with higher q but are less liquid. The segments’ industry 
stock returns and industry volatility do not differ across familiar and non-familiar 
segments. 
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2.4.4   The impact of familiarity on segment selection for divestment 
 
To examine whether CEOs are biased in their selection on which segments to divest 
assets, we estimate binary logit regressions in which the dependent variable takes the 
value of one for divested segments and zero for retained segments. For comparability, 
we follow Schlingemann, Stulz, and Walkling (2002) for the specification of the 
economic factors. These are performance, investment, size, whether it is a core 
segment, whether the segment is less than 10% of total sales, segment q, and segment 
industry’s liquidity. Using these variables, we control for the most important reasons 
to divest, i.e., efficiency, financing, and focus. We also include year dummies and 
dummies for the number of segments as reported by the firm. Table 2.7 presents the 
results. 
The results of Regression (1) largely corroborate the results of Schlingemann, 
Stulz, and Walkling (2002). The table shows that CEOs are more likely to divest 
assets from segments with lower cash flows and segments that operate in more liquid 
industries. The negative coefficient for cash flows supports both the financing and 
efficiency rationales to divest.  
The efficiency explanation implies that firms divest assets when their industry 
peers can manage these assets more efficiently. If firms divest for financing reasons, 
on the other hand, they choose assets from segments with low cash flows and need not 
consider cash flows from industry peers. In contrast to Schlingemann, Stulz, and 
Walkling (2002), our coefficient of industry median cash flows is significant, 
indicating that firms divest assets from segments for efficiency reasons. Further 
results show that capital expenditures influence the likelihood to divest on the industry 
level, but not on the segment level. That is, CEOs are more likely to divest assets from 
segments that operate in industries with higher capital expenditures, possibly to 
economize on cash flows.  
Consistent with our statistics, the probability of asset divestiture is higher for 
larger segments, since we also include partially divested segments. Furthermore, the 
CEO’s choice of divestment is not influenced by the segment’s imputed Tobin’s q, 
whether a segment operates in the firm’s core industry, or whether a segment has sales 
of less than 10% of the firm’s consolidated sales.  
To examine whether CEOs’ familiarity with segments influence their divestiture 
decisions, the second regression includes the aggregate familiarity dummy, which is a 
dummy for CEOs’ direct or industry working experience in a segment. Consistent 
with our first hypothesis, our results show that CEOs exhibit a familiarity effect. After 
controlling for other factors, we find that CEOs are less likely to divest assets from 
familiar segments. The odds ratio is 0.742, indicating that asset divestments to occur 
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Table 2.7 
Binary logit regressions explaining from which type of segments firms divest 
assets 
This table presents the results of binary logit regressions that explain from which type of segments firms 
choose to divest assets. The dependent variable takes the value of one for divested segments and zero for 
retained segments. We base our regression on Schlingemann, Stulz, and Walkling (2002). Proxies for 
familiarity are the CEOs’ industry working experience, which we split into home-base experience (i.e., direct 
working experience), inside industry working experience, and outside industry working experience. The 
control in first-stage variable is the predicted probability from Regression (3.3). All other variables are self-
explanatory or defined more completely in Table 2.4. The subscripts refer to the year relative to the year in 
which firms announce their divestment. As in Schlingemann, Stulz, and Walkling, we truncate ratios at -1 and 
+1 and growth variables at -100% and +200%. All regressions include firm year dummies and dummies for the 
number of segments. P-values appear in parentheses and are based on Huber/White standard errors. 
  (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   
Intercept -1.420  -1.276  -1.836 * -1.867 * 
 (0.141)  (0.191)  (0.077)  (0.072)  
Cash flow t-1/sales t-2 -0.925 ** -0.963 ** -0.954 ** -0.942 ** 
 (0.013)  (0.011)  (0.012)  (0.012)  
Industry median cash flow t-1/sales t-2 1.351 * 1.406 * 1.417 * 1.494 ** 
 (0.072)  (0.062)  (0.060)  (0.049)  
Capx t-1/sales t-2 -1.275  -1.290 * -1.551 ** -1.571 ** 
 (0.102)  (0.091)  (0.048)  (0.047)  
Industry median capx t-1/sales t-2 6.479 ** 6.433 ** 6.732 ** 6.872 ** 
 (0.020)  (0.018)  (0.014)  (0.012)  
Cross-subsidization 0.833  0.918  1.137  1.158  
 (0.278)  (0.222)  (0.141)  (0.135)  
Sales t-1/ firm sales t-2 1.644 *** 1.636 *** 1.637 *** 1.795 ***
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  
Core dummy -0.160  -0.044  -0.028  -0.044  
 (0.287)  (0.789)  (0.865)  (0.795)  
Segment's Tobin's q 0.236  0.260 * 0.247  0.252  
 (0.125)  (0.094)  (0.113)  (0.105)  
Size<10% dummy 0.121  0.112  0.126  0.123  
 (0.562)  (0.594)  (0.548)  (0.560)  
Liquidity 1.327 * 1.199  1.345 * 1.388 * 
 (0.074)  (0.112)  (0.078)  (0.069)  
Aggregated familiarity dummy   -0.299 * -0.282 *   
   (0.060)  (0.077)    
Control for first stage     0.960  1.016  
     (0.148)  (0.129)  
Home base       -0.413 ** 
       (0.026)  
Inside industry experience        -0.164  
       (0.456)  
Outside industry experience        -0.162  
       (0.454)  
         
Number of observations 1049  1049  1049  1049  
McFadden R-squared 5.00%   5.26%   5.41%   5.55%   
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%        
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only 74.2% as often among familiar segments as among non-familiar segments. This 
result applies to the entire sample, i.e., both newly-hired and longer-tenured CEOs. 
Including the aggregate familiarity dummy significantly increases the explanatory 
power of our regression.  
Because the selection of the segment to divest partially or wholly also depends on 
the overall decision whether or not to divest, we add the predicted probability of a 
firm to divest from Regression (3) of Table 2.3 to Regression (3) of Table 2.7. Adding 
the predicted probability does not significantly influence our results on the role of the 
familiarity effect. 
To examine what type of experience makes CEOs more likely to divest from non-
familiar segments, the fourth regression includes the three dummy variables for home 
base, inside-industry experience, and outside-industry experience instead of a single 
dummy for familiarity. The results indicate that the home-base dummy is the only 
significant dummy with the predicted negative impact on the segment selection choice. 
Because the main difference between the home-base proxy and the industry-
experience proxies is CEOs’ gained knowledge from hands-on experience and 
connections with employees of the segment, this result suggests that such knowledge, 
either real or assumed, is the main driver behind the familiarity effect. 
 
 
2.4.5    The bargaining process between CEOs and segment managers  
 
The role of political power within organizations suggests that CEOs have to gain 
tenure before they can exhibit their familiarity effect. Therefore, we split our sample 
of divesting firm years into a sample of CEOs with tenure of up to two firm years, and 
a sample of CEOs with at least three or more years of tenure. We choose the two-year 
cutoff point to be comparable with Xuan (2006), who exclusively examines newly-
hired CEOs with tenure up to two years. Besides, within two or three years of tenure, 
CEOs have gained enough political leeway to take corporate actions that are not in 
line with their original mandate (Hambrick and Fukutomi, 1991).13 Table 2.8 provides 
the results.  
Regression (1) shows the results for newly-hired CEOs and Regression (2) for 
longer-tenured CEOs. We find that newly-hired CEOs do not show a familiarity bias, 
which is consistent with the stronger bargaining position of segment managers that 
plays an important deterrent role in the negotiation process. In line with Xuan’s (2006) 
bridge-building hypothesis, newly-hired CEOs may induce cooperation from the non-
familiar-segment managers and appear to play fair by not divesting more often from 
these segments. The regression also indicates that newly-hired CEOs are more likely 
                                            
13 Changing the threshold to three years does not change our conclusions.  
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Table 2.8 
Binary logit regressions explaining from which type of segments firms divest 
assets, with subsamples split according to CEO tenure 
This table presents the results of binary logit regressions that explain from which type of segments firms 
choose to divest assets. The dependent variable takes the value of one for divested segments and zero for 
retained segments. Regression (1) contains only firm years with CEOs with a tenure up to two years. 
Regression (2) contains only firm years with CEOs with a tenure of at least three years. We base our regression 
on Schlingemann, Stulz, and Walkling (2002). Proxies for familiarity are the CEOs’ industry working 
experience, which we split into home-base experience (i.e., direct working experience), inside industry 
working experience, and outside industry working experience. The control in first stage variable is the 
predicted probability from Regression (3.3). All other variables are self-explanatory or defined more 
completely in Table 2.4. The subscripts refer to the year relative to the year in which firms announce their 
divestment. As in Schlingemann, Stulz, and Walkling, we truncate ratios at -1 and +1 and growth variables at -
100% and +200%. All regressions include firm year dummies and dummies for the number of segments. P-
values appear in parentheses and are based on Huber/White standard errors. 
  (1) (2) 
  Newly hired Longer tenured 
Intercept -1.496  -1.223  
 (0.139)  (0.293)  
Cash flow t-1/sales t-2 -1.279 * -0.847 * 
 (0.070)  (0.089)  
Industry median cash flow t-1/sales t-2 0.625  1.904 ** 
 (0.712)  (0.039)  
Capx t-1/sales t-2 -1.947  -1.904 * 
 (0.110)  (0.092)  
Industry median capx t-1/sales t-2 3.488  7.992 ** 
 (0.571)  (0.016)  
Cross-subsidization 0.225  2.137 * 
 (0.842)  (0.055)  
Sales t-1/ firm sales t-2 2.084 *** 1.768 *** 
 (0.007)  (0.001)  
Core dummy -0.183  0.020  
 (0.548)  (0.927)  
Segment's Tobin's q 0.325  0.112  
 (0.240)  (0.579)  
Size<10% dummy 0.141  0.096  
 (0.722)  (0.714)  
Liquidity 1.785  1.379  
 (0.170)  (0.154)  
Control for first stage 0.639  0.843  
 (0.590) (0.337)  
Home base 0.137  -0.657 *** 
 (0.672)  (0.006)  
Inside industry experience  0.308  -0.347  
 (0.428)  (0.218)  
Outside industry experience  0.005  -0.192  
 (0.990)  (0.461)  
     
Number of observations 360  689  
McFadden R-squared 6.50%   7.11%   
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%     
 
 
Does CEOs' familiarity with business segments affect their divestment decisions? 29
42
 
 
to divest assets from the larger segments and segments with lower cash flows. Other 
economic factors do not play significant roles. 
The significantly negative coefficient of the home-base dummy in Regression (2) 
for longer-tenured CEOs is in line with our second hypothesis. The odds ratio of 0.518 
suggests that home-base segments experience 48.2% fewer divestitures than do non-
familiar segments. The results confirm our prediction of different regimes for newly-
hired versus longer-tenured CEOs. The findings support the role of relative political 
power and its accumulation within the firm. 
 
 
2.4.6   What explains the familiarity effect?  
 
In this section, we examine the three competing explanations for the familiarity effect, 
i.e., entrenchment, superior knowledge, and assumed knowledge.  
One of the implications of Shleifer and Vishny’s (1989) entrenchment theory is 
that entrenched CEOs aim to extract excessive remuneration relative to the firm’s 
performance. If this theory is true, then CEOs who divest assets from non-familiar 
segments so that they can become more powerful and more costly to replace would 
also receive excessive remuneration. In Table 2.9, Regression (1), we form an 
interaction term comprising the home-base dummy and a dummy that indicates 
whether the CEO receives excess remuneration above the sample median, which we 
calculate from the procedure described earlier. 
The results do not support the entrenchment explanation, as CEOs with high 
excess remuneration do not show a stronger familiarity bias (interaction coefficient 
equals 0.272, p equals 0.467). However, our home-base dummy remains significant 
and negative (coefficient equals -0.863, p equals 0.008).14 
In addition to excess remuneration, we also test the entrenchment explanation by 
means of corporate governance measures. We expect good corporate governance to 
induce CEOs to make value-maximizing decisions for their firm, rather than for 
themselves. We control for external governance in the first stage of a firm’s decision 
of whether or not to divest. Internal governance mechanisms could have even greater 
importance in the second stage, which reflects the decisions of which assets to divest. 
CEOs of firms with a more independent board of directors have less power over the 
board; hence, they have less discretion over their decisions (e.g., Ryan and Wiggins 
III, 2004; Moeller, 2005). If CEOs have a familiarity effect due to their desire to 
entrench, they would not be able to exhibit that bias in well-governed firms. 
Regression (2) adds an interaction term consisting of the home base dummy and a 
dummy that takes the value of one for firm years with an above-median percentage of
                                            
14 Using the fourth quartile as threshold for high excess remuneration does not change our results. 
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Table 2.9 
Binary logit regressions explaining from which type of segments firms with 
longer-tenured CEOs divest assets 
This table presents the results of binary logit regressions that explain from which type of segments firms 
choose to divest assets. The dependent variable takes the value of one for divested segments and zero for 
retained segments. All regressions contain only firm years with CEOs with a tenure of at least three years. We 
base our regression on Schlingemann, Stulz, and Walkling (2002). Proxies for familiarity are the CEOs’ 
industry working experience, which we split into home-base experience (i.e., direct working experience), 
inside industry working experience, and outside industry working experience. The high excess compensation 
dummy equals one when the CEO’s excess return is above the median of our sample. The good internal 
governance dummy equals one for firm years where the percentage of inside directors is above the median of 
our sample. The crisis dummy equals one when the firm’s cash flow to sales is lower than the industry cash 
flow to sales for two years in a row. The control in first stage variable is the predicted probability from 
Regression (3.3). All other variables are self-explanatory or defined more completely in Table 2.4. The 
subscripts refer to the year relative to the year in which firms announce their divestment. As in Schlingemann, 
Stulz, and Walkling, we truncate ratios at -1 and +1 and growth variables at -100% and +200%. All regressions 
include firm year dummies and dummies for the number of segments. P-values appear in parentheses and are 
based on Huber/White standard errors.  
  (1)   (2)   (3)   
Intercept -1.300  -1.464  -1.181  
 (0.290)  (0.212)  (0.310)  
Cash flow t-1/sales t-2 -0.673  -0.883 * -0.901 * 
 (0.234)  (0.081)  (0.074)  
Industry median cash flow t-1/sales t-2 1.960 ** 1.981 ** 1.820 * 
 (0.043)  (0.037)  (0.051)  
Capx t-1/sales t-2 -1.484  -2.016 * -1.902 * 
 (0.331)  (0.075)  (0.097)  
Industry median capx t-1/sales t-2 8.303 ** 9.091 *** 8.776 *** 
 (0.024)  (0.008)  (0.009)  
Cross-subsidization 1.088  2.171 * 2.118 * 
 (0.494)  (0.050)  (0.060)  
Sales t-1/ firm sales t-2 1.871 *** 1.923 *** 1.693 *** 
 (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.002)  
Core dummy 0.019  0.042  0.030  
 (0.934)  (0.850)  (0.891)  
Segment's Tobin's q 0.063  0.111  0.082  
 (0.765)  (0.590)  (0.690)  
Size<10% dummy -0.073  0.054  0.101  
 (0.793)  (0.840)  (0.703)  
Liquidity 2.091 ** 1.741 * 1.292  
 (0.048)  (0.088)  (0.180)  
Control for first stage 0.971  0.978  0.796  
 (0.298)  (0.287)  (0.366)  
Home base -0.863 *** -0.737 ** -0.520 ** 
 (0.008)  (0.015)  (0.037)  
Inside industry experience  -0.394  -0.346  -0.336  
 (0.183)  (0.231)  (0.238)  
Outside industry experience  -0.115  -0.130  -0.201  
 (0.672)  (0.625)  (0.441)  
Home base * High excess compensation dummy 0.272      
 (0.467)      
High excess compensation dummy -0.011      
 (0.960)      
Home base * Good internal governance dummy   0.101    
Does CEOs' familiarity with business segments affect their divestment decisions? 31
44
 
 
   (0.784)    
Good internal governance dummy   -0.036    
   (0.867)    
Home base * Crisis dummy     -1.089 * 
     (0.086)  
Crisis dummy      0.254  
     (0.431)  
       
Number of observations 641  666  689  
McFadden R-squared 7.63%   7.38%   7.48%   
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 
1%           
 
independent directors in the board. The interaction term does not show significant 
results (coefficient equals 0.101, p-value equals 0.784) and our home-base dummy 
remains significant (coefficient equals -0.737, p-value equals 0.015).15 
Since our results suggest that entrenchment is not the main explanation for the 
familiarity effect, we now examine which of the two versions of knowledge can 
justify this effect, the rational, i.e., superior knowledge from acquired information and 
through acquaintances; or the non-rational, i.e., assumed knowledge or the illusion of 
control. Ex ante, it is difficult to distinguish between the two, since, everything else 
equal, CEOs tend to give familiar segments higher valuation relative to non-familiar 
segments under either explanation. Although we cannot rule out superior knowledge, 
we can identify a situation in which assumed knowledge is more likely to drive CEOs’ 
familiarity bias, i.e., when CEOs are under pressure to show good performance to the 
board and shareholders. We define such a situation as one in which CEOs of firms 
underperform their industry for two years in a row. One year of underperformance 
could be blamed on bad luck. However, two consecutive years of bad performance are 
more likely to be attributed to CEOs’ poor ability and that they are not likely to 
possess superior information. Such pressure also mitigates agency as a factor to 
explain familiarity bias, as these CEOs do not have the luxury of having slack that is 
associated with agency costs. Thus, it is more likely that only those CEOs who are 
under the illusion of control will rely disproportionately on the support of familiar 
segments in terms of people and performance.  
                                            
15 We note that although an independent board is a better monitor than a more dependent board, how effective 
it is depends on the information that the CEO provides (Song and Thakor, 2006; Adams and Ferreira, 2007). A 
CEO may be especially reluctant to share relevant information on divestment decisions that are motivated by 
the CEO’s desire to entrench, which could explain the nonsignificant result. However, our results do not 
change when we define well-governed firms as those firms in the highest quartile of independent directors. As 
an alternative governance measure, we use CEO ownership in our empirical test. CEOs with a higher stake in 
their firm have more decision-making power (Finkelstein, 1992; Bigley and Wiersema, 2002; Adams, 
Almeida, and Ferreira, 2005). On the other hand, a CEO’s incentives are more aligned with shareholders’ 
incentives when they own a higher percentage of the firm’s shares (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). We find that 
neither above- nor below-median CEO ownership influences CEOs’ familiarity bias (results are available on 
request). 
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We identify 27 firm years, comprising 88 segments, with returns on sales that are 
below the industry median for two consecutive years prior to the divesting years. 
Regression (3) includes an interaction term with a dummy variable for one for these 
firm years and for the home-base dummy variable. We find that the home-base 
dummy remains significantly negative (coefficient equals -0.520, p equals 0.037). In 
line with the illusion of control explanation, interacting with the crisis dummy 
provides a significant, negative coefficient (coefficient equals -1.089, p equals 0.086).  
A drawback of interaction variables in binary logit regressions is that we cannot 
interpret the coefficients as the marginal effect of the interaction term (Ai and Norton, 
2003; Powers, 2005). We calculate the interaction effect via the procedure proposed 
by Ai and Norton (2003). We still find a negative interaction effect, albeit not 
significant (p-value equals 0.358). 
We additionally examine another margin that may discriminate between the two 
alternative knowledge explanations by means of the number of years that the CEOs 
last gained their experience in the home base. Over the years, the CEOs’ superior 
information can fade, while their illusion of control remains. On the other hand, as 
CEOs gain more knowledge of the non-familiar segments over the years, the discount 
for non-familiar segments due to the CEOs’ inability to estimate their risks gradually 
reduces. Consequently, the difference in valuations between familiar and non-familiar 
segments becomes smaller. CEOs may also prefer to be surrounded by familiar people 
or those with whom they have connections. However, we expect this type of affinity 
to be strongest among those CEOs that have the most recent experience with 
personnel in the home-base segment. Therefore, the longer the period since CEOs last 
worked in their home base, information and acquaintances become less of a factor 
than their illusion of control that prevents them from divesting assets from familiar 
segments. 
To investigate the impact of passage of time away from the home base, we re-
estimate Regression (2) of Table 2.8, but here, we split the home-base dummy into 
four quartiles based on the number of years since the longer-tenured CEO left the 
segment: up to five years, six to nine years, ten to 15 years, and over 16 years. We 
find that CEOs show their familiarity bias for the first three quartiles of being away 
from the home-base segments: the coefficient for the first quartile equals -0.623 (p-
value equals 0.085), for the second quartile equals -0.799 (p-value equals 0.023), for 
the third quartile equals -1.294 (p-value equals 0.002). But for the fourth quartile, the 
coefficient equals -0.308 (p-value equals 0.370).  
Although one might argue that CEOs’ political connections is a continuing and 
dynamic process through which they keep contacts and exchange information, the 
relationships are not likely to have a life span long enough to sustain a familiarity 
effect up to 15 years after they leave their home-base. Thus, short of actual knowledge, 
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CEOs who have long departed from the segment may substitute assumed knowledge 
for superior knowledge by committing the illusion of control. 
 
 
2.5   Shareholder returns and the familiarity effect 
 
This section investigates how the stock market perceives the familiarity effect in 
divestitures by means of an event study. We expect that superior knowledge of home-
base segments will yield positive abnormal returns for all divestitures. Divesting 
assets from familiar segments is valuable, as familiar managers have a comparative 
advantage in valuing the segment’s assets and locating potential buyers. Divesting 
from non-familiar segments is also valuable, because managers have less knowledge 
how to best manage and improve the performance of these assets. An additional effect 
may arise in the case of assumed knowledge. Illusion of control can lead to an 
unrealistic belief that CEOs can improve the performance of the home base’s poorly 
performing assets. This unrealistic believe can result in a disposition effect (Shefrin 
and Statman, 1985) where CEOs retain their losing assets in their home bases far too 
long. Such behavior could have a downward pressure on the share price until the CEO 
decides to divest these assets. We expect these home-base divestments to have a 
relatively larger positive impact on the share price. 
 
 
2.5.1   The average market response to divestitures 
 
We estimate the abnormal returns to divestiture announcements by means of the 
market model as described by MacKinlay (1997). Our estimation window runs from 
day -160 to -41 relative to the announcement date. We aggregate the abnormal returns 
over the day prior to the divestiture announcement until the day after the divestiture 
announcement. Table 2.10 provides statistics for the whole sample of divestitures16, 
the subsample of home-base divestitures, and the subsample of non-home-base 
divestitures. Since longer-tenured CEOs mainly exhibit the familiarity effect, we also 
split the sample into longer-tenured and newly-hired CEOs.  
                                            
16 Our sample has in total 592 divestitures. Of these 592 divestitures, we lose 280 observations due to missing 
transaction values and 34 observations due to missing values in the abnormal returns. To avoid that outliers 
drive our results, we also exclude the highest and lowest 2.5 percentile CAR observations. We further have 
seven firms that announce more than one divestiture at the same date from the same segment. We treat these 
announcements as one observation. One firm announces more than one divestiture from two different segments 
at the same date. We treat this announcement as two observations. Deleting this announcement does not 
significantly influence our results.  
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Table 2.10  
CARs to divestiture announcement for home bases and non-home bases 
The table presents the means, standard deviations, and mean differences of the cumulative abnormal returns 
over days -1 to +1 relative to the divestiture announcement. We estimate the abnormal returns by means of the 
market model as described by MacKinlay (1997) with an estimation window running from day -160 to day -41 
relative to the announcement date. The home-base segments are segments in which CEOs have direct working 
experience. Longer-tenured CEOs are CEOs with a tenure of at least three years and newly-hired CEOs are 
CEOs with a tenure up to two years.  
  All   Home base   Non-home base   Mean difference 
      (1)   (2)   (1) - (2) 
Mean 0.55%  0.86%  0.41%  0.44% 
(p-value) (0.010)  (0.039)  (0.093)  (0.337) 
St.dev. 3.38%  3.60%  3.29%   
N 258  78  180   
        
Longer-tenured CEOs         
Mean (a) 0.62%  1.48%  0.33%  1.14% 
(p-value) (0.017)  (0.010)  (0.249)  (0.054) 
St.dev. 3.41%  3.64%  3.29%   
N 174  44  130   
        
Newly-hired CEOs        
Mean (b) 0.39%  0.05%  0.62%  -0.57% 
(p-value) (0.288)  (0.932)  (0.188)  (0.447) 
St.dev. 3.35%  3.45%  3.29%   
N 84  34  50   
        
Mean difference (a) - (b) 0.23%  1.43%  -0.29%   
(p-value) (0.606)  (0.083)  (0.601)   
                
 
The results show a positive average abnormal return of 0.55% for the whole 
sample, which is significantly different from zero. When we split the sample into 
home-base and non-home-base divestitures, we find that the home-base divestitures 
generate 0.86% abnormal returns, while the non-home-base divestitures generate 
0.41% abnormal returns. The difference between the two sub-samples is not 
significant. However, the difference is significant for the sample of divestitures made 
by longer-tenured CEOs, which is the group of CEOs for which we find a familiarity 
effect (i.e., the difference is 1.14%, with p-value equals 0.054). In addition, home-
base divestitures made by longer-tenured CEOs generate higher abnormal returns than 
home-base divestitures made by newly-hired CEOs (i.e., the difference is 1.43%, with 
p-value equals 0.083).  
The higher positive abnormal returns for home-base divestitures support the role 
for superior knowledge, as CEOs are able to pick winners (Stein, 1997) when they 
divest assets from their home base. The findings also suggest that assumed knowledge 
leads CEOs to show a disposition effect by waiting too long before they divest the 
poorly performing assets from their home base. Since we find the highest abnormal 
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returns for the subsample of CEOs that show a familiarity effect, our evidence 
suggests that substantial costs are associated with this effect.  
 
 
2.5.2   The impact of familiarity on the market response to divestitures 
 
In addition to the univariate analysis, we estimate an ordinary least squares regression 
where we regress the three-day abnormal returns on the home-base dummy and 
several control variables. We follow Bates (2005) for the specification of the control
variables, which are: the relative transaction size, Tobin’s q, industry-adjusted capital 
expenditures, industry-adjusted leverage, industry-adjusted cash, and the percentage 
of stock owned by the CEO. With these variables, we control for the efficiency 
explanation as well as for the financing explanation. Table 2.11 provides the results.  
In line with our univariate results, Regression (1) shows a positive and significant 
home-base coefficient. Home-base divestitures generate 0.9% higher abnormal returns 
than non-home-base divestitures. The regression further shows a positive relation 
between the relative transaction size and the market reaction, indicating that a 10% 
increase in relative transaction size brings about 0.89% higher abnormal returns. This 
is in line with results of Bates (2005) for the subsample of divestitures where the firm 
pays out the proceeds in terms of equity. The other control variables do not provide 
any significant result.  
While Regression (1) does not control for the increasing focus explanation in 
which Berger and Ofek (1995) show that this type of divestitures have a positive 
impact on firm performance, we remedy that by adding excess value and a core 
dummy to Regression (2).  We find that, consistent with the focusing explanation, 
divestitures from core segments generate 1.3% lower abnormal returns than 
divestitures from non-core segments. Excess value does not show a significant impact. 
More importantly, adding these two variables does not influence the home-base 
coefficient, which remains 0.9%.  
Since only longer-tenured CEOs exhibit a familiarity effect, we estimate the 
regression for longer-tenured CEOs and newly-hired CEOs separately (see Regression 
(3) and Regression (4), respectively). We find that longer-tenured CEOs who divest 
assets from their home base generate 1.7% higher returns than longer-tenured CEOs 
who divest from their non-home base. The home-base dummy is not significant in the 
newly-hired CEOs sample. Again, our evidence suggests that even though longer-
tenured CEOs are less likely to divest assets from their home base, these home-base 
divestitures generate higher abnormal returns. The higher abnormal returns support 
the superior knowledge explanation. Yet, given the familiarity effect, this result also
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Table 2.11 
OLS regression explaining announcement CARs to divesting firms 
This table presents the results of ordinary least squares regressions of three-day CARs to divestiture 
announcements. Regressions (1) and (2) contain the whole sample of divestitures. Regression (3) contains only 
firm years with CEOs with a tenure of at least three years. Regression (4) contains only firm years with CEOs 
with a tenure up to two years. We estimate the abnormal returns by means of the market model as described by 
MacKinlay (1997) with an estimation window running from day -160 to day -41 relative to the announcement 
date. The home-base segments are segments in which CEOs have direct working experience. The relative 
transaction size is the transaction value divided by the book value of the firm’s total assets. Tobin’s q is the 
ratio of the market-to-book value of assets, as calculated in Malmendier and Tate (2005, 2007). We define the 
industry-adjusted variables as the firm variable minus the median of all Compustat firms with the same two-
digit SIC code. Capital expenditures are gross capital expenditures minus depreciation and amortization. 
Leverage is debt divided by total assets. We calculate the excess value measure as in Berger and Ofek (1995). 
The dummy core segments equals one for divestments from segments with the same primary two-digit SIC 
code as the primary two-digit SIC code of the firm. All regressions include firm year dummies and dummies 
for the number of segments. P-values appear in parentheses and are based on White standard errors. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
      longer tenured newly hired 
Intercept 0.005  0.011 * 0.019 ** -0.009  
 (0.370)  (0.073)  (0.018)  (0.481)  
Home base 0.009 ** 0.009 * 0.017 ** 0.008  
 (0.048)  (0.068)  (0.018)  (0.294)  
Relative transaction size 0.089 *** 0.082 *** 0.061 ** 0.255 *** 
 (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.026)  (0.001)  
Tobin's q -0.004  -0.004  -0.005  -0.003  
 (0.107)  (0.215)  (0.246)  (0.350)  
Industry-adj. capx t-1/sales t-2 0.030  0.026  0.008  0.028  
 (0.262)  (0.455)  (0.847)  (0.844)  
Industry-adj. leverage 0.005  0.004  -0.011  0.007  
 (0.745)  (0.808)  (0.603)  (0.724)  
Industry-adj, cash t-1/sales t-2 0.002  -0.007  -0.008  -0.019  
 (0.886)  (0.742)  (0.758)  (0.547)  
Percentage of stock owned -0.035  -0.028  -0.016  -0.652  
 (0.294)  (0.459)  (0.661)  (0.518)  
Excess value   0.007  0.011  0.000  
   (0.291)  (0.224)  (0.969)  
Dummy core segment   -0.013 ** -0.019 *** 0.002  
   (0.025)  (0.009)  (0.845)  
         
Number of observations 236  213  148  65  
Adjusted R-squared 5.70%   6.70%   7.40%   13.20%   
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%           
 
suggests a cost related to assumed knowledge, in the case CEOs do not divest home-
base assets, while they should be divested.  
 
 
2.6   Additional evidence and robustness tests 
 
Here, we provide additional supporting evidence for the influence of familiarity on the 
divestment decisions and test the sensitivity of our results.  
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2.6.1   Does self-selection explain the familiarity effect? 
 
During the selection process of CEOs, the boards of directors take into account CEOs’ 
prior working experience. One of the reasons to select someone to be a CEO could be 
the specific characteristics of their home-base segment. Thus, selection bias may be 
the underlying explanation for the familiarity effect. That is, if the boards hire CEOs 
with the purpose to expand the home-base segments, we would expect fewer 
divestitures in these segments. Since CEOs are most likely to take actions according 
to their mandate in the first two or three years of their tenure (Hambrick and Fukutomi, 
1991), and yet our results do not show any familiarity effect in this period. Thus, our 
evidence does not support this version of selection bias as an explanation.  
We also investigate other situations in which self-selection could occur. For 
example, the board of directors might be more likely to appoint managers who work 
for larger and more successful segments, which would make the CEOs less likely to 
divest assets from these better-performing segments. Our statistics indicate that 
familiar segments are larger and more often core segments, compared to non-familiar, 
non-core segments. However, these statistics also show no significant difference in 
performance between familiar and non-familiar segments in terms of sales growth and 
cash flows.  
To ascertain that self-selection is not likely to drive our results, we add an 
interaction term of the home-base dummy with the core-segment dummy to 
Regression (8.2). We find the interaction term has no significant influence (interaction 
coefficient equals 0.090, p equals 0.832; home-base coefficient equals -0.708, p 
equals 0.031). Interacting the home-base dummy with the segment performance also 
does not show significant influence (interaction coefficient equals 1.72, p equals 0.216; 
home-base coefficient equals -0.997, p equals 0.007).  
Another potential self-selection bias is that the boards appoint people to the CEO 
positions because they have worked for a home-base segment that operates in a high 
growth industry, but underperforms its industry peers. The CEO’s task would be to 
grow and improve the performance of that segment. We identify the home-base 
segments that operate in above-median-q industries among industries in our sample, 
and at the same time underperform their industry. Our sample of 215 firm years with 
longer-tenured CEOs has only 26 firm years in which high-growth home-base 
segments underperform their industry. Leaving these firm years out of our sample 
does not significantly influence our results. 
On the other hand, boards may reward and hire as CEOs managers who have had 
hands-on experience in home-base segments that operate in high-growth industries 
38 Chapter 2
51
 
 
and outperform the industry. We find that 90 out of the 215 firm years with longer-
tenured CEOs have such home bases. We add an interaction term to Regression (2) of 
Table 2.8 for these 90 firm years along with the home-base dummy and find that the 
home-base coefficient remains significant. The interaction term is not significant, 
suggesting the same familiarity bias exists for both sub samples (home-base 
coefficient equals -0.675, p equals 0.017; interaction coefficient equals -0.065, p 
equals 0.822).  
 
 
2.6.2   Three-digit SIC classification for industry working experience 
 
Our results show that CEOs only exhibit a familiarity bias towards home-base 
segments, but not towards their industry-experience segments. A possible explanation 
for this discrepancy is that the classification of industry working experience, based on 
a two-digit SIC code, is too broad, i.e., various types of experience under the same 
two-digit SIC code may be different and not transferable. Thus, a classification on the 
basis of a three-digit SIC code that captures narrower experience might be more 
appropriate. Therefore, we again re-estimate Regression (2) of Table 2.8 with 
familiarity proxies based on a three-digit SIC code and find similar results. The 
coefficient for home base is -0.643 (p equals 0.005), for three-digit SIC inside 
industry experience is -0.096 (p equals 0.743), and for three-digit SIC outside industry 
experience is -0.453 (p equals 0.177).  
 
 
2.6.3   Different subsamples  
 
In the final set of robustness tests, we re-estimate regressions for four subsamples, i.e., 
firm years with partially divested segments, firm years with fully divested segments, 
firm years with divestments of at least $10 million from a segment, and divesting firm 
years with a negative excess value.  
We first examine firm years with fully divested segments and firm years with 
partially divested segments to examine whether the familiarity bias plays different 
roles in the decision to divest segments fully or partially. We expect familiarity to 
play a role for both types of divestitures. We further expect that full divestitures are 
more likely to occur among small segments and that partial divestitures are more 
likely to occur among larger segments. Since larger segments are more likely to 
consist of a collection of several divisions, it is harder for firms to divest these 
segments completely. Furthermore, segments’ performance is more visible to the 
market than is the performance of a division of segments with the same size. 
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Therefore, we expect that a segment’s poor performance plays a larger role in the 
decision to fully divest segments relative to the decision to partially divest segments.  
Firms that divest to focus on their core business will be more likely to fully divest 
unrelated segments instead of a part of the unrelated segment, although larger 
unrelated segments are more difficult to divest completely. Firms that divest to 
generate funds need not completely divest a segment, but partially divesting a 
segment may be sufficient. According to Meyer, Milgrom, and Roberts (1992), the 
prospect of a divestment with possible layoffs motivates segment managers to 
influence activities in an attempt to protect their job. These activities may be more 
intense against the CEOs that plan to fully divest non-familiar segments.  
In Table 2.12, Regression (1) provides the results of the regression with partially 
divesting firm years and Regression (2) provides the results of the regression with 
fully divesting firm years.  
Our findings confirm that firms are more likely to partially divest larger segments 
and fully divest smaller segments. We also find that segment performance is 
negatively related to the probability of a full divestment; higher industry performance 
increases the likelihood of a partial divestiture. For financing needs, our findings also 
confirm that segments that receive more investment funds are more likely to be 
partially divested, but investments do not influence the likelihood of a full divestment. 
The core dummy does not significantly influence either type of divestments.  
More importantly, we find that both subsamples provide significant negative 
coefficients for a CEO’s home-base experience. For the full divestiture sample, 
inside-industry experience also provides a significantly negative coefficient. Because 
the full divestiture of a segment represents a more drastic and possibly irreversible 
course of action, i.e., to exit the industry and forgo the option to re-enter, CEOs may 
need stronger justifications to convince themselves that the segment under 
consideration is indeed beyond remedies within their firms. The search for extra 
justifications could cause the CEOs to attach greater confidence to reviving segments 
with which they are familiar at the level of inside industry experience. Therefore, the 
significant inside-industry experience coefficient may partly be a result of illusion of 
control.  
As larger divestitures should have a greater impact on firms, we test the 
familiarity effect for firm years with a total value of divestitures within a segment of 
at least $10 million. We exclude firm years in which a divestiture value of a segment 
is unknown and the total value of the other divestitures within that segment is less 
than $10 million. The final sample decreases from 689 to 317 segment observations. 
Agreeing with our previous tests, Regression (3) shows that CEOs are less likely to 
divest assets with a value of at least $10 million from home-base segments. 
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Table 2.12 
Binary logit regressions explaining from which type of segments firms with 
longer-tenured CEO divest assets, using different subsamples 
This table presents the results of binary logit regressions explaining from which segment firms divest. The 
dependent variable is one for divested segments and zero for retained segments. Regression (1) contains the 
sample in which firms divest their segments partially. Regression (2) contains the sample in which firms divest 
a full segment. Regression (3) contains firm years with divestitures in which the total value of divestitures 
within a segment is at least $10 million. If a divestiture value in a segment is unknown and the total value of 
the other divestitures within that segment is less than $10 million, we exclude the firm year. Regression (4) 
contains the sample of firm years with a negative excess value (Berger and Ofek, 1995). We base our 
regressions on Schlingemann, Stulz, and Walkling (2002). Proxies for familiarity are the CEOs’ home-base 
experience, inside industry working experience, and outside industry working experience. The control in first 
stage variable is the predicted probability from Regression (3.3). The other variables defined more completely 
in Table 2.4. The subscripts refer to the year relative to the year in which firms announce their divestment. We 
truncate ratios are truncated at -1 and +1 and growth variables at -100% and +200%. All regressions include 
firm year dummies and dummies for the number of segments. P-values appear in parentheses and are based on 
Huber/White standard errors. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Partial Full >$10m Excess value<0
Intercept -1.675 ** 4.948  0.539  -2.350  
 (0.036)  (0.152)  (0.721)  (0.203)  
Cash flow t-1/sales t-2 -0.603  -6.165  -0.321  0.210  
 (0.276)  (0.118)  (0.712)  (0.827)  
Industry median cash flow t-1/sales t-2 1.898 * -5.031  2.287 * 2.545  
 (0.062)  (0.158)  (0.072)  (0.138)  
Capx t-1/sales t-2 -1.600  -6.308  -2.132 * 5.829  
 (0.171)  (0.592)  (0.087)  (0.251)  
Industry median capx t-1/sales t-2 8.189 ** 5.587  4.753  -1.439  
 (0.024)  (0.759)  (0.268)  (0.831)  
Cross-subsidization 2.227 ** 8.020  1.957 * -5.911  
 (0.047)  (0.548)  (0.094)  (0.320)  
Sales t-1/ firm sales t-2 2.583 *** -5.007 ** 0.974  2.832 *** 
 (0.000)  (0.047)  (0.207)  (0.006)  
Core dummy -0.050  0.449  -0.228  0.049  
 (0.832)  (0.557)  (0.504)  (0.898)  
Segment's Tobin's q 0.016  0.247  -0.214  0.114  
 (0.943)  (0.727)  (0.516)  (0.764)  
Size<10% dummy -0.012  1.345  -0.351  0.374  
 (0.968)  (0.108)  (0.387)  (0.498)  
Liquidity 1.527  -1.588  0.791  1.266  
 (0.143)  (0.620)  (0.565)  (0.477)  
Control for first stage 0.750  2.930  0.513  0.997  
 (0.430)  (0.647)  (0.725)  (0.570)  
Home base -0.488 * -2.321 * -0.793 ** -0.813 * 
 (0.059)  (0.091)  (0.021)  (0.090)  
Inside industry experience  -0.255  -2.302 ** -0.460  0.078  
 (0.406)  (0.022)  (0.286)  (0.879)  
Outside industry experience  -0.163  -1.361  -0.639  -0.076  
 (0.563)  (0.128)  (0.133)  (0.863)  
         
Number of observations 601  103  317  237  
McFadden R-squared 8.60%  32.79%  8.89%  10.18%  
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%           
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Because Schlingemann, Stulz, and Walkling (2002) find that firms with a lower 
excess value are more likely to divest and our average firm trades at a premium, we 
re-estimate the familiarity effect for firm years with a negative excess value. 
Regression (4) shows that, even though their firm is worth less than all segments 
separately, CEOs remain to be less likely to divest from their home bases. 
 
 
2.6.4   Long-term returns 
 
In non-tabulated analyses (and available on request), we examine long-term returns 
adjusted for pure-play firm performance (i.e., synthetic composite of portfolios of 
single segment firms with at least $20 million sales that match the divesting firm 
segment for segment in the narrowest SIC industry available and in the segment sales 
weighted proportion). We split the sample into four different divestment strategies: 
firm years in which divestitures occur only in home-base segments (i.e., 40 
observations); firm years in which divestitures occur only in non-home-base segments 
(i.e., 102 observations); firm years in which divestitures occur in both home-base 
segments and non-home-base segments (i.e., 42 observations); and firm years with 
externally-hired CEOs (i.e., 23 observations).17  
Our results are in accordance with our event study. We find that divestitures 
generally create positive values during and after the divesting year. Although the 
difference in adjusted performance between the four divesting strategies is not always 
significant, our results further suggest that CEOs who only divest from their home 
base create the greatest incremental wealth for shareholders. Thus, the results further 
strengthen our conclusion. 
 
 
2.7   Conclusion 
 
This chapter examines the impact of CEOs’ background characteristics on corporate 
decisions. Managers’ characteristics play a role in their decisions in the areas of 
investment, financial and organizational practices (Bertrand and Schoar, 2003; Ben-
David, Graham, Harvey, 2007). In their survey of behavioral corporate finance 
literature, Baker, Ruback, and Wurgler (2004) conclude that there are very few 
behavioral finance studies that examine the CEOs’ perspective. Rather, most such 
                                            
17 To be comparable with our event study, we restrict our sample to firms that disclose the value of their 
divestitures. The number of observations decreases over the length of the period that we examine. In particular, 
we have 207 observations for the divesting year, where the number of observations decreases to 198, 187, and 
161 observations when we lengthen the period to one, two, and three years after the divesting year, 
respectively. 
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studies focus mainly on investments and financing decisions. Examples of these 
studies are Heaton (2002), Malmendier and Tate (2005, 2007), and Xuan (2006). Our 
tests help to fill this gap by making the connection between CEOs’ working 
experiences with firms’ divestment decisions.  
We analyze the political process in an internal capital market between corporate 
headquarters, as exemplified by the CEO, and their business segments’ managers. In 
particular, we focus on how CEOs’ familiarity with segments influences their negative 
budget allocations to segments in the form of divestments. CEOs are familiar with 
segments through their working experience. Our empirical evidence supports two 
hypotheses. First, CEOs are more likely to divest assets from non-familiar segments 
relative to familiar segments. Second, they exhibit this familiarity effect later in their 
tenure. Longer-tenured CEOs divest about half as often from their home-base 
segments compare to non-familiar segments.  
We investigate whether CEOs’ true superior knowledge of the home-base 
segments and their personnel explains the familiarity effect, or whether CEOs’ 
illusion of control, which implies that they assume to have knowledge, explains this 
effect. We also investigate the entrenchment hypothesis, in which the CEOs divest 
non-familiar assets to make their skill more valuable with the familiar segments that 
remain; and a hypothesis on various self-selection biases in which not divesting from 
their home base is part of the reasons that the board chooses a CEO. Our findings 
support both knowledge based hypotheses: CEOs have superior knowledge in general 
for all divestiture decisions, but exhibit assumed knowledge at the margin for not 
divesting home base segments.   
We further find evidence that the internal capital market is a political process, in 
addition to an economic mechanism, for allocating corporate funds. The relative 
bargaining power of segment managers, in the form of political clout from size, 
segment and organizational knowledge, moderates CEOs’ familiarity bias. Business 
segments under newly appointed CEOs are more successful in preventing assets from 
their segments from having to carry a disproportional share of the firms’ divestment 
decision.   
Our event study suggests that, on average, firms are capable of creating value for 
shareholders by divesting assets. However, the familiarity effect of longer-tenured 
CEOs can be costly to shareholders, because the highest abnormal returns are 
generated by longer-tenured CEOs who are willing to divest from their home-base 
segments. These CEOs achieve 1.7% higher returns compared to those CEOs who 
divest from non-home-base segments.  
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APPENDIX 2A 
Matching procedure 
We construct a matched sample of firms that do/do not divest assets. We derive the 
benchmark firms from our sample of 3,934 non-divesting firm years (i.e., our initial 
sample of 5,251 firm years minus 1,317 divesting firm years). We require that during 
year t-1, the benchmark firm must operate in the same number of business segments 
and be in the same sales decile as the divesting firm. We base the sales deciles on the 
sales of the 5,251 firm years. When we have a choice among possible benchmark 
firms, we choose the firm with a primary SIC code that is closest to the divesting firm 
primary SIC code. 
For 29 firm years that do not match the same number of segments in the same 
sales decile, we take the firm year with the same number of segments. We allow a 
broader match, i.e., with sales decile above or below the divesting firm’s decile. This 
flexibility leaves us 11 firm years in the highest deciles with operations in five to 
seven segments without a match. For these firm years we search for the closest match 
in terms of number of segments, sales decile, and industry. A consequence of our 
flexibility is that the average sales of our benchmark firms is significantly lower than 
that of the divesting firms (i.e., $6,239 million versus $9,849 million), although the 
number of segments is similar for both divesting and non-divesting firms. 
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APPENDIX 2B 
Classification of the three levels of familiarity 
To illustrate the differences between the three levels of familiarity, we consider 
Bausch & Lomb Inc., which discloses four segments: Vision Care (two-digit SIC 28 
and 38), Eyewear (two-digit SIC 38), Pharmaceuticals (two-digit SIC 28), and 
Healthcare (two-digit SIC 2 and 28). The CEO of this firm, William Carpenter, was 
employed as a global business manager in Eyewear. Prior to his employment at 
Bausch & Lomb, he worked for Johnson & Johnson and Reckitt & Coleman.  
According to our measure, Carpenter’s home-base segment is Eyewear. The 
Vision Care segment operates in the same two-digit industry as the Eyewear segment, 
which gives Carpenter inside-industry experience. Johnson & Johnson operates in the 
two-digit industries of all segments, which means that Carpenter is familiar with all 
segments, based on his outside-industry experience.  
This example illustrates that the three familiarity levels can overlap. Because 
familiarity is stronger in segments in which CEOs have more direct working 
experience, we tabulate Eyewear as the home base, Vision Care as the inside industry 
experience segment, and Pharmaceuticals and Healthcare as the outside industry 
experience segments. 
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Chapter 3 
 
“Thinking about going abroad”: 
The choice of advisor in cross-border 
M&A deals18 
 
 
 
3.1   Introduction 
 
The worldwide removal of entry restrictions in many industries and the growing 
significance of services in the economy have dramatically increased the number and 
importance of cross-border mergers and acquisitions (M&As). Between 1980 and 
1985 for example only 13 percent of the total value of the mergers recorded in the 
Securities Data Corporation database consisted of mergers taking place across 
national borders. Between 2000 and 2005 already 29 percent of the total value 
consisted of cross-border mergers. 
While the characteristics, determinants, and valuation of cross-border M&As have 
been widely studied, the selection of an investment bank as a financial advisor in a 
cross-border M&A has been somewhat overlooked. Any M&A is a strategic and 
complex decision, taken only very infrequently. Consequently, firms and their CEOs 
often rely on detailed advice from well-informed investment banks acting as advisors. 
Cross-border M&As are almost by definition more complex and judicious advisor 
selection may therefore be even more crucial. Yet, few studies have investigated this 
choice comprehensively. This chapter aims to fill this gap. 
Two questions about the selection of an advisor by acquirers in cross-border 
M&As need to be addressed: “Who do these acquirers select as advisors?” and “Who 
                                            
18 This chapter is based on De Jong, Ongena, and Van der Poel (2008). We thank Olivier Stulp for excellent 
research assistance and Gerard Mertens for providing helpful comments. 
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should they select?” (Bao and Edmans, 2007). We tackle both questions. For the “do” 
question, we construct an empirical model of the choice by the acquirer between 
hiring one or no advisor, followed by the choice of advisor nationality and experience. 
We estimate the latter choice using the nested multinomial logit methodology and 
assume that acquirers pick advisor nationality and experience as a function of target, 
acquirer, deal, advisor, and nation characteristics. We address the “should” question 
by investigating how stock-market investors assess the difference between the actually 
observed and the estimated choices (which we surmise may be reasonably close to 
optimal choices given the large dataset and comprehensive model we employ). 
We hypothesize that the acquirer’s decision on advisor nationality depends on the 
benefits of the services that advisors from the target nation can provide relative to the 
services that advisors from the acquirer nation can provide. In particular, target-nation 
advisors derive their competitive advantage from their local knowledge on the 
nation’s economic and regulatory conditions, while acquirer-nation advisors have 
more knowledge on these conditions in the acquirer’s nation. Firms might hire 
advisors from a third nation when neither of the benefits prevails. 
We also hypothesize that acquirers take into account the advisors’ global and 
target-country experience when deciding on the advisor’s nationality. Global advisors 
generally have broader and more international expertise that could help them to 
reduce information asymmetries and transaction costs in cross-border M&As. The 
more detailed country-specific knowledge of advisors that belong to the top five in the 
target nation can especially be helpful when the advisor originates in the acquirer or a 
third nation. 
From the Securities Data Corporation (SDC) database we cull all completed 
cross-border deals in the period 1995 – 2005 involving non-financial and listed firms. 
We end up with 3,537 deals involving 92 different target nations. We find that the 
determinants of the decision to engage an advisor in a cross-border deal seemingly do 
not differ from those in a domestic deal. More importantly however, we provide clear 
evidence that acquirers select advisor nationality and experience based on these 
advisors’ benefits in a cross-border setting. Our results suggest that acquirers engage 
advisors from the country (i.e., either acquirer or target nation) with the greatest 
procedural formalism of dispute resolution and the country that is most financially 
sophisticated. Firms further tend to hire target-nation advisors when acquiring firms in 
nations that are less open to foreign acquisitions. Greater investor protection in either 
acquirer or target nation increases the likelihood of firms to hire advisors from their 
own nation. The global and country experience of the advisor is a substitute for the 
cross-border acquisition experience of the acquirer and especially needed when the 
deal is complex. 
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We further show that the acquirer’s advisor selection has value implications. Our 
findings on the acquirer’s abnormal returns suggest that firms optimally choose non-
global, non-top-target-country advisors from either the target nation or their own 
nation, as their advice leads to acquisitions that generate the highest value for the 
acquirer. Surprisingly, the hiring of global advisors, who have the greatest 
international competitive advantage, does not lead to superior returns. 
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. We review the related empirical 
literature in Section 3.2. We review the functions of an advisor in an M&A and the 
role played by reputation, and the selection of targets, advisors and deal valuation in 
cross-border M&A deals. Section 3.3 describes the data, the three-stage decision tree 
and the econometric methodology we employ. Section 3.4 provides the results for 
estimations of the choice between no or one advisor, the decision between a target-, 
acquirer-, or third-nation advisor, and the selection of the global and country 
experience of the advisor. We also analyze the difference in investor assessment 
between predicted and unpredicted advisor choices. Section 3.5 discusses several 
robustness tests. We conclude in Section 3.6. 
 
 
3.2   Empirical literature 
 
This chapter provides the first comprehensive empirical evidence on the determinants 
of the selection of an advisor by acquirers located world-wide in cross-border 
M&As.19 As such, this chapter contributes to both the literature dealing with M&A 
advisor selection and to the literature dealing with cross-border M&A deals and the 
services investment banks provide in this respect. 
 
 
3.2.1   Selection of an advisor in merger and acquisition transactions 
 
A large literature investigates the role advisors play in M&A transactions and the 
value they can create. Servaes and Zenner (1996) identify three functions investment 
banks fulfill as advisors, i.e., reduction in transactions costs, informational 
asymmetries, and contracting costs. A firm can reduce its transaction costs by hiring 
an advisor that identifies potential targets, values them, and creates bids at a lower 
cost. Advisors may also reduce problems of asymmetric information between the 
target and acquirer, which could especially be severe when assets are difficult to value, 
the target is highly diversified, or when the acquirer is the first bidder. Finally, 
                                            
19 While most work focuses on advisor selection by the acquirer, Forte, Iannotta and Navone (2007) focuses on 
advisor selection by the target. They also employ a nested binomial model. 
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advisors can reduce contracting costs as the investment bank could act as a monitor 
since their reputation clearly depends on the quality of their advice. The empirical 
evidence in Servaes and Zenner (1996) suggests that acquirers select advisors for all 
three functions, with a reduction of transaction costs as main function. 
Allen, Jagtiani, Peristiani, and Saunders (2004) highlight the certification role of 
advisors. Banks that function both as lenders and advisors can provide further 
certification, since, as a lender, the bank has private information about its client, 
which the bank can use in providing its advisory services.20 Conflicts of interest can 
arise if a firm believes that material secret information about its business that is to be 
released to an investment bank would be of interest to a competitor or potential 
acquirer (see also Bhattacharya and Chiesa (1995) and Yosha (1995) for example). 
Surprisingly though, hiring advisors or even the reputation of advisors do not 
seem to positively influence acquirer returns (Bowers and Miller, 1990; Servaes and 
Zenner, 1996; Rau, 2000; Ma, 2007). The evidence of Rau (2000) further suggests 
that the performance of the acquirers in the mergers or tender offers does not explain 
the advisors’ market share. The deal completion ratio matters more and first-tier 
investment banks often charge fees that are mainly contingent on completion. These 
results are in line with a conflict of interest between advisors and its acquirer or target 
client that could arise from the fee structure in their contracts as proposed by 
McLaughlin (1990; 1992). McLaughlin (1990) suggests that the advisors’ concern 
about their reputation could partially mitigate this conflict. 
However, Kale, Kini, and Ryan (2003) do find that acquirers can benefit from 
highly reputable advisors. Their results indicate that high reputation advisors not only 
identify more valuable mergers or structure the deal better and thereby achieve higher 
total synergy gains, but that acquirers employing a higher reputation advisor than the 
target also receive a larger share of the total synergy gains from the takeover. 
Furthermore, top-tier advisors engaged by targets seem better capable of matching 
acquirers and targets (Ma, 2007), rather than redistributing value from acquirers. 
Better matching also corresponds to higher target returns, higher combined returns, 
more bidders competing for the target, higher offer premiums, and payment in cash. 
Ultimately, to increase the likelihood of striking value-enhancing deals, firms 
should select advisors based on past performance rather than market share. Bao and 
Edmans (2007) provide evidence that a bank’s resulting market share is negatively 
associated with the component of abnormal returns that is attributable to deal 
characteristics but is independent of its past total abnormal returns, completion ratio 
and speed. They also find that frequent acquirers are less likely to hire advisors from 
banks with a large market share. In this respect, Francis, Hasan, and Sun (2006) find 
                                            
20 Similarly see Drucker and Puri (2005) and Schenone (2005), among others, on lending relationships and 
IPOs. 
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that firms are more likely to retain their financial advisor if their previous experience 
with this financial advisor is positive in terms of the announcement effect. 
 
 
3.2.2   Cross-border M&A deals 
 
Acquirers face a more complex decision when “venturing abroad” rather than “staying 
at home”.21 Identifying and valuing potential targets may be harder and different rules 
and regulations, for example, may further complicate the deal. In line with these 
arguments, previous studies find that country characteristics influence acquisition 
patterns across countries. Rossi and Volpin (2004), for example, show that firms from 
countries with better investor protection through higher accounting standards, better 
shareholder protection, and with common law origins make more acquisitions, more 
hostile deals, and more deals in countries with poorer investor protection. The authors 
argue that the lower private benefits of control in countries with greater investor 
protection make the market for corporate control more effective. 
Similarly, Buch and DeLong (2004) suggest that information costs and regulation 
determine the likelihood of cross-border bank mergers. These mergers are more likely 
to occur between firms of countries that are more nearby, that share the same 
language, and that have the same legal origin. Bank targets are typically located in 
countries with tougher banking authorities and more transparent bank disclosures, 
while acquirers typically come from countries with less tough banking authorities. 
Apart from acquisition patterns, country characteristics can also influence the 
acquirers’ value creation in cross-border deals. For instance, Moeller and 
Schlingemann (2005) find lower US acquirer returns when the target comes from a 
country with a French civil law origin, which is typically associated with poorer 
corporate governance (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1997; 2000), 
or from a country with fewer economic restrictions. They relate these results to the 
hubris hypothesis (Roll, 1986) and agency problems that arise with the increased 
integration of international markets (Dennis, Dennis, and Yost, 2002). Firms also earn 
higher returns when acquiring firms from less developed countries (Doukas and 
Travlos, 1988; Kiymaz, 2004), from countries with greater takeover activity, other 
than the UK (Moeller and Schlingemann, 2005), from countries where accounting 
data is less value relevant (Black, Carnes, Jandik, and Henderson, 2007), and from 
countries with better quality of public institutions (Kiymaz, 2004). 
Different country characteristics also influence target returns. Starks and Wei 
(2004) suggests that shareholders of US target firms demand compensation for being 
                                            
21 See Kissin and Herrera (1990) for a description of 14 additional decisions firms have to make when making 
a cross-border acquisition rather than a domestic one. 
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acquired by firms from countries with worse governance practices. On the contrary, 
Bris and Cabolis (2005) find that with 100 percent acquisitions the target shareholders 
receive a larger premium when their shares are acquired by better-governed firms in 
terms of shareholder protection and accounting standards. As targets adopt the 
governance regime of the country of acquirer if it owns 100 percent of the targets’ 
shares after the acquisition, the target shareholders receive compensation for their 
insiders’ loss of private benefits. 
 
 
3.2.3   Advisors in cross-border M&A deals 
 
The complexity of cross-border acquisitions may require advisors to play an enhanced 
or even different role in the acquisition process. Consequently, firms may base their 
choice of an advisor in a cross-border deal on additional requirements. According to 
Shimizua, Hitt, Vaidyanathc, and Pisanod (2004), the key role financial advisors play 
in the cross-border acquisition has been somewhat overlooked. 
A survey of 142 executives by Angwin (2001) suggests that, in a cross-border 
acquisition, UK and French firms are more likely to hire an advisor for a due diligence 
process and that cultural differences influence their perceptions of how acquisitions 
should be managed. Similarly, Angwin and Savill (1997) suggest that external 
advisors are sought to help in identifying targets and performing a financial and 
systems due diligence. 
Francis, Hasan, and Sun (2007) investigate the actual selection of advisors and the 
value effects of 376 cross-border M&A deals made by US acquirers. The authors 
argue that acquirers engage “US advisors” – i.e., advisors that are active in the US 
market – to certify the quality of the deal, as these advisors are concerned about their 
reputation in their home market, and advisors with target-country experience to reduce 
the deal’s transaction costs. Their results suggest that the likelihood to engage US 
advisors increases with deals that involve cash payments, larger targets, and no 
acquisition experience in the target nation in the previous five years. Besides, 
acquirers experience greater abnormal returns when hiring US advisors in cash-paid 
deals and when hiring advisors with target-country experience in stock-paid deals. 
This chapter differs from that of Francis, Hasan, and Sun (2007) in our focus on 
multiple acquirer and target nations that allows us to study how the characteristics of 
the acquirer and target nation can play a key role in advisor choice. In addition, we 
model the sequential choice for an internal or external advisor and its country 
affiliation and experience. 
Benou, Gleason, and Madura (2007) examine abnormal returns of acquisition 
announcements of foreign high-tech firms that are more difficult to value as the 
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uncertainties around high tech are compounded by the uncertainties of the foreign 
market conditions. The authors argue that greater media exposure can ease 
uncertainties about the firm’s technology, while a top-tier investment bank can reduce 
transaction, asymmetric information, and contracting costs. Their results suggest that 
deals with a top-tier advisor and more past media attention for the target generate 
greater abnormal returns around their announcement. For these results to hold, top-tier 
advisors need to be active in the region of the target, but can be either global market 
or high-tech industry players. 
 
 
3.3   Methodology 
 
We set up our empirical model of acquirer choice of advisor nationality and 
experience. We describe the data and sample, motivate the model with a three-stage 
decision tree, and introduce the nested multinomial logit procedure. We motivate and 
define the explanatory variables employed in the regressions in the next section. 
 
 
3.3.1   Data and sample 
 
From the Securities Data Corporation (SDC) database we collect all completed cross-
border deals that (1) are announced between January 1st, 1995 and December 31st, 
2005, (2) that are larger than $ 10 million, (3) in which at least 50 percent of the 
shares were acquired, and (4) that resulted in a 95 percent or more ownership (by the 
acquirer) after acquisition. 4,752 deals satisfy these criteria. Table 3.1 provides an 
overview of the data selection. 
 
Table 3.1 
Sample Composition 
This table lists the total number of cross-border deals of at least $10 million in which 50 percent of the shares 
are acquired to obtain 95 percent ownership after acquisition. The table further lists the number of acquirers 
that are not listed, the number of deals involving financial firms, the number of deals for which the designation 
of the acquirer is unclear, the number of deals in which the acquirer engages more than one advisor, and the 
resulting number of deals that is being analyzed. 
  Number of Deals   
Total number of cross-border deals (> $ 10 million, 50% acquired shares, 95% ownership 
after acquisition) 4,752  
Acquirer is not listed 347 - 
Acquirer or target is financial firm (i.e., primary SIC 6000-6999) 514 - 
The designation of the acquirer is unclear (relative size of acquisition is larger than or 
equal to one) 75 - 
Acquirer hires more than one advisor 279 - 
Total number of observations in the analysis 3,537   
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In 347 deals the acquirer is not listed, in 514 deals the acquirer or target is a 
financial firm (i.e., the primary SIC is between 6000 and 6999), and in 75 cases the 
designation of the acquirer is unclear (as the relative size of the acquisition versus the 
acquirer is larger than or equal to one). In 279 (i.e., 7 percent) of the remaining 3,806 
deals, acquirers hire more than one advisor. Consequently, we are left with 3,537 
deals in which listed non-financial acquirers choose one or no advisor.22 
Though 638 (i.e., 18 percent) of these deals are between firms from the US and 
the UK, we document 541 different acquirer-/target-nation combinations in total. The 
twenty most important target and acquirer nations are reported in Table 3.2, but 72 
other target nations and 26 other acquirer nations observe at least one acquisition that 
is retained in the sample. 
 
 
3.3.2   Three-step decision tree 
 
In the model, we maintain that advisor nationality is of primary importance in the 
advisor choice by the acquirers and that this choice of advisor nationality may have an 
important influence on advisor experience. As shown in the three-step decision tree in 
Figure 1, firms first decide whether or not to have an advisor (the top “branches”), 
then on the nationality of their advisor (the middle “branches”), and then, conditional 
on that choice, choose the experience they want their advisor to have (the bottom 
“branches”). 
Although our discussion is framed almost entirely in terms of the decisions 
acquirers make in selecting advisors, the observed outcomes may also reflect the 
willingness and ability of advisors to supply these services. For example, a 
multinational corporation that considers entering Lithuania through an acquisition 
may prefer the services of a target-nation advisor with global and country experience, 
but finds that no advisor can provide this combination (of nationality and experience). 
Maybe the size of the target-nation advisor market is too small, the legal structure is 
(still) too undeveloped, or the barriers to cross-border entry are too high such that 
there are no target-nation advisors with global and country experience that are 
available. To the extent possible, we will try to control for such supply factors in our 
empirical model below by including many explanatory variables that reflect the 
institutional environment in the target nation. 
At the nodes of the top branches of the tree in Figure 1, we report the sample 
number and frequencies of choosing no or one advisor, in the middle branches we 
report the sample frequencies of choosing a target-, acquirer-, or third-nation advisor, 
while at the bottom branch nodes, we report the sample frequencies of choosing an
                                            
22 Section 3.5 discusses a robustness test in which we include multiple advisors. 
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Figure 1  
Decision Tree 
The figure clarifies the sequential choices made by the acquirer and the observed number and proportion of 
deals in each category. 
             Global and country experience 
     No advisor        143 41.4%
     2,189 61.9%          
          Target nation     Global but no country experience 
          345 25.6%    49 14.2%
                 
               No global but country experience 
Acquirer               54 15.7%
3,537                   
               
No global and no country 
experience 
              99 28.7%
                
               Global and country experience 
               36 8.2%
                 
     One advisor     Acquirer nation     Global but no country experience 
    1,348 38.1%    437 32.4%    168 38.4%
                
              No global but country experience 
              24 5.5%
                
              
No global and no country 
experience 
             209 47.8%
               
              Global and country experience 
              68 12.0%
                
         Third nation     Global but no country experience 
        566 42.0%    221 39.0%
               
             No global but country experience 
             39 6.9%
               
             
No global and no country 
experience 
            238 42.0%
 
advisor with global- and target-country experience, global but no target-country 
experience, no global but target-country experience, and no global and no target-
country experience, conditional on the choice of advisor nationality. Table 3.3 defines 
the dependent variables. The table also lists the specific data sources we consult to 
construct each variable. 
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An acquirer can hire no or one advisor. The advisor’s nationality is either the 
target-, the acquirer-, or a third-nation affiliation of the parent. 23  There are more 
acquirers choosing either acquirer- or target-nation advisors (i.e., 58 percent), than 
there are acquirers engaging third-nation advisors (i.e., 42 percent). Hence, the 
country expertise of the advisor (either of acquirer or target nation) may matter. On 
the other hand, industry or other (more general) expertise must also play a role as a 
sizeable minority of advisors comes from third nations. Third-nation advisors are 
actually more often chosen than advisors from acquirer (i.e., 32 percent) or target 
nations (i.e., 26 percent) when considered separately. 
The conditional experience frequencies further enrich this picture. An advisor is 
defined to have global experience if the advisor is one of the top ten advisors in the 
world in terms of the total transaction value of all deals in the year prior to the cross-
border announcement reported in SDC. An advisor has country experience if the 
advisor is one of the top five advisors in the target country in terms of the total 
number of deals in the year prior to the cross-border announcement listed in SDC. 
Advisors can have global or no global and country or no country experience. We a 
priori choose for this definitional differentiation between global and country 
experience, because the much smaller number of deals at the country level strengthens 
the potential relevance of the fixed costs incurred in getting to know a country. 
Acquirers’ preferences for advisor experience differ greatly depending on the 
choice of advisor nationality. Only 19 percent (14 percent) of the third- (acquirer-) 
nation advisors have any country experience, while almost 60 percent of the target-
nation advisors have country experience. This could simply reflect an equilibrium 
outcome, i.e., the demand for some target-nation services within third or acquirer 
nations is simply not great enough to induce an advisor to expand its services to the 
target nation to the extent of being a top five service provider. On the other hand, as 
the local demand for the services in the target nation is large, the main target-nation 
advisors may also be among the top five providers in terms of the number of deals and 
hence are defined to have target-country experience. Therefore, as discussed above, 
the observed choices may reflect not only demand but also supply conditions in the 
target, acquirer and third nations. We try to control for these conditions in our logit 
regressions. 
In contrast to country experience, the reach of the advisor experience (global or 
not) plays a secondary role in determining the advisor nation. Of our sample, 56 
percent of target-nation advisors, 47 percent of acquirer-nation advisors, and 51 
percent of third-nation advisors have global experience. Hence, while advisors from 
                                            
23 As the SDC database only lists the nationality of the parents of financial advisors, a subsidiary of Goldman 
Sachs located in the Netherlands, for example, will be classified as a US and not as a Dutch advisor. 
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the acquirer nation are somewhat less global, the differences between the three groups 
of advisor nations seem ultimately relatively small. 
We argue that the raw-data findings from Figure 1 provide solid support for the 
maintained assumptions of our model. The finding that many acquirers choose third-
nation advisors – even when this impedes the selection of an advisor with country 
experience – supports our maintained assumption that advisor nationality is of 
primary importance and is the choice made first in the decision tree. In addition, the 
finding that advisor experience does vary substantially with the choice of target, 
acquirer, and third nation supports the assumption that the choice of advisor 
nationality may have a significant influence on the degree of advisor experience, and 
may therefore be modeled as conditional on advisor nationality. 
 
 
3.3.3   Econometric model 
 
Based on the tree structure of Figure 1, we construct a model of the choice by the 
acquirer of advisor nationality and experience. We further show how that model can 
be estimated using the nested multinomial logit (NMNL) methodology proposed by 
McFadden (1978). We will also model the initial choice by the acquirer between 
having no or one advisor. Choosing to complete the transaction without an advisor 
implies no subsequent choice of advisor nationality and experience. The nested 
multinomial logit of advisor nationality and experience is therefore preceded by a 
(standard) logit model of the need for an advisor. 
In the first stage of the nested multinomial logit, we assume that acquirers pick 
advisor nationality as a function of target, acquirer, deal, advisor, and nation (target, 
acquirer, and bilateral) characteristics that are relevant for the nationality and 
experience choice.24 We hypothesize that acquirers base their nationality decision on 
the relative attractiveness of having a local concierge, which tends to push an acquirer 
towards a target-nation advisor, vis-à-vis the home cookin´ effect, which tends to push 
a firm towards an acquirer-nation advisor (as in Berger, Dai, Ongena, and Smith, 
2003). Acquirers may choose a third-nation advisor when the concierge and home 
cookin´ effects are both relatively weak. As discussed further below, some of the 
explanatory variables are included in part to control for factors that affect the 
willingness and ability of advisors to supply services in the relevant nations. 
Let NiY be a discrete-valued dependent variable that takes on the value of 0, 1, or 2 
depending on whether acquirer i chooses a target-, acquirer-, or third-nation advisor, 
respectively. We assume that the discrete value NiY is the observed outcome from a 
                                            
24 Note that the first stage of the nested multinomial logit model is the second step in the decision tree (see 
Figure 1). 
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continuously-valued, latent variable *NiY that reflects the net benefits flowing to an 
acquirer from selecting a target-, acquirer-, or third-nation advisor. The first stage of 
our model is:  
 
)Z ,Z( EN,
*N
Ni fY =          (1) 
 
where NZ  are variables relevant for the nationality choice and EN ,Z  are variables 
that are relevant for the experience choice, and hence ‘indirectly’ also for the 
nationality choice. Indeed, in the second stage, the acquirer chooses advisor 
experience conditional on these characteristics, EN ,Z , that are relevant for the choice 
of advisor experience. We hypothesize that acquirers base their advisor experience 
decisions on the tradeoff between having access at the corporate level to the broad 
expertise associated with advisors with global experience versus the benefits from 
country-specific knowledge associated with advisors with country experience. 
We assume the existence of a latent variable *N|RiY that reflects the flow of benefits 
to acquirer i from choosing an advisor with or without global/country experience 
(assigned the values of 0, 1, 2, or 3 respectively), conditional on the nationality chosen 
in the first stage, 
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Following McFadden (1978), we assume that *NiY and *N|EiY are linear in their 
regressors and that the regressions errors follow a generalized extreme-value 
distribution. This assumption implies that we can write the joint probability of 
observing an acquirer choosing nationality N and experience E as: 
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and the unconditional probability of choosing N as: 
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We then follow McFadden (1978) and define the “inclusive value” as: 
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The parameters α , Nβ , and ρ  are estimated by working backwards on the Figure 
1 decision tree, applying multinomial logit at each stage. First, the Nβ  are estimated at 
each nationality node (N = target, acquirer and third nation) by regressing the 
conditional bank reach observations N|EiY on experience relevant variables, EN ,Z . Then, 
estimated values of Nβ  are used to construct inclusive values for each nationality node 
using equation (4). These inclusive values summarize the impact of these 
characteristics on the experience decision, conditional on a given choice of nationality. 
In the second step, α  and ρ  are estimated by regressing the advisor nationality 
observations NiY on variables relevant for the nationality choice, NZ , and the inclusive 
values, NI . 
 
 
3.4   Results 
 
Our empirical model relies on a number of target, acquirer, and deal characteristics, 
and also accounts for target-, acquirer-, and bilateral-nation characteristics. Table 3.3 
lists the variable names and definitions. For each step in our empirical model, we 
motivate and define all variables and then discuss the estimation results. We first 
model the choice between no or one advisor, then analyze the decision between a 
target-, acquirer-, or third-nation advisor, finally turn to the selection of the global 
and country experience of the advisor. 
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3.4.1   No advisor or one advisor 
 
3.4.1.1   Variables 
 
Target, acquirer, and prospective deal characteristics determine the acquirer’s choice 
between no or one advisor. Investment banks that advise targets may play an 
important role in contacting potential buyers, screening bids, negotiating specific deal 
terms, and providing a fairness opinion (Hansen, 2001; Boone and Mulherin, 2006). 
On the one hand, the target may hire an investment bank to help in the search for an 
acquirer. In this respect, the acquirer receives cooperation. On the other hand, 
acquirers may face opposition and/or tougher negotiations when the target hires an 
advisor to thwart any deal or to assist it with the negotiation (see also Ma (2007)). 
Consequently, the decision by the acquirer itself to engage an advisor will be 
influenced by the target’s decision to hire an advisor. We include a dummy variable 
d(Target hires advisor) that equals one if the target firm hires an advisor, and equals 
zero otherwise. 
The public listing of the target may also be a determinant of the acquirer’s choice. 
Knowing how to deal with the target’s shareholders and the listing regulations may be 
of first order importance in accomplishing the deal, hence increasing the need for an 
advisor. If listing further implies more dispersed ownership, takeovers may also 
become more complex due to free-riding (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986). We incorporate 
a dummy variable d(Target is listed) that equals one if the target is listed, and equals 
zero otherwise. 
Not only target but also acquirer characteristics may determine the choice for an 
advisor. More acquisition experience may on the margin decrease the need for an 
acquirer to hire an advisor because of learning for example. There may also be a fixed 
cost in setting up a mergers and acquisitions group within the acquirer to provide 
(internal) advice and replace the (external) advisor. More acquisitions may make it 
optimal for the acquirer to bear this cost (Servaes and Zenner, 1996). Greater 
acquisition experience may also indicate overinvestment à la Jensen (1986) or 
managerial hubris à la Roll (1986) (Kale, Kini, and Ryan, 2003). As common in the 
literature we measure ln(1+ Previous acquisition experience) as the natural log of one 
plus the number of deals in the ten years prior to the cross-border deal (in which the 
acquirer and/or acquirer parent obtained at least 50 percent of the assets to own at 
least 95 percent). 
Deal characteristics also matter. Contracting costs may increase more than 
proportionally in size and complexity of the acquisition. From a large group of 
shareholders, it may also be more likely that one or more shareholders sue if the deal 
is not value enhancing. We include a variable ln(Value transaction) that is defined as 
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the natural logarithm of the value of the transaction. Firms are further more likely to 
hire an advisor when their payment includes stock. Including stock requires special 
expertise in designing the payment package and in possibly issuing new shares 
(Servaes and Zenner, 1996). Shareholders in a cross-border acquisition may also be 
reluctant to receive foreign stock (Rossi and Volpin, 2004). A dummy variable 
d(Stock payment) equals one if at least a proportion of the payment consists of stock, 
and equals zero otherwise. 
Information asymmetry between acquirers and targets is a principal hurdle to any 
transaction. It may be larger for unrelated acquisitions (Servaes and Zenner, 1996). 
Although previous studies did not find any statistically significant correspondence 
between the likelihood of hiring an advisor and the acquisition of a related target 
(Servaes and Zenner, 1996; Kale, Kini, and Ryan, 2003; Ma (2007)), we include the 
dummy variable d(Related acquisition) that equals one if the target and acquirer have 
at least one equal 3-digit SIC code, and equals zero otherwise. 
An acquirer is further more likely to hire an advisor when the deal needs 
regulatory approval. Advisors probably have more experience than most acquirers in 
dealing with the regulator and can provide this service at a lower cost than the 
acquirer itself. A dummy variable d(Regulatory approval) equals one if regulatory 
agencies have to approve the deal, and zero otherwise. The regulatory process of 
approval and the set of agencies involved may not only depend on the sector of the 
target and the size of the deal, but also on the target nation. 
The accounting and auditing standards in the target nation may also play a role in 
determining the choice for an advisor. Stricter standards facilitate target valuation for 
the acquirer, reducing transaction costs. On the other hand, stricter standards may 
entail stringent reporting and disclosure rules for acquisition, increasing transaction 
costs. Rossi and Volpin (2004) also use accounting standards as one of their proxies 
for investor protection. Accounting standards improve firms’ disclosure making them 
more transparent and easier to identify as potential takeover candidates. A variable 
Accounting and auditing taken from the Global Competitiveness Report measures the 
strength of financial auditing and reporting standards in the nation regarding company 
financial performance (1=weakest, 7=strongest).25 
 
                                            
25 We derive all the variables from the Global Competitiveness Report 2005, because the versions of earlier 
years up to the beginning of our sample period provide the scores of fewer countries or do not provide these 
scores. For instance, we do not have the accounting and auditing scores for 1997. The 2002 report has this 
information for 68 of our sample countries, while this number increases to 80 countries for the 2005 report. As 
the correlation between the scores of the 68 available countries in 2002 and 2005 equals 0.857, we do not 
expect that the year from which we derive the scores determines our results. The correlation for the variables 
effectiveness of antitrust policy and financial sophistication between the 2002 and 2005 reports equal 0.944 
and 0.934, respectively. To analyze as many acquirer-/target-country combinations, we impute the mean value 
of our sample countries to the remaining missing values. 
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3.4.1.2   Results 
 
Table 3.4 lists the key statistics (mean, median, minimum, maximum, and standard 
deviation) for the target, acquirer, deal, and nation characteristics of the 2,189 deals in 
which the acquirer has no advisor and the 1,348 deals where the acquirer reports one 
advisor. The table also lists the differences in the means and its statistical significance 
on the basis of a standard difference-of-means test.  
In advised deals, targets are (statistically significantly) also more likely to engage 
an advisor and be listed while the deal itself is larger, more often involves stock 
payment, features related acquisitions, and requires regulatory approval than in 
unadvised deals. The accounting and auditing standards of the target nation are also 
higher in the advised acquirer group. 
Table 3.5 reports the estimated coefficients and marginal effects from the logit 
regression of the choice of the number of advisors (i.e., zero or one) on target, deal, 
and target-nation characteristics. Each estimated marginal effect measures the change 
in the probability of observing a given choice given a small change in the regressor, 
holding the other variables constant, evaluated at the sample mean of the explanatory 
variables, i.e., ZZA )/)Pr(( ∂∂ . The number of observations used in this regression is 
3,537. Statistical significance is assessed on the basis of Huber-White standard errors 
(Huber, 1967; White, 1980). 
The acquirer is more likely to get an advisor if the target uses an advisor, if the 
target is listed, if the acquirer has little previous experience, if the value of the 
transaction is large, if the payment includes stocks or if the deal requires regulatory 
approval (though this last coefficient is only marginally significant). 
The economic relevancy of each of the estimated coefficients can be readily 
assessed at the sample mean of the other explanatory variables for the significant 
dummy variables and continuous variables alike. Remember that almost 40 percent of 
the acquirers engages one advisor. The listing of the target increases this likelihood by 
almost 30 percentage points to 70 percent. If the target gets an advisor this likelihood 
increases by almost 15 percentage points to 55 percent. A one standard deviation 
decrease in previous acquisition experience or increase in the value of the transaction 
increases this likelihood by approximately almost 10 and 15 percentage points, 
respectively. We find these effects to be economically relevant and basically 
confirming earlier findings in the literature (e.g., Servaes and Zenner, 1996; Kale, 
Kini, and Ryan, 2003). The determinants of the decision to engage an advisor in a 
cross-border deal seemingly do not differ from those in a domestic deal. 
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Table 3.5 
Regression of No or One Advisor on Target, Deal and Target-Nation 
Characteristics 
This table reports the estimated coefficients and marginal effects from a logit regression. Each estimated 
marginal effect measures the change in the probability of observing a given choice given a small change in the 
regressor, holding the other variables constant, evaluated at the sample mean of the explanatory variables, 
i.e., ZZA )/)Pr(( ∂∂ . The number of observations used in the regressions is 3,537. Table 3.3 provides the 
variable definitions. *, **, *** represent statistical significance, based on Huber-White standard errors, at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
  
Estimated 
coefficents  Marginal effects in % at mean 
Independent Variables       One advisor No advisor 
d(Target hires advisor) 0.537 ***  12.4 *** -12.4 *** 
d(Target is listed) 1.185 ***  28.7 *** -28.7 *** 
ln(1+ Previous acquisition experience) -0.263 ***  -6.1 *** 6.1 *** 
ln(Value transaction) 0.631 ***  14.6 *** -14.6 *** 
d(Stock payment) 0.273 **  6.5 ** -6.5 ** 
d(Related acquisition) 0.095   2.2  -2.2  
d(Regulatory approval) 0.190 *  4.4 * -4.4 * 
Target-Nation accounting and auditing 0.021   0.5  -0.5  
Constant -3.393 ***      
          
Percentage correctly predicted  73.8%             
Log likelihood -1,897       
Pseudo R-squared 19.3%       
        
Percentage correctly predicted (full) 63.1%       
BIC (full)     8,251             
 
 
3.4.2   Target-, acquirer- or third-nation advisor 
 
3.4.2.1   Variables 
 
We now turn to the main contribution of this chapter, which is to analyze the decision 
between a target-, acquirer-, or third-nation advisor and the selection of the global 
and country experience of the advisor in a nested multinomial logit model. 
A number of acquirer-, target-, and acquirer-nation characteristics can be naturally 
linked to the choice of the nationality of the advisor. Take for example the experience 
of the acquirer in the target nation. The more extensive is this experience, the less 
valuable any target-country experience may be the advisor can offer. Hence we 
include a dummy variable d(Acquisition experience in target nation) that equals one if 
the acquirer and/or acquirer parent has acquisition experience in the target nation in 
the ten years period prior to the cross-border acquisition, and equals zero otherwise. 
Openness may be a characteristic unique to the target nation. In a closed target 
nation, the role as a local concierge played by the advisor will be more important, 
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hence the acquirer may select an advisor from the target nation. In an open target 
nation, the acquirer may get by with the home cookin´ services of an advisor from the 
home (acquirer) nation. We define a variable Openness as the percentage of 
acquisitions in the target nation (whereby a firm in the target nation gets acquired) that 
are cross-border acquisitions during the year prior to the year in which the cross-
border deal takes place. 
Next, we include four characteristics of both the target and the acquirer nation. 
The sophistication of the financial markets in the target nation may simplify the 
valuation of the target, reducing the need for a concierge. On the other hand, 
sophisticated financial markets in the target nation may allow only higher quality 
financial advisors to thrive there, enhancing the attractiveness of an advisor from the 
target nation. Similarly, sophisticated financial markets in the acquirer nation make an 
advisor from the home nation more appealing to the acquirer. We obtain a measure for 
the Financial sophistication of the target and acquirer nations from the Global 
Competitiveness Report. 
Investor protection in both the target and acquirer nation also matters. Rossi and 
Volpin (2004) find that firms that make a cross-border acquisition are more likely to 
be incorporated in countries with better investor protection than the target firm. We 
examine only the acquisitions where after the transaction the acquirer owns at least 95 
percent. Under international law, cross-border acquisitions resulting in 100 percent 
ownership by the acquirer switch the nationality of the target firm, and the applicable 
investor protection, to the acquirer nation. Shareholders wanting to sue the firm will 
have to do that in the acquirer nation. Stricter investor protection in the target nation 
makes a concierge from the target nation more useful, while stricter investor 
protection in the acquirer nation may make an advisor from the acquirer nation more 
appealing. We take the measure of Investor protection from doingbusiness.com (as in 
Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2006)). 
Formalism in a country’s legal system may make regulation more specific, but 
also more elaborate, protracted, inconsistent and even unfair in its judicial procedures 
and decisions. In the latter sense, formalism in the target nation makes a concierge 
more valuable. Similarly, more formalism in the acquirer nation makes an advisor 
from the acquirer’s home nation more attractive. We take the measure of country 
formalism from Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2003). They 
construct an aggregate measure of the substantive and procedural intervention in 
lower-court proceedings for evicting a non-paying private residence tenant. A low 
value indicates a lower degree of formalism. Finally, we also include the logarithm of 
GDP per capita of both the target and acquirer nations as controls. 
In addition to the characteristics of the target and the acquirer nation, we also 
include a set of variables that we label bilateral in the sense that they measure 
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differences between characteristics of the target and acquirer nation. ln(Distance) is 
the natural logarithm of the physical distance between the target and acquirer nation. 
A higher distance possibly makes the engagement of a local concierge, i.e., a target 
nation advisor, more of a necessity. Similarly, if the legal origin of the target and 
acquirer nation (à la La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1997)) differs, 
an advisor familiar with − and from − the target nation may be more valuable. A 
dummy variable d(Same legal origin) equals one if the legal origin of the target and 
acquirer nation is the same, and equals zero otherwise. 
The cultural distance between the two nations may play a comparable role. Our 
measure of the Cultural distance between the target and acquirer nation is the Kogut 
and Singh (1988) index that aggregates the differences in the four Hofstede (1991) 
cultural dimensions between the target and acquirer nation. Finally, a dummy variable 
d(Similar language) equals one if any of the languages of the target and acquirer 
nation are similar, and equals zero otherwise. 
 
 
3.4.2.2   Results 
 
Table 3.6 lists the mean and standard deviation for the target, acquirer, deal, and 
nation characteristics of the deals in which the acquirer opts for a target-, acquirer-, or 
third-nation advisor. The number of observations for each of these choices is 345, 437, 
and 566, respectively. The table also lists the differences in the means between the 
three groups and their statistical significance on the basis of standard difference-of-
means tests. 
Somewhat surprisingly, acquirer experience in the target nation is significantly 
higher in the group of deals with target-nation advisors than in the two other deal 
groups. On the other hand, and as expected, the openness of the target nation is lower 
among deals with target-nation advisors, while its financial sophistication and investor 
protection are higher. None of the bilateral nation characteristics differ between the 
decisions to hire target-nation or acquirer-nation advisors. 
Table 3.7 reports the estimated coefficients from a one-stage logit (Model I) and 
the two-stage nested multinomial logit regression (Model II) of the choice of target-, 
acquirer-, or third-nation advisor on target-, acquirer-, and bilateral-nation 
characteristics. The difference between the two models is the inclusive value that is 
present in Model II, but not in Model I. Recall that the inclusive value summarizes the 
impact of the characteristics on the subsequent experience decision, conditional on a 
given choice of nationality. Tying the choice model to a utility maximization model 
would turn the inclusive value into “the expected maximum utility of the alternatives 
in each nationality nest”. 
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Table 3.7 also displays the marginal effects for Model II. Each estimated marginal 
effect measures the change in the probability of observing a given choice given a 
small change in the regressor, holding the other variables constant, evaluated at the 
sample mean of the explanatory variables. The number of observations used in these 
regressions is 1,348. 
 
Table 3.7 
Regression of Target-, Acquirer- or Third-Nation Advisor on Target-, Acquirer- 
and Bilateral-Nation Characteristics 
This table reports the estimated coefficients and marginal effects from (I) a one-step logit and (II) the two-
stage nested multinomial logit (NMNL) regression of the choice of target-, acquirer-, or third-nation advisor on 
target-, acquirer-, and bilateral-nation characteristics. Each estimated marginal effect measures the change in 
the probability of observing a given choice given a small change in the regressor, holding the other variables 
constant, evaluated at the sample mean of the explanatory variables, i.e., ZZC )/)Pr(( ∂∂ . The number of 
observations used in the regressions is 1,348. Table 3.3 provides the variable definitions. *, **, *** represent 
statistical significance, based on Huber-White standard errors, at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
  Estimated coefficents   Marginal effects in % at mean
 I  II II 
Independent Variables Acquirer nation 
Third 
nation  
Acquirer 
nation 
Third 
nation  
Target 
nation 
Acquirer 
nation 
Third 
nation 
d(Acquirer experience in 
target nation) -0.392* -0.444***  1.053*** 0.665**  -2.5*** 6.3 ** -3.8 
                 
Target-Nation Characteristics               
Openness 5.540*** 4.866***  6.457*** 4.203**  -16.6** 35.4 *** -18.8 
Financial sophistication -0.580** -0.753***  -1.363*** -1.292***  4.7*** -1.9 -2.8 
Investor protection  0.100 -0.036  0.179 0.008  -0.1 2.5 ** -2.3** 
Formalism  -0.560*** -0.568***  -0.788*** -0.749***  2.7** -1.1 -1.7 
ln(GDP per capita ) -2.306*** -2.097***  -3.039*** -2.521***  9.4*** -9.2 ** -0.3 
                 
Acquirer-Nation Characteristics                
Financial sophistication 1.502*** 0.146  2.131*** -0.059  -1.2 31.7 *** -30.5***
Investor protection  0.322*** -0.086  0.256** -0.201**  0.4 6.5 *** -6.9***
Formalism  1.037*** -0.305**  2.111*** 0.139  -1.8* 28.7 *** -26.9***
ln(GDP per capita ) 1.731*** -0.863***  2.644*** -0.287  -0.9 42.3 *** -41.4***
                 
Bilateral-Nation Characteristics                
ln(Distance) 0.094 0.113  0.438*** 0.368***  -1.4*** 1.3 0.1 
d(Same legal origin) 0.332 0.046  -0.485 -0.695*  2.4 2.6 -5.0 
Cultural distance  -0.118 -0.070  -0.034 -0.003  0.0 -0.5 0.4 
d(Similar language) -0.359 0.216  -0.183 0.419  -1.1 -8.6 ** 9.7** 
Inclusive value      4.675*** 3.328***  -12.9*** 21.7 *** -8.8***
Constant -5.824 36.339***  -22.252** 31.363***        
                 
Percentage correctly predicted  (I)                    69.9%  67.5%  71.0%  
Percentage correctly predicted (II)          88.4% 79.2% 80.2% 
Percentage correctly 
predicted  69.6%    82.0%          
Log likelihood -1,079    -651          
Pseudo R-squared 25.8%        55.2%                    
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The difference in the percentage of correctly predicted observations in Models I 
and II − the percentage increases from 69.6 percent to 82.0 percent − immediately 
illustrates the importance of taking into account the inclusive value. A log likelihood 
ratio test further rejects the exclusion of the inclusive value (two times the difference 
between the two log likelihoods far surpasses the critical chi-squared value of 3.84). 
But also the sign of the coefficient of the experience of the acquirer in the target 
nation on advisor choices in Model I and II differs. Once we account for the 
subsequent choice of the experience of the advisor, an acquirer with target-nation 
experience is three percentage points less likely to choose a target-nation advisor and 
six percentage points more likely for an advisor from the acquirer nation. This result 
indicates that in a cross-border deal the firm’s target-country experience will direct the 
acquirer in choosing the country affiliation of the advisor and the subsequent choice 
of the advisor’s country experience. 
Target- and acquirer-nation characteristics seem to play an even more important 
role in determining the country affiliation of the advisor. An open target nation makes 
it less likely the acquirer will opt for a target-nation advisor. The effect is also 
economically relevant: a one standard deviation increase in openness decreases the 
probability of a target-nation advisor by around three percentage points and increases 
the probability of an acquirer-nation advisor by around six percentage points. In 
assessing this impact, remember that the choice of advisor nationality was split almost 
three ways between target, acquirer, and third nation (26, 32, and 42 percent, 
respectively). 
Financial sophistication, formalism, and GDP per capita of the target nation favor 
the choice for a target-nation advisor. A one standard deviation in either one variable 
increases the likelihood by four, two, and five percentage points. Surprisingly, 
investor protection in the target nation does not affect the choice for a target-nation 
advisor, but increases the acquirer-nation choice by four percentage points.26 
The characteristics of the acquirer nation, on the other hand, affect the likelihood 
of both the choices for an acquirer-nation or third-nation bank, but in an opposite 
direction. A one standard deviation in financial sophistication of the acquirer nation 
increases the likelihood of an acquirer-nation advisor by almost twenty five 
percentage points, investor protection by almost eleven percentage points, formalism 
by around twenty percentage points, and GDP per capita by twenty percentage points. 
Bilateral nation characteristics hardly matter with the exception of language. A 
different language in the target nation decreases the choice for an acquirer-nation 
                                            
26 A robustness test using 1,251 observations with only acquisitions of 100 percent of the target’s assets gives 
similar results (i.e., marginal effects for the target nation equal -0.6 with p-value 0.302; for the acquirer nation 
2.9 with p-value 0.021; for a third nation -2.3 with p-value 0.071). 
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advisor by almost nine percentage points, but increases the choice for a third-nation 
advisor by ten percentage points. 
To conclude, target-nation characteristics influence the preference for a target-
nation advisor somewhat. But especially the acquirer-nation characteristics determine 
the choice for either an acquirer- or a third-nation advisor. Overall, we provide clear 
support for the home cookin´ and concierge services that advisors from the acquirer 
and target nation, respectively, can offer. 
 
 
3.4.3   Global and country experience 
 
 
3.4.3.1   Variables 
 
Next, we investigate the selection of the global and country experience of the advisor 
in the second stage of the nested multinomial logit model (remember that the 
estimation procedure actually starts with this third step of the decision tree). Advisors 
can have global and country, global but no country, no global but country, and no 
global and no country experience. We estimate a logit model for each of the advisor 
nationality choices made by the acquirer, i.e., the target-, acquirer-, and third-nation 
advisor groups. 
We explain advisor experience in each group by six independent variables. A 
more diversified target makes it more difficult for the acquirers to value the target, as 
the acquirers are less likely to have detailed knowledge on every industry in which the 
diversified target operates. The greater information asymmetry induces acquirers to 
rely more on advisors (Servaes and Zenner, 1996), particularly on those advisors that 
are global as they may cover more industries. We define ln(1+ Number of SIC codes 
of target) to be the natural logarithm of one plus the number of SIC codes of the 
industries in which the target operates. 
We also include acquirer characteristics. Large acquirers for example are more 
likely to face a larger, more sophisticated and international shareholder base. These 
shareholders may be more likely to sue if the deal is not value enhancing. We define 
the ln(Market value of acquirer assets) as the natural logarithm of the market value of 
the acquirer (i.e., the book value of total assets plus the market value of equity minus 
the book value of equity). 
The cross-border acquisitions experience of the acquirer may determine how 
much the acquirer prizes global and/or country experience. We calculate % Cross-
border acquisition experience as the percentage of cross-border deals in the ten years 
prior to the cross-border deal (in which the acquirer and/or acquirer parent obtained at 
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least 50 percent of the assets to own at least 95 percent). It equals zero if there were 
no cross-border deals or no deals. 
Deal characteristics may also matter for the advisor experience choice. Though 
global top-tier advisors may prefer not to advise on hostile (and complex) deals 
(Servaes and Zenner, 1996), their skills may be especially prized when the deal is 
complex and hobbled by agency problems (Rau and Rodgers, 2002). Evidence 
suggests complex deals are often advised by global advisors (Servaes and Zenner, 
1996), though deal complexity and the hiring of a top-tier bank seems less strongly 
related. We introduce a dummy variable d(Complex deal) that equals one if the 
reaction of the target to the acquirer’s bid upon the initial disclosure of the offer price 
is hostile or unsolicited, or if there are more than one bidder, and equals zero 
otherwise. 
Finally, we include the antitrust policy effectiveness of both the target and 
acquirer nations in promoting competition. Higher effectiveness in either nation may 
make global and country experience more important. 
 
 
3.4.3.2   Results 
 
Table 3.8 reports the marginal effects from the second stage in the nested multinomial 
logit model. The global and country experience level of target-, acquirer-, or third-
nation advisors, respectively, is regressed on target, acquirer, deal, target-, and 
acquirer-nation characteristics. The number of observations used in the regressions 
equals 345, 437, and 566, respectively. 
Large acquirers and acquirers that take over diversified targets engage target-
nation advisors with global and major country experience. The same type of firms 
tends to engage acquirer-nation advisors with global experience, but without major 
country experience. Acquirers with more cross-border acquisition experience and with 
an acquirer- or third-nation advisor seemingly care less about the experience of this 
advisor. They are more likely to select an advisor without global or country 
experience and less likely to select an advisor with global experience. Acquirers with 
experience but with a target-nation advisor, on the other hand, are somewhat less 
likely to pick an advisor without global experience (but with country experience). 
Hence, the experience of the acquirer only substitutes for the experience of the 
advisors from acquirer or third nations. 
Deal complexity leads to a comparable implicit substitutability. Acquirers in 
complex deals that opted for an acquirer- or third-nation advisor will avoid advisors 
without experience and want these advisors to have global experience (with or without 
country experience). In this case, advisor experience seemingly can help the acquirer
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Table 3.8 
Regression of Global- and Country-Experience Level of Target-, Acquirer- or 
Third-Nation Advisors on Target, Acquirer, Deal, Target-, and Acquirer-Nation 
Characteristics 
This table reports the marginal effects from the two-stage nested multinomial logit (NMNL) regression of the 
global- and country-experience level of target-, acquirer-, or third-nation advisors on target, acquirer, deal, 
target-, and acquirer-nation characteristics. Each estimated marginal effect measures the change in the 
probability of observing a given choice given a small change in the regressor, holding the other variables 
constant, evaluated at the sample mean of the explanatory variables, i.e., ZZE )/)Pr(( ∂∂ . The number of 
observations used in the regressions equals 345, 437, and 566, respectively. Table 3.3 provides the variable 
definitions. *, **, *** represent statistical significance, based on Huber-White standard errors, at the 10%, 5%, 
and 1% levels, respectively. 
  Marginal effects in % at mean 
 Advisor Experience 
 Global and Global but No global but No global and 
  country no country country no country 
Target- Nation Advisor                 
ln(1 + Number of SIC codes of target) 10.3 -2.6 -2.5 -5.2 
ln(Market value of acquirer assets) 10.1*** 1.5 -1.1** -10.5*** 
% Cross-border acquisition experience 7.1 0.0 -7.4** 0.4 
d(Complex deal) -19.5 -7.1 -13.7*** 40.4** 
Target-nation antitrust policy effectiveness -17.6 22.4** -23.7** 18.9 
Acquirer-nation antitrust policy effectiveness -4.7 -6.5* 1.8 9.4 
Percentage correctly predicted (per group) 80.4% 0.0% 40.7% 60.6% 
Percentage correctly predicted  57.1%       
Log likelihood -386       
Pseudo R-squared 13.3%       
Acquirer-Nation Advisor                 
ln(1 + Number of SIC codes of target) -0.1 23.0** -9.0*** -13.8** 
ln(Market value of acquirer assets) 2.4*** 11.1*** -0.1 -13.5*** 
% Cross-border acquisition experience -9.7*** -9.7 -2.5 21.9** 
d(Complex deal) 1.0 20.4 12.3 -33.7** 
Target-nation antitrust policy effectiveness -4.1*** 7.1 0.7 -3.7 
Acquirer-nation antitrust policy effectiveness 13.6*** 24.2 -8.3*** -29.5* 
Percentage correctly predicted (per group) 16.7% 62.5% 4.2% 81.3% 
Percentage correctly predicted  64.5%       
Log likelihood -396       
Pseudo R-squared 16.5%       
Third-Nation Advisor                 
ln(1 + Number of SIC codes of target) -5.7* 12.9** -4.1 -3.1 
ln(Market value of acquirer assets) 3.0*** 7.6*** -1.5** -9.2*** 
% Cross-border acquisition experience 4.8 -20.9*** -1.4 17.5*** 
d(Complex deal) 27.9** -7.0 6.2 -27.2*** 
Target-nation antitrust policy effectiveness -1.9 5.5* -0.8 -2.7 
Acquirer-nation antitrust policy effectiveness -0.9 -1.0 1.2 0.7 
Percentage correctly predicted (per group) 10.3% 57.9% 0.0% 69.7% 
Percentage correctly predicted  53.4%       
Log likelihood -607       
Pseudo R-squared 8.4%       
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in dealing with the complexity of the deal. Acquirers in complex deals with target-
nation advisors, on the other hand, seem fine with advisors without experience. 
Antitrust policy effectiveness in the target nation makes lack of country 
experience for target-nation advisors more likely, possibly because such a policy may 
keep the market structure in the target nation relatively easy to assess. Antitrust policy 
effectiveness in the acquirer nation, on the other hand, makes global experience for 
acquirer-nation advisors preferable. Policy effectiveness at home may push firms to 
look for deals involving rents abroad, necessitating global experience in their 
acquirer-nation advisors. Antitrust policy effectiveness in either target or acquirer 
nations does not seem to play a role when third-nation advisors were selected. 
 
 
3.4.4   Acquirers’ stock price reactions 
 
Finally, we turn to studying the acquirers’ stock price reactions in a three-day window 
− i.e., minus one to plus one day − when deals are announced. We use the market 
model to calculate the Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs). To make sure that 
outliers do not influence our results, we exclude the extreme one-percentile CAR 
observations from our sample (the one-percentile threshold equals -18.2 percent and 
the 99-percentile threshold equals 23.1 percent). Table 3.9 reports the percentage 
CARs of cross-border deal announcements for the total sample and for the groups 
where our model predicts or does not predict country affiliation or experience of the 
advisors. 
On average, acquirers that do not hire an advisor generate 0.88 percent abnormal 
returns, while those that do hire a financial advisor generate 1.01 percent abnormal 
returns. The results on advisor origin and experience suggest that deals where 
acquirers engage advisors from their home nation and deals where acquirers engage 
non-global, non-top-target-country advisors generate the highest abnormal returns (i.e., 
1.24 percent and 1.88 percent, respectively). The lower abnormal returns for the 
global advisors are consistent with the results of McLaughlin (1992) and Rau (2000). 
When we distinguish between firms’ choices that our model correctly predicts and 
does not correctly predict, we find striking results. Firms that engage advisors and are 
expected to do so generate 1.07 percentage points lower abnormal returns than firms 
that engage advisors but are not expected to do so (i.e., p-value equals 0.001). The 
complexity of the acquisitions or redundant costly fees for advisors may explain this 
difference. However, we do not see a significant difference between firms with 
“expected” and “unexpected” in-house advisors. Though statistically not significant, 
abnormal returns are 1.53 percentage points higher when “unexpectedly” an acquirer 
engages an advisor from the target nation (i.e., p-value equals 0.124). An advisor 
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Table 3.9 
Cumulative Abnormal Returns Around Cross-Border Deal Announcements and 
the Predicted and Not Predicted Country and Experience of the Advisors 
This table reports the percentage three-day Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) of cross-border deal 
announcements and the predicted and not predicted country affiliation and experience of the advisors. Table 
3.3 provides the variable definitions. *, **, *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
levels, respectively. 
    Predicted Not predicted Difference 
Classification   
Total 
sample (1) (2) (1)-(2) 
No advisor Mean 0.88 0.88 0.87 0.00  
 St.dev. (5.02) (4.95) (5.45)   
 N 2,149 1,853 296   
Advisor Mean 1.01 0.52 1.59 -1.07 *** 
 St.dev. (5.83) (5.94) (5.65)   
 N 1,317 713 604   
Advisor from target country Mean 0.92 0.74 2.26 -1.53   
 St.dev. (5.88) (5.81) (6.29)   
 N 340 300 40   
Advisor from acquirer country Mean 1.24 1.34 0.87 0.48  
 St.dev. (6.67) (6.99) (5.37)   
 N 418 329 89   
Advisor from third country Mean 0.90 1.05 0.27 0.78  
 St.dev. (5.08) (5.07) (5.06)   
 N 559 450 109   
Global & country Mean 0.63 0.04 1.26 -1.22 * 
 St.dev. (5.35) (5.18) (5.49)   
 N 246 127 119   
Global & no country Mean 0.24 -0.11 0.66 -0.77  
 St.dev. (5.78) (5.09) (6.48)   
 N 429 231 198   
No global & country Mean 0.73 0.10 0.89 -0.79  
 St.dev. (4.99) (4.44) (5.13)   
 N 116 23 93   
No global & no country Mean 1.88 2.38 0.62 1.77 *** 
 St.dev. (6.15) (6.66) (4.39)   
  N 526 377 149     
 
unpredicted from the acquirer nation, on the other hand, decreases abnormal returns 
by 0.48 percentage points (p-value equals 0.552). Getting unexpectedly an advisor 
without any experience results in a three-day CAR that is 1.77 percentage points 
lower (p-value equals 0.003), while unpredicted advisor experience − i.e., global and 
country, global but no country, no global but country − results in abnormal returns 
that are respectively 1.22, 0.77, and 0.79 higher (p-value equals 0.074, 0.170, and 
0.500, respectively). 
In Table 3.10, we report the estimated coefficients from an ordinary least squares 
regression of the percentage three-day CARs of cross-border deal announcements on 
the advisor origin and experience groups. We include a Target-, Acquirer-, and Third-
Nation advisor dummy in Model I, which we split up according to the four experience 
categories in Model II.  
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Table 3.10 
Regression of three-day Cumulative Abnormal Returns Of Cross-Border Deal 
Announcements on Target, Acquirer, Advisor, and Deal Characteristics 
This table reports the estimated coefficients from an ordinary least squares regression of the percentage three-
day Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) of cross-border deal announcements on target, acquirer, deal, and 
advisor characteristics. Table 3.3 provides the variable definitions. *, **, *** represent statistical significance 
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
  Estimated coefficients 
Independent Variables I II 
Tobin's q 0.003  0.004  
Free cash flow to assets 0.401  0.602  
d(Target is listed) -2.161 *** -1.972 *** 
d(Related acquisition) -0.007  0.044  
d(Tender offer) 0.789  0.739  
d(Complex deal) 0.461  0.533  
d(Stock payment) -0.351  -0.384  
Relative transaction size 4.049 *** 3.911 *** 
Target-nation advisor 0.385    
Global and country experience   -0.106  
Global but no country experience   -0.711  
No global but country experience   0.054  
No global and no country experience   1.621 *** 
Acquirer-nation advisor 0.320    
Global and country experience   0.701  
Global but no country experience   -0.966 * 
No global but country experience   -0.476  
No global and no country experience   1.428 *** 
Third-nation advisor 0.117    
Global and country experience   -0.159  
Global but no country experience   -0.083  
No global but country experience   0.202  
No global and no country experience   0.310  
Year and industry dummies Yes Yes  
Constant 0.734  0.714  
          
N 3,466   3,466   
Adjusted R-squared 1.4%   2.0%   
 
As control variables, we use similar target, acquirer, and deal characteristics as 
Moeller and Schlingemann (2005). Acquirer characteristics include Tobin's q and 
Free cash flow to assets. We use d(Target is listed) as a target characteristic. Deal 
characteristics are d(Related acquisition), d(Tender offer), d(Complex deal), d(Stock 
payment), and Relative transaction size.  We also add Year and Industry (one digit 
SIC) dummies. 
The results indicate that, in line with previous studies, acquirers experience higher 
abnormal returns when they announce an acquisition of non-listed and relatively 
larger firms (e.g., Servaes and Zenner, 1996; Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz, 2005; 
Moeller and Schlingemann, 2005). The variables of interest are the advisor’s origin 
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and experience. The dummies on advisor origin show positive, but non-significant, 
coefficients. A decomposition of these variables into advisor’s experience provides 
more insight. We find that acquirers that engage either target-nation advisors or 
acquirer-nation advisors that do not belong to the top ten of the global advisors or to 
the top five of the target-nation advisors generate 1.62 percent and 1.43 percent, 
respectively, higher abnormal returns than acquirers that do not engage an advisor. 
Moreover, acquirers with advisors from their own nation that have global experience 
generate 0.97 percent lower abnormal returns. None of the third-nation advisor 
dummies provide significant differences. 
These results suggest that advisor selection can influence deal value. Acquirers 
select non-global, non-top-target-nation advisors from either the target or their own 
nation when these advisors qualify for the acquirer’s needs best. The greater abnormal 
returns indicate that these advisors provide concierge benefits when originated in the 
target nation, while they provide home cookin´ benefits when originated in the 
acquirer nation. Remarkably, the competitive advantage of global advisors having 
broad international experience does not seem to add value or even negatively 
influences the acquirer’s value. In addition, being one of the top five target-nation 
advisors does not seem to guarantee the highest concierge benefits.  
Perhaps the higher fees or the fee structure of more reputable advisors (e.g., 
McLaughlin, 1992; Rau, 2000) is a result of the non-significant impact of the 
concierge and home cookin´ benefits.27 On the other hand, agency issues might induce 
firms to hire more reputable advisors that are more likely to complete acquisitions 
(Rau, 2000). Acquirers may also select global or top-target-nation advisors when they 
have less cross-border acquisition experience. However, in non-tabulated analyses, the 
results remain significant for the sample of firms that has acquisition experience in the 
target nation over the previous ten years (results are available on request). 
 
 
3.5   Robustness 
 
In this section, we examine the robustness of our results on the firm’s decision to 
select advisors from the target, acquirer, or third nation to changes in the employed 
model and sample. First, we compare the performance of our two-stage nested 
multinomial logit model with a one-stage multinational model. We subsequently 
discuss the robustness of our results to the inclusion of observations where firms hire 
multiple advisors, the impact on our results of the observations from the US and UK, 
and the stability of the results in different subperiods. 
                                            
27 Unfortunately, we do not have enough fee data to directly test for this possible interpretation, as SDC 
provides information on total fees for just 36 observations and on termination fees for 155 observations. 
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3.5.1   One-stage multinomial logit 
 
So far we have argued that, once firms decide to select an advisor, the advisor’s 
country of origin is of primary importance for their subsequent advisor selection. We 
also maintained that advisor origin has a major impact on a firm’s choice of advisor 
experience priors, which motivate our choice of a two-stage nested multinomial model. 
However, it may well be the case that firms take these two decisions simultaneously. 
Therefore, we estimate a multinomial logit model and regress the 12 choices (i.e., 
three origin choices and four experience choices) on the same independent variables 
as that of the first and second stage of the two-stage nested multinomial logit, which is 
the more restricted model. We compare both models by means of Schwartz’s 
Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC), which is a model selection criterion that 
accounts for the fit of the model, the number of observations and the number of free 
parameters (Schwartz, 1978). The BIC-value for the multinomial logit equals 4,489, 
while that of the two-stage nested multinomial logit equals 4,348. The lower BIC-
value of the nested model justifies the use of this model. 
 
 
3.5.2   The impact of multiple advisors 
 
Our basic analysis does not include deals in which firms hire multiple advisors, since 
we cannot classify these deals into a single branch of the decision tree. For instance, if 
a German company that acquires a Spanish firm decides to hire a German and a 
Spanish advisor, we have to classify the German advisor as an acquirer-nation advisor 
and the Spanish advisor as a target-nation advisor. So, the deal would be classified in 
two advisor-origin groups. 
Deals where firms engage multiple advisors are typically more complex and may 
therefore require a selection procedure that is different from that of hiring a single 
advisor. We check whether these deals significantly influence our results by running 
the two-stage nested multinomial logit regression for the deals where firms hire one 
advisor plus the deals where firms hire multiple advisors. To circumvent the 
classification issue of the multiple-advisor deals, we include each deal as often as the 
number of advisors hired, resulting in 622 additional advisor-deal observations.28 In 
this way the regression has a total of 1,970 observations (i.e., 1,348 plus 622). 
                                            
28 That is, 230 deals with two advisors, 37 deals with three advisors, nine deals with four advisors, and three 
deals with five advisors. 
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Though our results are almost unaltered (hence not reported but available upon 
request), two changes are nevertheless noteworthy. We find that, with the inclusion of 
the multiple-advisor deals, the target nation’s openness no longer influences the 
likelihood of selecting an advisor from the acquirer nation (i.e., the marginal effect 
equals 12.8, the p-value equals 0.233), yet it remains important for the selection of a 
target-nation advisor (i.e., the marginal effect equals -15.9, the p-value equals 0.011). 
Also, the target nation’s investor protection looses its significance for the marginal 
effects on the selection of acquirer-nation advisors (i.e., the marginal effect equals 1.2, 
the p-value equals 0.223). Except for these two changes, our results remain robust to 
the inclusion of multiple advisors. 
 
 
3.5.3   US and UK 
 
Because the US and the UK are relatively well represented in our sample both as 
acquirer and target nation (see Table 3.2), we assess whether our results are sensitive 
to the inclusion of these large countries in two different ways. 
First, although US and UK targets and acquirers make deals that involve many 
other countries, an overrepresentation of these two countries reduces the variability of 
country-level characteristics to explain the advisor’s nationality. We mitigate this 
problem by taking the differences between the characteristics of the target and 
acquirer nations instead of these characteristics at the country level. We change the 
four characteristics of both the target and acquirer nation (i.e., financial sophistication, 
investor protection, formalism, and gross domestic product) into “bilateral variables” 
by subtracting the target-nation value from the acquirer-nation value. 
When using these new bilateral variables, the results yield similar conclusions as 
our original country-level results however. We find that firms hire advisors from the 
country with the highest financial sophistication and gross domestic product. Higher 
investor protection in the acquirer nation relative to the target nation increases the 
probability that firms hire advisors from their own nation rather than from a third 
nation. Firms are more likely to engage advisors from their own nation when this 
nation knows greater formalism than the target nation, otherwise they hire either 
target- or third-nation advisors. 
Second, we test whether our results are driven by the overrepresentation of either 
the US or the UK by adding additional country dummies to the first stage of the 
nested multinomial logit regression. In particular, we re-estimate our nested model 
four times adding a dummy for the US acquirers, US targets, UK acquirers, or UK 
targets, respectively. This procedure allows us to identify the precise impact of each 
group on the estimated coefficients. 
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The results indicate that acquirers from the US are more likely to hire advisors 
from their own nation relative to a third nation. Firms that acquire US targets are more 
likely to hire advisors from the US-target nation relative to a third nation. We further 
find that UK acquirers and firms that acquire UK targets are more likely to hire 
advisors from a third nation. Since we classify the advisor’s origin according to the 
nation in which the advisor’s parent is incorporated, the supply of advisory services 
from subsidiaries of top-tier banks from the US may explain the results of the UK 
dummies. 
In terms of nation characteristics, the addition of either four country dummies 
does not influence the impact of a target- or acquirer-nation’s financial sophistication 
on the selection of the advisor’s nationality. We further find that the acquirer-nation’s 
investor protection loses its significance when adding a US-acquirer dummy, yet the 
addition of a UK-acquirer dummy does not influence its significance. The target-
nation investor protection is robust to adding either one of the four country dummies. 
In sum, these results indicate that investor protection plays an important role in 
advisor selection even among countries other than the US or UK, though US acquirers 
seem to respond most to the high US (acquirer-nation) protection. 
The addition of a US- or UK-target dummy further leads to a loss in significance 
of the marginal effects of the target-nation and acquirer-nation formalism on the 
probability to engage target-nation advisors. However, the coefficients still suggest 
that greater acquirer nation’s formalism increases the likelihood to hire an acquirer-
nation advisor relative to a target-nation advisor. The formalism coefficients and 
marginal effects are robust for the addition of a US- or UK-acquirer dummy. As for 
the impact of a country’s wealth, only the addition of a US- or UK-acquirer dummy 
influences the significance of the impact of the acquirer country’s gross domestic 
product on the selection of acquirer-nation advisors. The openness of the target nation 
remains significant in explaining the selection of acquirer-nation advisors relative to 
target-nation advisors. 
To conclude, we find that the many US and UK deals not unexpectedly influence 
our results somewhat. However, this influence is not detrimental to our main findings. 
In addition, our findings on the differences between countries, where US and UK 
country-level characteristics should play a less significant role, strengthen our main 
conclusions. 
 
 
3.5.4   Subperiods 
 
We also test whether our results are robust for the period in which the cross-border 
deals take place. Different economic conditions during the sample period may have an 
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impact on the availability of advisors, and hence influence a firm’s selection of 
advisor. We estimate the two-stage multinomial logit for the period 1997 to 2000 and 
2001 to 2005 separately. Both periods comprise about half of the sample (i.e., 51 
percent for the first and 49 percent for the second period). The first period shows a 
yearly increase in the number of deals in which firms hire an advisor, while the 
economic downturn caused a decrease in this number in the second period. Some 
coefficients loose their significance, which is not surprising because the number of 
observations per regression is cut in half. However, we find that the signs of the 
coefficients do not change. So, the period in which the cross-border deals take place 
does not seem to affect our conclusions. 
 
 
3.6   Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, we examine 3,537 cross-border acquisitions in the period 1995 to 2005 
to get a better understanding of how acquirers select their financial advisors with 
cross-border acquisitions and the value implications of their decisions. The additional 
complexity of dealing with foreign, economic and regulatory, practices and conditions 
in cross-border deals makes the selection of advisors crucial. Experienced advisors 
could reduce cross-country related information asymmetries and transaction costs, and 
hence, enhance the value creation of international deals. 
We investigate three steps in the acquirer’s decision process. In the first step, 
where firms decide whether to hire an advisor, we find that acquirers’ decisions are 
similar to previous studies on domestic acquisitions. In the second step, acquirers 
decide on the advisor’s origin, i.e., whether the advisor should be originated in the 
target, acquirer, or a third nation. Acquirers prefer target-nation advisors when the 
target nation is less open to foreign acquirers, knows greater procedural formalism, is 
more financially sophisticated, and more wealthy, while their preference shifts to 
home-nation advisors with greater formalism, investor protection, financial 
sophistication, and wealth in the acquirer nation. When deciding on the advisor’s 
origin, acquirers also take into account the advisor’s global and target-country 
experience, which is the third-step decision. 
As advisor selection is especially crucial in an international setting, the firm’s 
advisor choice can have consequences for the value creation of the deal. We only 
focus on the acquirer abnormal returns and find that acquirers who engage target- or 
acquirer-nation advisors that do not belong to the global or target-country top players 
generate the highest abnormal returns. Remarkably, the hiring of global advisors, who 
have the greatest international competitive advantage, does not lead to higher value 
creation. 
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Overall, our empirical evidence suggests that acquirers balance the advisor origin 
based on the target- and acquirer-nation economic conditions, potential risks, and the 
supply of advisor quality. They show a preference for acquirer-nation advisors when 
their benefits outweigh the benefits provided by target-nation advisors and vice versa. 
Acquirers can exploit these benefits even by hiring less reputable advisors. 
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Chapter 4 
 
The effect of cross listing on management 
forecast specificity and accuracy in the 
Netherlands29 
 
 
 
4.1   Introduction 
 
Over the past decades international investments have grown enormously. Firms can 
raise money outside their home countries and investors can buy securities from 
companies around the globe (Karolyi, 1998; Stulz, 1999). Despite this strong 
globalization trend, national economies exhibit major and persistent differences in 
their economic, legal, and political characteristics. Firms can benefit from differences 
in international capital markets by obtaining a cross listing. 
According to conventional wisdom, firms cross list to attain a lower cost of capital, 
because their shares become more accessible to the global investment community 
(Karolyi, 1998). More recent analyses on cross listings relate a firm’s motivation to 
pursue overseas listings to agency conflicts, transparency and disclosure concerns, and 
other governance problems (e.g., Stulz, 1999; Karolyi, 2006).  
In this chapter, we build on this new literature and examine the impact of cross 
listings in the US or UK on management earnings forecasts disclosed by Dutch firms. 
We build on the premise that firms bond themselves in terms of legal liability 
exposure and reputation by cross listing in countries with better governance regimes 
(Coffee Jr., 1999; 2002), which is the case for Dutch firms that cross list in the US or 
                                            
29 This chapter is based on De Jong, Mertens, and Van der Poel (2008). We thank Martin Coenen, Peter 
Easton, Ann Gaeremynck, Bart van Praag, Jeroen Suijs, Pauline Weetman, and participants of the 5th Research 
Seminar in Accounting Meeting in Rotterdam and the 2006 European Accounting Association Meeting in 
Dublin for helpful comments. The assistance of Hendrik de Boer is gratefully acknowledged. 
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UK (see La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1998; 2000). In particular, 
Dutch firms with such a cross listing are subject to more disclosure requirements and 
increased legal liability exposure. Also ‘reputational intermediaries’, like auditors and 
securities analysts, provide additional scrutiny and monitoring.  
Lang, Lins, and Miller (2003) and Lang, Ready, and Yetman (2003) relate 
bonding to increases in the amount and the quality of information surrounding the 
cross-listed firm, yet there is not much direct evidence on a firm’s transparency and 
disclosure issues in the context of cross listings (Stulz, 1999; Leuz, 2003; Karolyi, 
2006). We aim to provide additional insight in the influence of bonding on a firm’s 
transparency and disclosure quality by examining the impact of US and UK cross 
listings on a manager’s forecast specificity choice (i.e, point, range, open-ended, or 
qualitative forecasts) and the ex post realisation of the forecasts.30  
As in the Netherlands, firms in the US or UK are not required to disclose earnings 
forecasts. So, even though Dutch cross-listed firms face additional scrutiny and legal 
exposure, they disclose their forecasts on a voluntary basis. Managers disclose 
forecasts voluntarily in an attempt to influence investors’ expectations. According to 
the full disclosure theory, it is optimal for managers to release all value-relevant 
information, i.e., both good and bad news, otherwise  investors will value shares at the 
lower bound of expectations (Milgrom, 1981). Refinements of the full disclosure 
theory take into account the cost of disclosure (Verrecchia, 1983; Newman and 
Sansing, 1993), contracts between managers and shareholders (Dye, 1985), litigation 
risk (Skinner, 1994), and the quality of the information (Penno, 1997).  
Empirical studies predominantly examine management forecasts by US firms.31 
Only a few studies focus on management forecasts by UK firms, as these firms rarely 
disclose forward-looking information (Frost, 2004). If these UK firms release earnings 
forecasts, they mainly release forecasts in new share issue prospectuses and during 
takeover bids (Steele, 1982; Brennan, 2000). Since firms are likely to make different 
choices in their voluntary disclosures when they face additional scrutiny and legal 
exposure, it is informative to test the disclosure theory in the Netherlands and make a 
comparison with the US and UK setting, holding other factors constant. 
We provide three hypotheses to test the implications of legal and reputational 
bonding on the firm’s management earnings forecast decisions. We argue that a 
consequence of the enhanced disclosure and legal regimes abroad is that firms will 
adapt their disclosure strategies to reduce the likelihood of litigation and to avoid 
damaging their reputation. Our first hypothesis is that cross-listed firms will become 
                                            
30 Throughout the chapter, we use the terms specificity and precision in relation to the management forecast 
interchangeably. For the term ex post realisation of forecasts, we also use forecast accuracy or the forecast 
error. 
31 E.g., Skinner (1994), Baginski and Hassell (1997),  Bamber and Cheon (1998), Hutton, Miller, and Skinner 
(2003), Rogers and Stocken (2005), and Cao, Wasley, and Wu (2006). 
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reticent in providing specific forecasts to avoid making forecast errors. In the second 
and third hypotheses, we compare the forecasted earnings with the firm’s realised 
earnings. We hypothesize that forecasted earnings of cross-listed firms are more 
accurate than forecasted earnings of firms without a cross listing. Our third hypothesis 
predicts that cross-listed firms disclose more conservative forecasts than firms without 
a cross listing. A reason for more conservative forecasts is that a drop in share price 
around an earnings announcement brings about a greater litigation threat (Skinner, 
1994; Kasznik and Lev, 1995). In addition, firms might suffer a more severe 
reputation damage when their share price declines. 
To examine the influence of cross listings on management forecast decisions, we 
study 1,896 press releases in which 168 firms disclose 2,781 earnings forecasts in the 
period 1997 until 2001. Of the 168 firms, 21.4% have a cross listing in the US and/or 
the UK. To investigate whether legal bonding is more important than reputational 
bonding, we analyse exchange cross listings (i.e., US ADR level 2 or 3 listings and 
UK listings on LSE or AIM) and OTC cross listings (i.e., US and UK over-the-
counter market) separately. According to Coffee (2002), OTC cross listings have a 
more limited legal bonding role as firms with such a cross listing do not face 
additional regulatory exposure. We also distinguish between cross listings in the US 
and the UK. 
In line with our first hypothesis, we find that firms with a cross listing in the US 
or UK disclose less precise forecasts. This result does not only apply to exchange 
listings, but also to OTC listings, suggesting that apart from legal bonding, 
reputational bonding is an important driver for firms to disclose less precise forecasts. 
In line with our second and third hypothesis, we find that cross-listed firms make 
smaller forecast errors and are more conservative, i.e., less optimistic, than non-cross-
listed firms. Apparently, cross-listed firms reduce their forecast specificity in 
particular when they are uncertain about their prospects. 
When we relate these outcomes to a firm’s transparency and disclosure quality, 
the additional legal exposure and reputational scrutiny have two effects on a firm’s 
voluntary disclosure. First, the quality of the disclosed information of cross-listed 
firms is greater than that of non-cross-listed firms, since their forecasts are more 
accurate. Second, managers’ concerns about disclosing incorrect and overly optimistic 
forecasts lead them – in the case of uncertainty about future earnings – to disclose less 
precise and more conservative information. The latter result also has a positive effect 
on disclosure quality, because the chosen specificity is a better indication of the 
uncertainty about the earnings in cross-listed firms. Still, 24% of the forecasts by 
cross-listed firms are point forecasts, against 29% of the other firms. These 
interpretations imply that management forecasts by cross-listed firms are more 
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informative, and thus that legal and reputational bonding have a positive influence on 
management forecasts in international capital markets. 
 The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews the 
studies on cross listings and management forecasts. Section 3 first discusses the 
institutional background relevant to Dutch firms and then provides our three 
hypotheses. Section 4 discusses the dataset, defines the variables, and describes the 
models. Section 5 discusses the results. We conclude in Section 6. 
 
 
4.2   Literature review and hypotheses 
 
In this section we present our perspective on the literature on cross listings and the 
effects of cross listings on management earnings forecast specificity and forecast 
accuracy.  
 
 
4.2.1   Cross listings 
 
Globalization in capital markets has accelerated rapidly over the past decades. One of 
the most pronounced consequences is that firms are no longer exclusively listed on the 
stock exchange in the country of incorporation, but often obtain one or more cross 
listings in other countries. Previous studies document positive value effects for firms 
with cross listings. For example, Miller (1999) and Foerster and Karolyi (1999) find 
that the announcement of a cross listing in the US yields an average abnormal 
announcement return of 1%. Foerster and Karolyi (2000) find that firms from counties 
with low accounting standards that cross list on a major US stock exchange 
outperform their local market over three years after the cross listing. Conventional 
motivations for the cross-listing premium are market segmentation and liquidity. In 
segmented markets, a cross listing makes the shares available to a larger investor base, 
which allows risk sharing and reduces capital costs (e.g., Foerster and Karolyi, 1999; 
Miller, 1999, Foerster and Karolyi, 2000). Liquidity benefits arise from lower trading 
costs (Domowitz, Glen, and Madhavan, 1998).  
Stulz (1999) challenges these conventional motivations by emphasizing the idea 
that informational problems and principal-agent considerations can be important 
drivers of the value effects of cross listings. Karolyi (2006) provides an extensive 
analysis of the groundwork by Stulz. In this chapter, we focus on the more recent 
motivations for cross listings. 
Coffee Jr. (1999, 2002) introduces the legal bonding motivation, which entails 
that cross listings by non-US firms on US exchanges increase disclosure and 
96 Chapter 4
109
 
 
monitoring because of legal-liability exposure. The greater investor protection at US 
exchanges reduces agency costs for minority shareholders caused by managers or 
large shareholders. Among others Doidge (2004) and Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz 
(2004) provide empirical evidence of legal bonding. Specifically, in the field of a 
firm’s information environment, Lang, Ready, and Yetman (2003) and Huijgen and 
Lubberink (2005) find that firms with a cross listing in the US are more conservative 
in reporting earnings. Lang, Lins, and Miller (2003) find that non-US firms with a 
NYSE listing have greater analyst coverage and increased analyst forecast accuracy. 
Note that recent research finds that cross-listed firms’ compliance with US laws 
can be low and that investors and regulators abstain from taking enforcement actions 
(Siegel, 2005). Lang, Ready, and Wilson (2006) find that accounting data of cross-
listed firms are of lower quality than US firms’ accounting data when these firms’ 
main listing is in a country with weak investor protection, despite the fact that all US 
cross-listed firms are required to follow similar standards as US firms. These findings 
cast some doubts on legal bonding and have led to the definition of an alternative 
mechanism, i.e., reputational bonding (Siegel, 2005). Following Diamond’s (1991) 
formal model, firms can show that they deserve a reputational asset in the financial 
market among parties like investors, security analysts, and the business press, through 
good insider behaviour over time.  Another recent study by De Jong, DeJong, Mertens, 
and Roosenboom (2007) on Royal Ahold also casts doubt on the influence of legal 
bonding. In an attempt to explain the failure of the company caused by a major 
accounting fraud, the authors document that the cross listing did not influence 
managers, analysts, or investors.32  
 
 
4.2.2   Managers’ choice for forecast specificity level 
 
Managers decide on their forecast specificity level before they disclose the forecast. 
They can choose between point, range, open-ended (i.e., minimum or maximum), and 
qualitative forecasts. The legal and reputational bonding effects from a cross listing of 
Dutch firms in the US and the UK may affect forecast specificity. More exposure to 
potential legal-liability costs can bring about incentives to disclose less precise 
forecasts (Skinner, 1994; Bamber and Cheon, 1998). Less precise forecasts decreases 
the likelihood of making forecast errors. Empirical evidence shows that firms in a 
more litigious environment disclose forecasts less often, less precise and with smaller 
forecast horizons compared to firms in a less litigious environment (Baginski, Hassell, 
and Kimbrough, 2002; Frost, 2004). In addition, firms can bond themselves with 
                                            
32 Royal Ahold is a Dutch company whose shares were listed at the New York Stock Exchange from 1993 to 
2007.  See also footnote 47. 
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‘reputational intermediaries’, who provide additional scrutiny and monitoring. As a 
result, managers might exercise less discretion in their forecast decisions. Our first 
hypothesis is: Firms with a cross listing in the US or UK disclose less precise 
forecasts (H1). 
 
 
4.2.3   Forecast accuracy 
 
Forecast accuracy concerns the ex post reliability of management forecasts. Previous 
US studies show that, on average, actual earnings fall short of earnings forecasts.33 
Brennan (2000) finds that actual results are correct or exceed management forecasts 
disclosed by UK takeover bidders. For UK firms, Steele (1982) reports that non-
quantified forecasts reduce uncertainty about future earnings. Specifically, the author 
finds that the least biased forecasts are predictions of an earnings decrease.  
Skinner (1994) and Kasznik and Lev (1995) show that firms that experience a 
drop in share price around an earnings announcement face a greater litigation threat. 
Investors could argue that the firm’s disclosure was misleading, either because they 
were not warned for an earnings surprise or because they disclosed inaccurate 
forecasts. We expect that firms with a cross listing in the US or UK that release 
inaccurate forecasts not only experience a stronger litigation threat, but also higher 
reputation costs, which would provide these firms’ managers incentives to avoid 
misleading investors. Firms mitigate the probability of misleading investors by 
making less and smaller forecast errors. Accordingly, empirical evidence shows that 
managers in the US release less optimistic forecasts when they face a higher litigation 
threat (Rogers and Stocken, 2005). Similarly, we expect that Dutch firms with a cross 
listing in the US or UK make more conservative earnings forecasts than firms without 
such a cross listing, leading to smaller forecast errors. By more conservative forecasts, 
we mean less optimistic forecasts. This reasoning yields two hypotheses. First, we 
hypothesise that: The forecast error is smaller for firms cross listed in the US or UK 
(H2). Second, we predict that: The forecast errors are more conservative for firms 
cross listed in the US or UK (H3).  
 
 
                                            
33 See Pownall, Wasley, and Waymire (1993), Bamber and Cheon (1998), Irani (2001), and Rogers and 
Stocken (2005). However, McNichols (1989) only finds optimism in one year in the period 1979-1983 and 
Cao, Wasley, and Wu. (2006) only find optimism in ambiguous cash flow forecasts.  
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4.3   Management earnings forecasts and cross listings in 
the Netherlands 
 
Because we analyse management forecasts disclosed by Dutch firms, we provide a 
description of the legal environment in the Netherlands in Section 3.1. We describe 
additional requirements for Dutch firms cross listed in the US or UK in Section 3.2. 
Finally, we pay attention to a specific Dutch feature, i.e., the scale of Mock, in Section 
3.3. 
 
 
4.3.1   Management earnings forecasts and Dutch legislation 
 
According to Dutch law, firms are not required to disclose earnings forecasts. Section 
391, subsection 2, book II of the Civil Code states that firms should give a statement 
in their annual reports concerning their business outlook. 34  Unless there are 
compelling reasons for not doing so, firms should pay particular attention to 
investments, financing and personnel, and the circumstances that affect future 
turnover and profitability. In addition, the Dutch Accounting Standards Board (Raad 
voor de Jaarverslaggeving) issues guidelines for financial reporting, which are not 
compulsory. Guideline 4.01.108 requires firms to provide statements regarding 
information on investments, financing, personnel, and the circumstances that affect 
future turnover and profitability.35 Finally, Dutch firms that are listed on Euronext 
Amsterdam have to comply with the listing requirements, which include the 
recommendation that firms announce their expected turnover or results. Euronext also 
requires listed firms to immediately announce ‘every fact or circumstance which is 
assumed to have significant influence on the share price’ (article 28h Listing 
Requirements) publicly through a press release.36  
In the case of malpractice, Euronext gives a warning or a serious warning to the 
firm. Moreover, investors can start a civil lawsuit against firms and charge them on 
the basis of committing a wrongful act. In the case of serious misrepresentation, 
investors with at least €250,000 of the firm’s nominal capital or 10% of the firm’s 
shares can also appeal at the Enterprise Chamber (Ondernemingskamer), which is a 
special court and part of the Amsterdam court of law (Klaassen and Schreuder, 1980). 
A Dutch foundation for minority shareholders (Vereniging van Effectenbezitters) 
often expresses concerns about non-compliance with article 28h (e.g., De Financiële 
                                            
34 Dutch listed companies have to comply with International Financial Reporting Standards since 2005. 
35 Dutch Accounting Standards Board (2005). 
36 As of October 1, 2005, this is referred to as article 47 of the Market abuse Act (Besluit Marktmisbruik) of the 
Autoriteit Financiële Markten, i.e. the Dutch Financial Markets Authority who is responsible for regulating 
behaviour on the financial markets in the Netherlands (Wet Toezicht Effectenverkeer, 2005). 
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Telegraaf of 11 October 2001). The association argues that authorities do not 
intervene adequately. Given the legal requirements and the listing contract, most firms 
listed on Euronext Amsterdam voluntarily disclose earnings forecasts.  
Prior studies on management forecast accuracy of Dutch firms examine forecasts 
published in annual reports. Hassink et al. (1997) document that 62% of the forecasts 
are correct, 13% are underestimated, and 25% are overestimated. Their results suggest 
that decreasing earnings forecasts are more reliable than increasing earnings forecasts 
and that the increasing earnings forecasts are more reliable than predictions of no 
change in earnings. Furthermore, larger firms provide more correct forecasts than 
smaller firms. Dorsman, Langendijk, and Van Praag (2003) examine open-ended 
forecasts with qualitative statements to calculate forecast errors. To include all the 
adjectives used in the director’s reports of the annual reports, the authors translate 
descriptive forecasts into quantitative forecasts. They find an average forecast error - 
defined as net income minus the midpoint of the range forecast - of 0.0030. Moreover, 
31% of the forecasts are underestimated forecasts and 69% are overestimated 
forecasts. Because the authors use the midpoint of the range forecasts as reference 
point, they find either overestimations or underestimations, and no correct forecasts. 
 
 
4.3.2   Management earnings forecasts for cross-listed firms 
 
Many Dutch firms have obtained cross listings on international exchanges, which 
affect their disclosure requirements in various degrees. We focus on four types of 
listings, i.e., exchange cross listings in the US and UK and over-the-counter (OTC) 
listings in the US and UK. 
The US exchange cross listings consist of level 2 and 3 ADR programmes, which 
are ADR issues in connection with a listing (on the AMEX or NYSE) or a quotation 
(on the Nasdaq) of either existing shares in the US (i.e., level 2) or a US public 
offering of the underlying shares (i.e., level 3). Like other foreign firms, Dutch firms 
with such a listing are exposed to legal liability under the US federal securities laws. 
Firms that offer securities on the NYSE or Nasdaq must fulfill a wide range of 
disclosure and financial statement requirements. The US Securities Act of 1933 (US 
Securities Act) and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (US Exchange Act) state the 
main disclosure requirements.37 Under both Acts, the US Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) require firms (level 2 and 3 ADR) to file an annual report on 
Form 20-F, which contains detailed financial and non-financial disclosure 
                                            
37  After our sample period, on July 30 2002, the US Sarbanes-Oxley Act was signed into law, which 
significantly modified the securities laws (see the website of the SEC; http://www.sec.gov/about/laws.shtml). 
With this Act, firms must fulfill even more stringent disclosure requirements (for more details on the 
disclosure requirements, see Title IV of the Act). 
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requirements. Firms also have to file a current report on Form 6-K, which contains all 
required material information on 1) information made or required to be made public 
under their local (in our case Dutch) Law; 2) information filed or required to be filed 
publicly with the exchange where the securities are listed; or 3) information 
distributed or required to be distributed to security holders. The firms with ADR level 
2 or 3 listings are subject to SEC enforcement and civil liability under Section 18 of 
the US Exchange Act, which subjects an issuer to liability for making false or 
misleading statements in its Form 20-F.38 SEC Rule 10b-5, promulgated under the 
Exchange Act, provides a broader basis for liability in securities transactions and also 
includes a firm’s annual report prepared under local GAAP.39  
The second type of exchange cross listing is a UK listing on the London Stock 
Exchange Main Market (LSE) or on the Alternative Investment Market (AIM). The 
Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (FSM Act 2000), which replaced the 
Financial Services Act 1986 in November 2001, contains a wide range of provisions 
concerning the regulation of financial markets and listing of firms in the UK.40 The 
Financial Services Authority (FSA) is the principal regulator under the Act.  
Under both the old Financial Services Act and the new FSM Act 2000, investors 
that suffer from incorrect or misleading statements can hold persons that are 
responsible for listing particulars or prospectuses liable. The legal liability exposure of 
cross-listed firms depends on which market they are cross listed. Firms with a listing 
on the LSE have to comply with the listing rules from the FSA. The FSA has 
published listing rules that contain detailed instructions for disclosing profit forecasts. 
If listed firms publish a forecast, they must either update or repeat the statement in the 
listing particulars (Section 81 FSM Act 2000). Particularly relevant for management 
forecasts is Section 47(2) of the Financial Services Act 1986 (superseded by section 
397 of the FSM Act 2000), which states in Paragraph 3 that “any person who does any 
act or engages in any course of conduct which creates a false or misleading 
impression as to the market in or the price or value of any relevant investments is 
guilty of an offence if he does so for the purpose of creating that impression and of 
thereby inducing another person to acquire, dispose of, subscribe for or underwrite 
those investments or to refrain from doing so or to exercise, or refrain from exercising, 
                                            
38  Exchange Act Rule 12g3-2(b) provides an exemption from the registration and periodic reporting 
requirements. The foreign issuer must submit an application to the SEC and must furnish certain (financial) 
information that the issuer has made public. This exemption, however, does not relieve a firm from other anti-
fraud provisions contained in the securities laws. 
39 Rule 10b-5 prohibits (a) employing any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, (b) making any untrue 
statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, 
in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or (c) engaging in any act, 
practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in 
connection with the purchase or sale of any security. 
40 The FSM Act 2000 is available on: http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts2000/ukpga_20000008_en_1. 
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any rights conferred by those investments.” 41  Apart from providing relevant 
information, which is not misleading or inaccurate, it is a fundamental principle of the 
UK Listing Rules that the market should be informed without delay of all relevant 
information or any new developments which may affect the value of the securities.42 
The Disclosure Rules and Transparency Rules (DTR) of the FSA contain also a 
specific dissemination of information requirement (DTR 6.3). 43 
The Alternative Investment Market (AIM) is a submarket of the LSE that has a 
more flexible regulatory system compared to the main market.44 Firms listed on the 
AIM are not bound to the full disclosure and listing rules of the FSA, though AIM 
firms have to comply with the AIM Rules which contain extensive disclosure 
requirements.45 An AIM firm must take reasonable care to ensure that any information 
it notifies is not misleading, false, or deceptive and does not omit anything likely to 
affect the import of such information (AIM Rule 10). Under the AIM rules, firms 
must also issue a notification of price sensitive information without delay which, if 
made public, would be likely to lead to a substantial movement in the price of its AIM 
securities (AIM Rule 11). The exchange maintains its own rules. The exchange may 
suspend the trading of AIM securities (AIM Rule 40). If the exchange considers that 
an AIM firm has contravened the rules, the exchange can issue a warning notice, fine 
the firm, censure the firm, publish the fact that it has been fined or censured, and 
cancel the admission of its AIM securities (AIM Rule 42). 
The third and fourth distinguished levels are the non-regulated over-the-counter 
(OTC) markets in the US and the UK, respectively. The unregistered transactions on 
the OTC do not require the firm to meet the aforementioned specific disclosure and 
financial statement requirements. In the US, firms can trade Level 1 ADRs in an OTC 
market, where they have to meet a minimum amount of requirements.46 In the case of 
trading securities in a non-regulated UK market, such as in the International Order 
Book (IOB), the FSA leaves the legal responsibility with the home countries. 
                                            
41 Section 397(3), FSMA; formerly section 47(2), FSA 1986. 
42 http://www.fsa.gov.uk. 
43 On July 2005 the DTR and the listing and prospectus rules came into effect. The previous versions of the 
rules where changed in order to implement the European Market Abuse Directive (2003/6/EC) and the 
European Prospectus Directive (2003/71/EC). Before July 2005, Chapter 9 (Continuing Obligations) of the old 
Listing Rules contained the requirements about the disclosure of information. The Directive regime is 
conceptually and operationally similar to the former Listing Rules regime. 
44 The AIM, which replaced the Unlisted Securities Market (USM) in June 1995, is regulated by the London 
Stock Exchange (LSE). The FSA supervises LSE. 
45 The AIM Rules for companies are available on the website of the LSE: 
http://www.londonstockexchange.com. 
46 During 1999, the SEC accepted a new rule requiring OTC-listed firms to file the same documents as US 
exchange listed firms. See for example Bushee and Leutz (2005), who investigate the effects of these new 
disclosure requirements. In our empirical analyses we conduct tests to examine whether these regulatory 
changes impact our results (see footnote 55).   
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We expect that the strongest bonding impact arises for Dutch firms with an 
exchange cross listing in the US or UK, as these firms expose themselves to stricter 
legal standards. According to Skinner (1994), investors mostly sue US firms and 
managers after disclosures that are followed by large share price declines. Coffee Jr. 
(2002) argues that more enforcement occurs by means of informal contacts, warnings, 
and administrative enforcement. Although Siegel (2005) argues that SEC actions 
against cross-listed firms are rare, some Dutch firms have been confronted with the 
consequences of the increased legal liability as a consequence of their cross listing in 
the US.47 As for UK cross listings, Frost (2004) characterizes the UK as a country 
where legal liability is relatively high, which makes firms more hesitant to release 
forward looking information, yet we are not aware of any suits against Dutch firms in 
the UK. 
Cross listing on the OTC market in the US and UK probably have a weaker 
impact on management forecasts. Coffee (2002) argues that, in spite of not exposing 
themselves to stricter legal requirements, OTC-listed firms still bond themselves by 
their presence in the market, though to a lesser extent than exchange-listed firms. 
Moreover, similar to exchange-listed firms, OTC-listed firms experience the 
additional scrutiny by ‘reputational intermediaries’. These arguments are consistent 
with Miller’s (1999) results that firms that announce a US exchange cross listing 
generate higher abnormal returns than firms that announce a US OTC cross listing. 
However, the accounting quality of US OTC-listed firms is more similar to local non-
cross-listed firms than to US exchange-listed firms (Lang, Ready, and Yetman, 2003). 
 
 
4.3.3   The scale of Mock 
 
The scale of Mock is a unique feature of the Dutch setting, which we have to take into 
account in our analyses on management forecasts. In 1984, investor relations advisor 
Harry Mock defined a scale of qualitative words and corresponding percentages. 
Within several years after its publication, the scale became a generally accepted 
standard within the Netherlands (Algemeen Dagblad of 29 March 1997 and Het 
                                            
47 Over the past two decades, investors filed charges against Dutch listed firms for not immediately disclosing 
price sensitive information in four cases (Effect, 2004; 2006). In 1990, investors sued Philips for being too 
optimistic about future earnings. This ended up in a settlement with US investors of $9.25 million in 1990 and 
a settlement with Dutch investors of €4.54 million in 1999. In a second case, Dutch investors sued Content for 
insider trading and agreed on a settlement of €1.32 million in 2000. Baan Company was involved in an 
accounting scandal in 1998 and reached a settlement of $32.5 million with US investors in 2003. There is still 
no settlement for the Dutch investors. In 2006, US and Dutch investors agreed on a settlement of $1.1 million 
with Ahold in a US class action suit for issuing false and misleading information and for the firm’s failure to 
disclose material information that makes its prior statements not misleading in the period 2001-2003. The fact 
that three out of the four cases concerns firms with a cross listing in the US suggests that such a cross listing 
enhances a Dutch firm’s legal liability exposure. 
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Financieele Dagblad of 28 August 1999). CFOs, investor relations managers, analysts, 
and investors use the scale to translate adjectives into percentages. An English version 
of the scale appeared in 1997 (Mock, 1999).  
The Mock scale consists of eight qualitative statements, such as ‘limited’ and 
‘significant’, and allocates exact percentages to these statements. Appendix 4A shows 
the scale of Mock. For example, according to the scale of Mock a prediction of 
‘significantly’ higher net earnings is equivalent to a forecast of an earnings increase of 
12 to 20%. An investor that is not aware of the scale of Mock would interpret this 
prediction as an open-ended forecast in which the earnings are predicted to be higher. 
However, Dutch investors know that managers may refer to the scale of Mock and 
interpret the prediction as a range forecast in which the earnings will increase 12 to 
20%.  
While the percentages on the scale of Mock are more informative than the 
qualitative statements, the adjectives and percentages are nearly synonymous for the 
Dutch financial community. At the same time, the use of the scale is a specific from of 
‘soft talk’ (Hutton, Miller, and Skinner, 2003) as investors can only speculate about 
whether managers actually use the Mock scale. Clearly, the Mock scale provides 
Dutch managers a degree of freedom in exercising discretion in their forecasts, 
because managers can introduce ambiguity.  
 
 
4.4   Data and variables 
 
This section discusses the data sources and the definitions of the variables that we use 
in our empirical examination. 
 
 
4.4.1   Data 
 
We obtain management forecasts for the period from 1997 until 2001, which we 
collect from the press releases disclosed by firms listed on Euronext Amsterdam. We 
perform a keywords search and read the title of each press release. We consider each 
press release that includes a forecast that is attributable to the management of the 
forecasting firm. We include all annual forecasts of EPS, net income, EBIT, EBITA, 
EBITDA, and sales that firms disclosed between the start of the fiscal year and the 
annual earnings announcement. If one press release contains several management 
forecasts, we record all of them. Furthermore, we analyze all forecast specificity 
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levels, i.e., point, range, open-ended, and qualitative forecasts. 48  This procedure 
provides us with a sample of 2,951 management forecasts disclosed in 2,014 press 
releases by 177 firms.  
Throughout the chapter, our level of analysis is a press release. If a press release 
contains more than one forecast for the same period, we apply the following ordering: 
EPS, net income, EBIT, EBITA, EBITDA, sales. In 46 press releases, firms disclose a 
preannouncement for the current year and an initial forecast for the next year. Since 
both forecasts apply to different fiscal years, we treat these forecasts as two 
observations. Our results do not change if we choose to include the preannouncements 
or the initial forecasts only.  
For each firm we obtain information on cross listings from the yearly Gids bij de 
Officiële Prijscourant. We obtain accounting data from the REACH database (Review 
and Analysis of Companies in Holland) and WorldScope. We first derive prior period 
results and final results from press releases. For the results that firms do not report in 
press releases, we use REACH or WorldScope. We derive analyst information from 
I/B/E/S and stock returns from Datastream. The ownership data is from yearly 
handbooks of Dutch listed firms (Handboek Nederlandse Beursfondsen).  
 
 
4.4.2   Variables 
 
Table 4.1 provides an overview of the definitions and sources of the variables in our 
study. We use a dummy variable Cross listing in US or UK with the value of one 
when firms are cross listed in the US and/or the UK, and zero otherwise. We expect 
that cross listings in the US have a stronger impact on forecast decisions than UK 
cross listings and that the impact of an exchange cross listing outweighs the impact of 
an OTC cross listing. Based on this hierarchy we define four additional dummy 
variables. First, we define the dummy variable US Exchange listing to have a value of 
one in case the firm has an ADR 2 or 3 listing in the US, and zero otherwise. Second, 
the dummy variable UK Exchange listing has a value of one in case the firm is listed 
in the UK on the LSE or AIM market and does not have a US exchange cross listing, 
and zero otherwise. Third, the dummy US OTC listing equals one in case the firm has 
a level 1 ADR listing (including OTC Bulletin Board companies) and does not have a 
UK exchange listing, and zero otherwise. Fourth, the dummy UK OTC listing equals
                                            
48 We find that 9 firms explicitly refer to the scale of Mock in 44 forecasts. In our analysis we consider 
forecasts with the qualitative Mock adjectives and without any reference to the scale of Mock as a separate 
group. It is not clear whether the forecasts where managers explicitly refer to the scale of Mock must be 
divided into this separate group of Mock forecasts or into the group range forecasts, as the percentage 
increase/decrease in predicted earnings is already established by explicitly referring to the Mock scale. 
Therefore, we exclude these observations. 
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Table 4.1 
Explanation of variables 
Variable Explanation 
Cross listing in US or UK  Dummy variable equals one when the firm has a cross listing in 
the US or UK, zero otherwise. With a cross listing, we refer to 
ADR level 1, 2, and 3 listings, LSE listings, AIM listings, and the 
UK OTC listings. Source: ‘Gids bij de Officiële Prijscourant 
1997/1998-2001/2002’ 
US exchange listing Dummy equals one if the Dutch listed firm has an exchange cross 
listing in the US. With an exchange cross listing, we refer to the 
ADR 2 and ADR 3 listings. If the firm has an exchange listing or 
OTC listing in the UK in addition to the exchange listing in the 
US, the dummy remains one. In all other cases, the dummy 
equals zero. Source: see cross listing in US and UK. 
UK exchange listing Dummy equals one if the Dutch listed firm has an exchange cross 
listing in the UK. With an exchange cross listing, we refer to a 
listing on LSE and AIM. If the firm also has an OTC listing in 
the US, the dummy remains one. However, if the firm also has an 
exchange listing in the US, the dummy becomes zero. In all other 
cases, the dummy equals zero. Source: see cross listing in US 
and UK. 
US OTC listing Dummy equals one if the Dutch listed firm has an OTC listing in 
the US via an ADR 1 listing. If the firm has an exchange listing 
in the UK, the dummy becomes zero. In all other cases, the 
dummy equals zero. Source: see cross-listing in US and UK. 
UK OTC listing. Dummy equals one if the Dutch listed firm has an OTC listing in 
the UK. If the firm has an exchange listing or OTC listing in the 
US, the dummy becomes zero. In all other cases, the dummy 
equals zero. Source: see cross-listing in US and UK. 
Specificity type Forecast specificity type equals one for qualitative forecasts, two 
for open-ended forecasts, three for open-ended forecasts that 
contain Mock words, four for range forecasts with Mock words, 
five for the other range forecasts, and six for point forecasts.  
Management forecast error (Realised earnings - forecasted earnings)/absolute (forecasted 
earnings). We can only measure forecast errors of point, range, 
and open-ended forecasts. When an open-ended forecast is 
incorrect, we take the lower bound (upper bound) of the 
minimum (maximum) forecast as forecast value. Source: Press 
releases as provided by Euronext, Worldscope, and REACH. 
Declining earnings trend Dummy variable equals one when the firm's earnings decline in 
the year of the forecast relative to the previous year. The dummy 
equals zero otherwise. Source: Worldscope and REACH 
Earnings variability Variance of a firm's net income standardised by its market 
capitalisation over a period of four years prior to the fiscal year to 
which the forecast pertains. Source: Worldscope and REACH 
Firm size Natural log of the beginning of the year market capitalisation. 
Source: Worldscope 
Horizon The number of days between the management forecast disclosure 
and the fiscal year end to which the forecast pertains. 
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Number of analysts following The number of analysts that follow a firm during the fiscal year 
of the forecast. Source: I/B/E/S. 
Sign of the news Dummy variable that equals one if the forecast is good news and 
zero in case of bad news. We classify news as good (bad) news 
when the cumulative abnormal returns over three days around the 
forecast are positive (negative). We calculate the cumulative 
abnormal returns via the market model as described by 
MacKinlay (1997). The estimation period starts 120 days prior to 
the forecast until 20 days prior to the forecast. We use the market 
index of Euronext Amsterdam to estimate the market returns. 
Source: Datastream 
Timeline of the forecast The timeline of the forecast equals one for initial forecasts, two 
for maintenance or revisions of previous forecasts, and three for 
preliminary earnings estimates. Preliminary earnings estimates 
are forecasts that firms disclose after the fiscal period end, but 
before the official disclosure of the annual results. 
Percentage block shareholders The total percentage of a firm's shares that outside shareholders 
hold in a block of at least five percent. We exclude block 
holdings of directors of the firm. Source: ‘Handboek 
Nederlandse Beursfondsen 1996-2002’ 
Tobin's q A proxy for a firm's growth opportunities is the Tobin’s q, which 
we calculate as the market value of a firm divided by the book 
value of the firm as defined by Perfect and Wiles (1994). In the 
Netherlands, firms base the value of their assets either on its 
replacement value or on its historical costs. In case of the 
replacement value, no change was necessary. However, in case of 
historical costs, we adjust this value towards its replacement 
value as described in the study of De Jong (2002). Source: 
Worldscope and REACH. 
 
one in the case of a listing on the OTC market in the UK and no other cross listings in 
the UK or US, and zero otherwise.  
In the definition of the variable Specificity type we illustrate the relevance of the 
scale of Mock, because Mock words make open-ended forecasts more precise. For 
example, ‘a modest increase’ implies an open-ended minimum forecast (minimum 0% 
increase), while, when we take into account the scale of Mock, the forecast becomes 
the range from 2 to 4% increase. Alternatively, ‘a sharp increase’ is an open-ended 
forecast without and with Mock (i.e., minimum 0% increase and an increase of more 
than 45%, respectively). The inclusion of Mock interpretations always makes the 
forecast more informative. This effect induces two groups for Mock: one group where 
the scale of Mock turns an open-ended forecast into a range forecast and one group 
where open-ended forecasts remain open-ended when interpreting the scale. The 
variable Specificity type takes on a value of one for qualitative forecasts, two for 
open-ended forecasts (minimum and maximum), three for open-ended forecasts that 
include words from the scale of Mock, four for range forecasts that include words 
from the scale of Mock, five for range forecasts, and six for point forecasts. 
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We include several variables that capture characteristics of the forecast. The 
variable Timeline of the forecast takes on the value of one for the first forecast 
disclosed during the fiscal year, two for maintenance or revisions of forecasts, and 
three for preliminary earnings estimates/preannouncements. Similar to Baginski, 
Hassel, and Waymire (1994), the preannouncement period starts after the fiscal period 
end and ends at the earnings announcement day. We define Horizon as the number of 
days between the forecast and the fiscal year end. The Sign of the news is based on a 
classification of forecasts as good (bad) news when investors respond positively 
(negatively) towards the news (e.g., Baginski, Hassel, and Waymire, 1994; Baginski 
and Hassell, 1997). The dummy takes on a value of one for good news forecasts and 
zero for bad news forecasts.  
We include several firm characteristics as control variables. We calculate Firm 
size as the natural log of the firm’s market capitalisation at the beginning of the fiscal 
year to which the forecast pertains (see also Baginski and Hassell, 1997; Bamber and 
Cheon, 1998). To proxy for growth opportunities, we use Tobin’s q, as defined by 
Perfect and Wiles (1994). Tobin’s q is the market value of the firm divided by the 
replacement value of the assets. In the Netherlands, firms base the value of their assets 
either on their replacement value or on their historical costs. In the first case, no 
change was necessary. In the latter case, we adjust this value towards its replacement 
value as described in the study of De Jong (2002). The variable Number of analyst 
following is defined as the number of analysts that follow a firm during the year of the 
forecast. We define Percentage block shareholders as the percentage of shares held in 
a block outside the firm. To have a block of shares, a person must directly or 
indirectly possess at least 5% of the firm’s outstanding shares.49 We focus on outside 
block holdings and exclude block holdings of directors of the firm. Earnings 
variability is the variance of a firm’s net income standardised by its end of the year 
market capitalisation over four years prior to the forecasting year. If the firm’s net 
income is not available for the previous four years, we move the period one year 
forward or use three years instead. The dummy variable Declining earnings trend gets 
the value one if firms experience a declining earnings trend during its forecasting year 
and the value of zero otherwise. Finally, we define dummy variables for each sample 
year and the industry groups based on two-digit SIC industry codes.  
The requirement that all information on firm and forecast characteristics should be 
available reduces our sample by 98 press releases. In addition, our sample has one 
firm with an extreme value in its earnings variance (i.e., earnings variance equals 
119.6) and four firms with an extreme Tobin’s q in a forecast year (i.e., Tobin’s q 
                                            
49 The 5% threshold is incorporated in the Wet Melding Zeggenschap, i.e., the Dutch implementation of EU 
transparency directives. It should be noted that shareholders of real estate agencies have a threshold of 25% 
above which they have to report their holdings. 
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greater than 7, which is a deviation of more than four standard deviations from the 
average Tobin’s q). These two firms disclose 20 press releases (i.e., five and 15, 
respectively) in the year in which we observe the extreme values. After excluding 
these observations, our final sample consists of 2,781 forecasts disclosed in 1,896 
press releases by 168 firms. 
 
 
4.5   Results 
 
We first report summary statistics of Dutch management forecasts in Section 5.1, 
followed by the results of the models explaining managers’ choice for forecast 
precision in Section 5.2 and forecast accuracy in Section 5.3. 
 
 
4.5.1   Statistics 
 
To get an impression about the proportion of Dutch listed firms with a cross listing in 
the US and/or UK, Panel A of Table 4.2 shows the distribution of the number of 
forecasting firms per type of cross listing.50  
Out of the total sample of 168 firms, 36 firms (i.e., 21.4%) have a cross listing 
(i.e., exchange and/or OTC listing) in the US, the UK, or in both countries. The group 
of firms with a cross listing in both countries consists of eight US exchange-listed 
firms, out of which six firms also have a UK exchange listing and two other firms also 
have a UK OTC listing. Eight firms solely have a US exchange listing and two firms 
solely have a UK exchange listing. The sample further contains 11 firms with only a 
US OTC listing and seven firms with only a UK OTC listing. In our subsequent 
analyses, we refer to US exchange-listed firms as the total of 16 US exchange-listed 
firms, we refer to UK exchange-listed firms as the two UK exchange-listed firms 
without a US exchange listing, and we refer to UK OTC-listed firms as the seven UK 
OTC-listed firms without a US exchange or OTC listing (see Section 4.2). 
Panel B provides the distribution of press releases per type of cross listing. We 
find a slightly higher percentage of press releases disclosed by cross-listed firms 
relative to the percentage of cross-listed firms in our sample (i.e., 26.3% versus 
21.4%), which implies that cross-listed firms disclose relatively more press releases 
with forecasts than non-cross-listed firms. This difference applies to all types of cross 
listings, except for the UK exchange-listed firms without a US exchange listing. A 
potential explanation for these differences is that the greater scrutiny forces cross-
                                            
50 Because 11 out of the 168 firms changed their type of cross listing during our sample period, this table 
provides the cross-listing status of firms when they first occur in the sample period.  
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listed firms to disclose forecasts more often. Alternatively, greater potential litigation 
costs might force US exchange-listed firms to update their forecast more often.  
 
 
Table 4.2 
Distribution of cross-listed firms 
Panel A presents the number of firms with a US exchange listing, and/or a UK exchange listing, a US OTC 
listing, and/or a UK OTC listing. Panel B presents the distribution of press releases as disclosed by firms with 
a US exchange listing, and/or a UK exchange listing, a US OTC listing, and/or a UK OTC listing. The 
percentages represent the percentage of (press releases from) cross-listed firms relative to the total number of 
(press releases from) firms in our sample.  
Panel A: Distribution of the number of firms         
         
  US exchange listing UK exchange listing US OTC listing UK OTC listing 
US exchange listing 8 (4.8%)       
         
UK exchange listing 6 (3.6%) 2 (1.2%)     
         
US OTC listing 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 11 (6.5%)   
         
UK OTC listing 2 (1.2%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 7 (4.2%) 
         
Total 16 (9.5%) 2 (1.2%) 11 (6.5%) 7 (4.2%) 
         
         
Total number of cross-listed firms: 36 (21.4%)    
Total number of non-cross-listed firms: 132 (78.6%)    
Total number of firms:  168     
     
         
         
         
Panel B: Distribution of the number of press releases       
         
  US exchange listing UK exchange listing US OTC listing UK OTC listing 
US exchange listing 133 (7.0%)       
         
UK exchange listing 108 (5.7%) 16 (0.8%)     
         
US OTC listing 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 135 (7.1%)   
         
UK OTC listing 17 (0.9%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 89 (4.7%) 
         
Total 258 (13.6%) 16 (0.8%) 135 (7.1%) 89 (4.7%) 
         
         
Total number of press releases disclosed by cross-listed firms:  498 (26.3%) 
Total number of press releases disclosed by non-cross-listed firms: 1398 (73.7%) 
Total number of press releases:     1896  
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Panel A of Table 4.3 provides statistics per press release for the sample of firms 
without cross listings and the sample of firms with cross listings. On average, non-
cross-listed firms disclose 1.453 forecasts in each press release.51 Firms in our sample 
often use the scale of Mock: on average, each press release contains 0.21 forecasts 
with a word from the scale. This result indicates that firms use a Mock adjective in 
about one out of seven forecasts (i.e., 1.453/0.21).52 Cross-listed firms include slightly 
more forecasts in each press release, but use fewer Mock adjectives. The forecast 
horizons are similar for cross-listed and non-cross-listed firms, i.e., about 170 days 
before the firm’s fiscal year end. The firm size and the number of analysts show that 
cross-listed firms are larger than the other firms. For example, the median number of 
analysts that follow a firm is 38 for cross-listed firms and only 9 for the firms without 
a US or UK listing. The q’s do not differ strongly between the two samples, i.e., an 
average q of 1.7 and 1.6, respectively. The cross-listed firms have lower 
blockholdings, i.e., on average 25% versus 40% for the other firms. A potential 
explanation for this difference is that on average cross-listed firms are larger firms. 
Finally, the earnings variability and the fraction of firms with a declining earnings 
trend do not differ strongly between the two samples.  
Panel B of Table 4.3 shows the frequencies of forecast characteristics in the press 
releases. The highest degree of forecast specificity is a point forecast, which is issued 
in 29% of the press releases of firms without a cross listing and 24% of the press 
releases of cross-listed firms. Overall, we do not find strong differences in specificity 
in the bivariate comparison. The messages in which the firms publish their forecasts 
are mainly earnings announcements. Only 10% (not cross listed) or 6% (cross listed) 
of the sample consists of press releases of which the main purpose is the forecast. For 
both sets of firms our observations are almost evenly split between good and bad news. 
Over the timeline of the forecast, we find that 35% of the forecasts from non-
cross-listed firms are initial forecasts, while 56% are revisions, and 9% are 
preliminary estimates, i.e., forecasts after the end of the book year. Cross-listed firms 
disclose initial forecasts less often than non-cross-listed firms (i.e., 29% of their 
forecasts), while they provide updates in terms of a maintenance or revision of their 
previous forecast more often (i.e., 63% of their forecasts). This result might explain 
the relatively larger number of press releases with forecasts disclosed by cross-listed
                                            
51 The average number of forecasts is higher than one, because some firms disclose more than one forecast in a 
press release. For instance, if a firm discloses an EBIT forecast and an EPS forecast, we count two forecasts.   
52 The inclusion of Mock adjectives can be coincidental. To test whether this is the case, we collect information 
on adjectives that the Mock scale does not include. Although many more adjectives outside the scale exist, we 
find that the number of forecasts with adjectives that do not exist in the scale of Mock is 0.042 for non-cross-
listed firms and 0.054 for cross-listed firms. These numbers indicate that non-cross-listed firms use non-Mock 
adjectives in about one out of 35 forecasts (i.e., 1.452/0.042). For cross-listed firms, this number is one out of 
28 (i.e., 1.505/0.054). This is a striking finding, which emphasises the widespread use of the scale of Mock in 
the Netherlands. 
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Table 4.3 
Descriptive statistics and distribution of management forecasts 
Panel A presents the mean, median, minimum, maximum, standard deviation and the number of observations 
of the variables per press release for the sample of firms with cross listing in the US or UK and for the sample 
of firms without such a cross listing. If press releases contain forecasts for two different timelines (e.g., initial 
forecast and preannouncement), we document both forecasts. Mock words are words from the scale of Mock 
as reported in Appendix 4A. We define the variables more completely in Table 4.1. Panel B provides the 
distribution of press releases with forecasts from cross-listed and non-cross-listed firms per forecast specificity 
group, message type, phase in the timeline, and sign of the news. 
Panel A: descriptive statistics per press release              
  Not cross listed   Cross listed 
 Mean St.dev. N  Mean St.dev. N 
  (Median)       (Median)     
Number of forecasts 1.453 0.670 1398  1.506 0.729 498 
 (1.000)    (1.000)   
Number of forecasts with Mock words 0.211 0.507 1398  0.143 0.428 498 
 (0.000)    (0.000)   
Forecast horizon 170 112 1398  171 107 498 
 (146)    (153)   
Firm size 18.683 1.521 1398  22.288 1.609 498 
 (18.737)    (22.580)   
Tobin's q 1.722 1.276 1398  1.648 0.922 498 
 (1.261)    (1.340)   
Number of analysts following 11.476 9.639 1398  34.974 13.407 498 
 (9.000)    (38.000)   
Percentage block shareholders 39.924 27.772 1398  24.877 17.596 498 
 (38.240)    (23.000)   
Earnings variability 0.029 0.187 1398  0.042 0.412 498 
 (0.001)    (0.000)   
Declining earnings trend 0.320 0.467 1398  0.329 0.470 498 
  (0.000)       (0.000)     
Panel B: distribution per press release           
  Not cross listed   Cross listed 
  Amount (%)   Amount (%) 
Total amount 1398   498  
Forecast specificity      
Point 406 (29%)  119 (24%) 
Range 100 (7%)  69 (14%) 
Range Mock 188 (13%)  46 (9%) 
Open ended Mock 28 (2%)  7 (1%) 
Open ended  597 (43%)  226 (45%) 
Qualitative 79 (6%)  31 (6%) 
Total 1398 (100%)  498 (100%) 
Message type      
Annual earnings announcement 394 (28%)  113 (23%) 
First quarter earnings announcement 59 (4%)  56 (11%) 
Half year earnings announcement 428 (31%)  124 (25%) 
First 9 months earnings announcement 65 (5%)  69 (14%) 
Preliminary earnings estimate 150 (11%)  56 (11%) 
Shareholders' meeting 73 (5%)  20 (4%) 
Forecast revision/maintenance 135 (10%)  28 (6%) 
Other 94 (7%)  32 (6%) 
Total 1398 (100%)  498 (100%) 
Sign of the news      
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Good news forecasts 695 (50%)  242 (49%) 
Bad news forecasts 703 (50%)  256 (51%) 
Total 1398 (100%)  498 (100%) 
Timeline of the forecast      
Initial management forecast 491 (35%)  146 (29%) 
Maintenance or revision 777 (56%)  316 (63%) 
Preliminary earnings estimate 130 (9%)  36 (7%) 
Total 1398 (100%)  498 (100%) 
            
 
firms relative to non-cross-listed firms. Greater scrutiny and potential litigation costs 
may induce these firms to disclose updates more often. In untabulated analyses we 
split the sample of cross-listed firms into the four different types of cross listings and 
find that US exchange-listed firms disclose most updates (i.e., 67%) and UK OTC-
listed firms disclose the least updates (i.e., 56%). As US exchange-listed firms are 
prone to the highest potential legal liability costs, these findings support the potential 
litigation costs explanation. 
 
 
4.5.2   Determinants of forecast specificity 
 
Table 4.4 reports summary statistics of the explanatory variables for forecast 
specificity for the full sample and per forecast specificity type. The statistics per 
specificity group show that cross-listed firms disclose relatively more range, open-
ended, and qualitative forecasts than point and Mock (open-ended and range) 
forecasts.  
The distribution is similar in the four separate groups of cross-listed firms, with 
range forecasts that occur most often among US exchange-listed firms, followed by 
UK exchange-listed firms and UK OTC-listed firms.  
We observe that firms that disclose preliminary earnings estimates provide the 
most precise forecasts, followed by firms that revise or maintain their previous 
forecast. Firms that release an initial forecast disclose the least precise forecasts. This 
is consistent with Baginski and Hassell’s (1997) result that more precise forecasts tend 
to be issued later in the period. The average forecast horizon is 170 days, which 
indicates that firms disclose their average forecast during the third quarter of the fiscal 
year. Consistent with increased uncertainty early in the fiscal year, the average 
forecast horizon appears to be longer for less specific forecasts, i.e., 216 days for 
qualitative forecasts decreasing to 104 days for point forecasts.  
We do not observe patterns in the relations between the sign of the news or firm 
size and specificity. Firms that disclose range-Mock forecasts have a Tobin’s q that is 
remarkably higher than that of firms that disclose other forecast specificity types.
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Table 4.4 
Statistics per forecast specificity type 
This table presents the mean, median, and standard deviation of all explanatory variables in the forecast 
specificity regression for the total sample and per forecast specificity type. We define the variables more 
completely in Table 4.1. The number of observations reflects the number of observations available per 
subsample. 
    Full 
sample
Point Range Range 
Mock 
Open-
ended 
Mock 
Open 
ended  
Qualitative
Cross listing in US/UK Mean 0.263 0.227 0.408 0.197 0.200 0.275 0.282
 Median 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
 St.dev. 0.440 0.419 0.493 0.398 0.406 0.447 0.452
         
- US exchange listing Mean 0.136 0.122 0.254 0.128 0.143 0.124 0.127
 Median 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
 St.dev. 0.343 0.327 0.437 0.335 0.355 0.330 0.335
         
- UK exchange listing Mean 0.008 0.006 0.047 0.000 0.000 0.006 0.000
 Median 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
 St.dev. 0.091 0.075 0.213 0.000 0.000 0.078 0.000
         
- US OTC listing Mean 0.071 0.069 0.047 0.043 0.000 0.090 0.064
 Median 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
 St.dev. 0.257 0.253 0.213 0.203 0.000 0.286 0.245
         
- UK OTC listing Mean 0.047 0.030 0.059 0.026 0.057 0.055 0.091
 Median 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
 St.dev. 0.212 0.172 0.237 0.158 0.236 0.227 0.289
         
Mean 0.336 0.185 0.207 0.274 0.314 0.454 0.509Timeline:  
initial forecast Median 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000
 St.dev. 0.472 0.388 0.406 0.447 0.471 0.498 0.502
         
Mean 0.576 0.560 0.781 0.688 0.600 0.525 0.482Timeline: 
revision/maintenance Median 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.000
 St.dev. 0.494 0.497 0.415 0.464 0.497 0.500 0.502
         
Mean 0.088 0.255 0.012 0.038 0.086 0.021 0.009Timeline: 
preannouncement Median 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
 St.dev. 0.283 0.436 0.108 0.193 0.284 0.142 0.095
         
Forecast horizon Mean 170 104 173 176 141 204 216
 Median 148 111 149 153 123 230 253
 St.dev. 111 112 94 98 105 99 98
         
Sign of the news Mean 0.506 0.501 0.408 0.594 0.400 0.513 0.473
 Median 1.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000
 St.dev. 0.500 0.500 0.493 0.492 0.497 0.500 0.502
         
Ln(firm size) Mean 19.630 19.754 20.776 19.257 18.716 19.548 18.975
 Median 19.454 19.674 20.387 18.928 17.676 19.337 18.540
 St.dev. 2.214 2.034 2.301 1.998 2.341 2.233 2.479
         
Tobin's q Mean 1.702 1.691 1.617 1.877 1.698 1.702 1.515
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 Median 1.297 1.324 1.127 1.386 1.104 1.296 1.350
 St.dev. 1.193 1.107 1.189 1.293 1.560 1.229 0.922
         
Mean 17.648 18.219 21.254 15.718 13.857 17.527 15.591Number of analysts 
following Median 14.000 16.000 16.000 11.000 8.000 15.000 10.000
 St.dev. 14.920 14.296 16.608 15.117 18.263 14.534 15.445
         
Mean 35.972 34.384 32.199 41.720 42.587 35.239 40.496Percentage block 
shareholders Median 32.000 29.980 26.000 37.445 47.750 30.690 39.835
 St.dev. 26.337 24.533 26.291 29.414 20.072 25.950 30.050
         
Earnings variance Mean 0.033 0.018 0.128 0.005 0.038 0.031 0.023
 Median 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001
 St.dev. 0.265 0.150 0.719 0.020 0.164 0.194 0.096
         
Declining earnings trend Mean 0.322 0.314 0.266 0.256 0.457 0.344 0.382
 Median 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
 St.dev. 0.467 0.465 0.443 0.438 0.505 0.475 0.488
         
Number of observations   1896 525 169 234 35 823 110
 
Firms that disclose range forecasts have higher average analyst coverage than firms 
that disclose point, open-ended, or qualitative forecasts. This result could reflect 
scrutiny and monitoring by reputational intermediaries. The firms that use Mock 
words (in both range and open-ended forecasts) have lower analyst following. The 
relation between block holdings and specificity is most outspoken for the open-ended-
Mock, range-Mock, and qualitative forecasts, where the average block holding is 
greater than 40%, in comparison with 36% in the full sample. Earnings variance and 
declining earnings trends are both lowest for Mock-range forecasts. 
To test our hypotheses, we now examine the relation of the factors that potentially 
influence managers’ choice for forecast specificity in a multivariate setting. Because 
the forecast specificity type is an ordinal variable, we estimate an ordered-response 
probit regression. The model is: 
 
g(Pr[Specificity < i | X]) = αi + β1 Cross listing US/UK + β2 Initial forecast + β3 
Revision/maintenance + β4 Horizon + β5 Sign of news + β6 Ln(firm size) + β7 Tobin’s 
q + β8 Analyst following + β9 Percentage block shareholders + β10 Earnings variance 
+ β11 Declining earnings trend + γ1..5 Year + ϕ1..7 Industry + εi     (1) 
 
The dependent variable Specificity is an ascending order of forecast specificity 
and X constitutes the vector of independent values as discussed in the previous section. 
The forecast specificity logit estimation fits the probability that the forecast is from 
forecast specificity type category i or lower, given the observed vector of explanatory 
variables. A positive (negative) coefficient indicates that higher values of the 
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independent variables are associated with more (less) specific forecasts. We estimate 
five different regression specifications and present the results in Table 4.5. 
In regression models (1) and (2) we estimate equation (1) for the full sample of 
forecasts with and without an indicator variable for cross-listed firms. The outcomes 
of model (1) show that managers provide more precise forecasts when they receive 
new information. Specifically, a revision or maintenance of previous forecasts 
(significant at 1% level) and initial forecasts (significant at 1% level) are significantly 
less precise in comparison with preannouncements. The results also show that a 
longer forecast horizon results in significantly less specific forecasts (at 1% level). For 
the sign of the news, q, blockholders, earnings variance, and the earnings trend we 
find no significant coefficients. 
The results from this table also show that firm size is positively related with 
forecast specificity, indicating that larger firms disclose more precise forecasts. 
Because firm size is highly correlated with analyst coverage (0.86), we first 
orthogonalise analyst coverage on firm size and then put the residuals of this 
regression into our regression models. This allows us to examine the impact of analyst 
coverage beyond firm size. Our results show that analyst following does add to the 
effect of firm size on forecast specificity. The coefficient of orthogonalised analysts 
yield a small negative effect on specificity. 
In model (2) we test our first hypothesis, which states that firms with a cross 
listing in the US or UK disclose less precise forecasts. As hypothesised, the variable 
cross listing turns out to have a negative relation with forecast specificity, which is 
significant at the 1% level.  
We further investigate this hypothesis in models (3) to (5), where we discriminate 
between exchange listings and OTC listings in the US and UK. In all three models, we 
use the same sample of non-cross-listed firms as a basis. We add one specific type of 
cross listing per model. That is, in model (3) we add firms with a US exchange listing, 
in model (4) we add the sample of firms with a US OTC listing, and in model (5) we 
add firms with a UK OTC listing. Due to the low number of observations for UK 
exchange-listed firms (see Table 4.2), we do not estimate the regression for this 
subsample.  
Our results indicate that, in each alternative specification, we find that cross-listed 
firms provide less precise forecasts. Specifically, firms with a listing on a US stock 
exchange, firms with an OTC listing in the US, and firms with an OTC listing in the 
UK appear to have incentives to disclose less precise information, which decreases the
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Table 4.5 
Regression analysis for forecast specificity choice 
This table reports ordered response regressions, in which the dependent variable is forecast specificity and 
takes on the value of one for qualitative, two for open-ended, three for open-ended-Mock, four for range-
Mock, five for range, and six for point forecasts. Regression (1) and (2) contain the full sample. Regression (3) 
contains firms without a cross listing in the US and/or UK and firms with a US exchange listing. Regression 
(4) contains firms without a cross listing in the US and/or UK and firms with a US OTC listing. Regression (5) 
contains firms without a cross listing in the US and/or UK and firms with a UK OTC listing. Each regression 
controls for the forecast year and the major industry groups based on two-digit SIC industry codes. We define 
the variables more completely in Table 4.1. We orthogonalise the variable Number of analyst following on 
Ln(firm size). We use Huber/White standard errors for calculating the significance. We document p-values in 
parentheses.  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Cross listing in US/UK   -0.3925 *** -0.2781 ** -0.5014 *** -0.7043 ***
   (0.000)  (0.018)  (0.000)  (0.000)  
Timeline: initial forecast -1.1361 *** -1.1056 *** -1.0797 *** -1.1128 *** -1.1470 ***
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  
Timeline: revision/maintenance -0.9930 *** -0.9740 *** -0.9181 *** -0.9964 *** -1.0182 ***
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  
Forecast horizon -0.0024 *** -0.0025 *** -0.0026 *** -0.0026 *** -0.0026 ***
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  
Sign of the news 0.0413  0.0556  0.1002 * 0.0829  0.0580  
 (0.432)  (0.289)  (0.076)  (0.160)  (0.334)  
Ln(firm size) 0.0323 ** 0.0886 *** 0.0655 *** 0.1189 *** 0.0979 ***
 (0.016)  (0.000)  (0.002)  (0.000)  (0.000)  
Tobin's q -0.0013  -0.0057  -0.0190  -0.0051  -0.0094  
 (0.958)  (0.813)  (0.462)  (0.838)  (0.725)  
Number of analysts following -0.0064 * -0.0038  -0.0046  -0.0058  -0.0062  
 (0.084)  (0.285)  (0.329)  (0.185)  (0.223)  
Percentage block shareholders -0.0010  -0.0013  -0.0022 ** -0.0018  -0.0021 * 
 (0.317)  (0.205)  (0.042)  (0.104)  (0.051)  
Earnings variance 0.0164  0.0450  0.0037  -0.1741  -0.1870  
 (0.797)  (0.503)  (0.957)  (0.272)  (0.250)  
Declining earnings trend -0.0677  -0.0558  -0.0535  -0.0406  -0.0596  
 (0.266)  (0.358)  (0.417)  (0.548)  (0.394)  
           
N 1896 1896 1656 1533  1487
Pseudo R2   0.078  0.082  0.084  0.087  0.093  
***: p < 1% ; **: p < 5% ; *: p < 10%                   
 
probability to mislead investors.53, 54 Since legal bonding purposes mainly apply to 
firms with a US or UK exchange listing, these results suggest that not only legal 
bonding, but also reputational bonding leads firms to disclose less precise forecasts.  
                                            
53 A regression for non-cross-listed firms and firms with a UK listing, independent of whether the firm is also 
listed in the US, provides a negative, but non-significant, cross-listing coefficient (i.e., coefficient equals -
0.242, p-value equals 0.12). However, the two firms with only a listing in the UK drive this non-significant 
result. When we exclude these two firms from the regression, we find a negative and significant cross-listing 
coefficient (i.e., coefficient equals -0.415, p-value equals 0.018). 
54 Because the SEC accepted a new rule in 1999 that requires US OTC-listed firms to file the same documents 
as US exchange-listed firms, we estimate the regression of model (4) for the subsample of firms that disclosed 
a forecast in the period 1997-1999 and for the subsample of firms that disclosed a forecast in the period 2000-
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4.5.3   Accuracy of management forecasts 
 
In this section, we will compare the forecasted earnings and subsequent realisations. 
We calculate the management forecast errors as follows: 
earningsForecasted
earningsForecastedearningsActualerrorforecastManagement −=   (2) 
A positive forecast error indicates that the forecast underestimates actual earnings. 
As with forecast specificity, we assume that managers are familiar with the scale of 
Mock. Therefore, we use the percentages equal to the scale to calculate the forecasted 
amount of range-Mock forecasts and open-ended-Mock forecasts. Obviously, we can 
only measure forecast errors of point, range, and open-ended forecasts. When an 
open-ended forecast is incorrect, we take the lower bound (upper bound) of the 
minimum (maximum) forecast as forecast value.  
We base our forecast error analysis on a sample of 1,756 press releases instead of 
1,896 press releases, because we cannot calculate forecast errors for the 110 
qualitative forecasts, we have missing values for 22 forecasts, and we exclude 8 
forecasts with extreme forecast errors. We consider values as extreme values when 
they deviate more than four standard deviations from the average forecast errors.  
Table 4.6 projects the frequencies of no forecast errors, overestimated forecasts, 
and underestimated forecasts per forecast specificity type. The results for the total 
sample show that non-cross-listed firms disclose forecasts that are correct in 51% of 
our sample. In 21% of the cases the forecasts overestimate realisations and in 28% of 
the forecasts we find an underestimation. For cross-listed firms, the statistics are very 
similar (50%, 22%, and 28%, respectively). In both groups, the percentage of 
underestimations is higher than overestimations for most forecast specificity types. 
Note that most open-ended forecasts are minimum forecasts and managers can only 
overestimate earnings if they release minimum forecasts.  
We also find that more precise forecasts clearly increase the stake of incorrect 
forecasts. The high percentage of correct forecasts for the sample of range-Mock 
forecasts indicates that managers actually apply the scale. Furthermore, the 
distribution of range forecasts indicates that the probability that cross-listed firms 
overestimate earnings is lower than that of non-cross-listed firms. In particular, 16% 
of the range forecasts by cross-listed firms are overestimations versus 31% of the
                                                                                                                                            
2001. The pre-1999 subsample has 75 press releases from US OTC-listed firms and the post-1999 period has 
60 press releases from US OTC-listed firms. Both regressions show a negative and significant cross listing 
coefficient (i.e., coefficient of the pre-1999 sample equals -0.33 with a p-value of 0.069; the coefficient of the 
post-1999 sample equals -0.792 with a p-value of zero). 
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Table 4.6 
Distribution of management forecast errors 
This table reports the distribution of management forecast errors of the sample of firms with a cross listing in 
the US and/or UK and the sample of firms without such a cross listing. We provide the number of observations 
of correct forecasts, underestimations and overestimations. We calculate management forecast errors as 
realised earnings less management forecast divided by the absolute value of the forecast. Underestimations are 
forecasts that fall short of the earnings outcome and overestimations are forecasts that are higher than the final 
outcome. We consider forecast errors that deviate more than four standard deviations from the mean as outliers 
and exclude these observations from our sample.  
      Not cross listed   Cross listed 
Forecast specificity type     N (%)   N (%) 
Total sample Correct  657 (51%)  232 (50%) 
 Overestimation  273 (21%)  103 (22%) 
 Underestimation  361 (28%)  130 (28%) 
 Total   1291 (100%)  465 (100%) 
        
Open ended Correct  471 (81%)  190 (84%) 
 Overestimation  101 (17%)  32 (14%) 
 Underestimation  8 (1%)  4 (2%) 
 Total   580 (100%)  226 (100%) 
        
Open ended-Mock Correct  26 (93%)  4 (57%) 
 Overestimation  0 (0%)  3 (43%) 
 Underestimation  2 (7%)  0 (0%) 
 Total   28 (100%)  7 (100%) 
        
Range mock Correct  68 (37%)  8 (18%) 
 Overestimation  37 (20%)  15 (33%) 
 Underestimation  81 (44%)  22 (49%) 
 Total   186 (100%)  45 (100%) 
        
Range Correct  44 (44%)  19 (28%) 
 Overestimation  31 (31%)  11 (16%) 
 Underestimation  24 (24%)  39 (57%) 
 Total   99 (100%)  69 (100%) 
        
Point Correct  48 (12%)  11 (9%) 
 Overestimation  104 (26%)  42 (36%) 
 Underestimation  246 (62%)  65 (55%) 
 Total   398 (100%)  118 (100%) 
 
range forecasts by non-cross-listed firms. Cross-listed firms seem more careful in 
releasing range or range-Mock forecasts than non-cross-listed firms, as they are more 
likely to underestimate future earnings rather than release correct forecasts. The point 
forecasts show a slightly different picture. Though both cross-listed and non-cross-
listed firms seem conservative by underestimating future earnings more often, cross-
listed firms disclose somewhat more overestimations than non-cross-listed firms (i.e., 
36% vs. 26% of the overestimations).  
Our hypotheses state that the forecast error is smaller and more conservative for
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Table 4.7 
Management forecast errors 
The table presents means, medians, standard deviations, and mean differences of management forecast errors 
for cross-listed and non-cross-listed firms per forecast specificity type. We calculate management forecast 
errors as realised earnings less management forecast divided by the absolute value of the forecast. 
Underestimations (i.e., underest.) are forecasts that fall short of the earnings outcome and overestimations (i.e., 
overest.) are forecasts that are higher than the final outcome. We consider forecast errors that deviate more 
than four standard deviations from the mean as outliers and exclude these observations from our sample. 
      Not cross listed  Cross listed  P-value difference 
   All Overest. Underest.  All Overest. Underest.  All Overest. Underest.
Forecast specificity type (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6)  (1) - (4) (2) - (5) (3) - (6)
Total sample Mean  -0.106 -0.647 0.109 -0.031 -0.233 0.075 0.012 0.001 0.241
 Median  0.000 -0.225 0.036 0.000 -0.123 0.029 0.918 0.000 0.092
 St.dev.  0.633 1.172 0.329 0.229 0.400 0.128    
            
Open ended Mean  -0.150 -0.862 0.041  -0.044 -0.333 0.180  0.017 0.032 0.166
 Median  0.000 -0.368 0.014 0.000 -0.139 0.046 0.163 0.017 0.230
 St.dev.  0.646 1.340 0.047 0.256 0.602 0.269    
            
Range mock Mean  -0.139 -1.024 0.149 0.005 -0.186 0.137 0.286 0.067 0.849
 Median  0.000 -0.460 0.089 0.004 -0.179 0.076 0.847 0.008 0.579
 St.dev.  0.897 1.717 0.267 0.217 0.201 0.165    
            
Range Mean  -0.115 -0.421 0.069 0.019 -0.142 0.073 0.016 0.198 0.904
 Median  0.000 -0.121 0.032 0.007 -0.081 0.025 0.000 0.742 0.404
 St.dev.  0.440 0.694 0.086 0.146 0.188 0.136    
            
Point Mean  -0.033 -0.370 0.102 -0.042 -0.193 0.048 0.852 0.130 0.236
 Median  0.005 -0.130 0.029 0.003 -0.021 0.016 0.082 0.006 0.090
  St.dev.   0.511 0.726 0.367  0.218 0.298 0.082        
 
 firms with a cross listing in the US or UK. Table 4.7 shows the magnitude of the 
forecast errors for the sample of firms with and without such a cross listing. In 
addition, we split the forecasts into a group of overestimations and underestimations 
and provide the p-values for the difference in forecast errors between cross-listed and 
non-cross-listed firms. We exclude the open-ended-Mock forecasts from the table, as 
the number of observations is not sufficient to make comparisons.  
The results suggest that, in line with our expectations, the mean forecast error of 
cross-listed firms is smaller than that of non-cross-listed firms (i.e., -3.1% vs. -10.6%, 
p-value of difference equals 0.012), implying that non-cross-listed firms overestimate 
earnings by 7.5% more than their cross-listed peers. The larger overestimations in the 
non-cross-listed sample drive this result.  
Table 4.7 further provides the forecast errors per specificity type, as the fact that 
cross-listed firms disclose less precise forecasts may be an explanation for the lower 
forecast errors. For each forecast specificity type, we find that the forecast error of 
non-cross-listed firms is greater than that of cross-listed firms. In addition, cross-listed 
firms are more conservative in their forecasts (i.e., their forecasts are less optimistic 
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than the forecasts by non-cross-listed firms). Again, these results are in line with the 
bonding arguments for cross-listings in countries with greater potential liability costs 
and enhanced scrutiny by reputational intermediaries. 
 
 
4.6   Summary and conclusions 
 
The purpose of this study is to analyse the influence of cross listings in the UK or US 
on characteristics of management earnings forecasts disclosed by Dutch firms. Since 
the UK and US have stricter governance regimes than the Netherlands, Dutch firms 
expose themselves to a stricter legal environment and greater scrutiny by cross listing 
in the UK and US, and thereby bond themselves in legal and reputational sense 
(Coffee Jr., 1999; 2002). Bonding leads cross-listed firms to exhibit higher quality 
information than non-cross-listed firms (Lang, Ready, and Yetman, 2003). Previous 
studies on the effect of cross listings document positive value effects (e.g., Foerster 
and Karolyi, 1999; Miller, 1999; Foerster and Karolyi, 2000) and increased analyst 
coverage (Lang, Lins, and Miller, 2003). However, Siegel (2005) finds low 
compliance with US laws, while investors and regulators abstain from taking 
enforcement actions. 
The relatively large number of Dutch firms with a cross listing (i.e., 21% of our 
sample) provides a unique setting to study the impact of bonding via these cross 
listings on forecast specificity and ex post forecast errors. We analyse both the legal 
and reputational bonding arguments by investigating: exchange cross listings, where 
firms experience increased legal exposure as well as increased scrutiny and 
monitoring (i.e., US ADR level 2 or 3 listings and UK listings on LSE or AIM); and 
OTC cross listings, where firms only experience increased scrutiny and monitoring 
(i.e., US and UK over-the-counter market).  
In this study, we find that cross-listed firms disclose less specific forecasts. At the 
same time, the average forecast error of firms with a cross listing in the UK or US is 
lower than that of firms without such a cross listing. We further show that cross-listed 
firms are more conservative (i.e., less optimistic) in their forecasts than are non-cross-
listed firms. Given that these results apply to both exchange-listed and OTC-listed 
firms, we argue that legal bonding and reputational bonding play an important role in 
firms’ disclosures of earnings forecasts. 
What are the consequences of these results for disclosure quality? A negative 
interpretation would be that cross-listed firms reduce forecast specificity in order to 
increase forecast accuracy. Here, the overall effect remains unclear. In our view this 
interpretation is incomplete and the effects of a cross listing are more positive. First of 
all, cross-listed firms are more careful in their forecast disclosures by disclosing more 
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precise forecasts only when they are most certain about their future performance. Still 
24% of the forecasts by cross-listed firms are point forecasts relative to 29% of the 
other firms. Thus, managers’ concerns about disclosing incorrect and overly 
optimistic forecasts could lead them to disclose less precise and more conservative 
information, particularly in the case of uncertainty about future earnings. This 
explanation results in a positive effect, as the specificity is an indication of the 
uncertainty about the earnings of cross-listed firms. Second, the quality of the 
disclosed information by cross-listed firms is greater than that disclosed by non-cross-
listed firms, since their forecasts are more accurate. These interpretations imply that 
management forecasts disclosed by cross-listed firms are more informative, and thus 
that legal and reputational bonding has a positive influence on disclosure quality. 
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APPENDIX 4A 
The Frequency of the use of words from the scale of Mock 
Qualitative words       
Dutch English 
% increase 
or decrease N   Percentage 
Fractioneel Marginal 0 - 2% 0  0% 
Gering Modest  2 - 4% 15  4% 
Licht Limited 4 - 7% 40 + 10% 
Duidelijk Marked 7 - 12% 59 ++ 16% 
Belangrijk Significant  12 - 20% 107  28% 
Sterk Strong  20 - 30% 52  17% 
Aanzienlijk Considerable  30 - 45% 59  15% 
Fors Sharp  45% or more 34  10% 
Total     366   100% 
      
+ Including two forecasts where a firm mentions ‘between modest and limited’   
++ Including one forecast where a firm mentions ‘between limited and marked’ 
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Chapter 5 
 
The demand for corporate financial 
reporting: 
A survey among financial analysts55 
 
 
 
5.1   Introduction 
Firms supply information by reporting earnings and providing additional disclosure to 
facilitate the demands of current and potential investors. Given the complexity of this 
information, analysts, as financial intermediaries, play a key role in a firm’s reporting 
and disclosure practices (Brennan and Tamarowski, 2000; Graham, Harvey, and 
Rajgopal, 2005). In supplying information, CFOs largely base their policies on what 
they expect analysts value. Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal (2005) survey CFOs on 
their reporting strategies and provide a comprehensive overview of their perceptions 
and behavior on themes like earnings benchmarks, earnings smoothing, and voluntary 
disclosure. For setting the stock price, 35% of these CFOs views analysts as the most 
important group and 36% views analysts as the second most important group. 
We investigate analysts’ view on corporate financial reporting practices by means 
of a survey among more than 300 sell-side analysts that follow US firms. A survey 
has added value in the sense that it generates insights into the market’s expectations 
on a firm’s financial disclosure policies to the extent that would not be possible by 
means of an archival study. Despite a tradition in surveying analysts (e.g., Bradish, 
1965; Estes, 1968; Chandra, 1974), in the current literature analysts are mainly 
approached to participate in experiments (e.g., Libby and Tan, 1999; Sedor, 2002; 
Libby, Tan, and Hunton, 2006). We are aware of one recent study by Block (1999) 
                                            
55 This chapter is based on De Jong, Mertens, Van der Poel, and Van Dijk (2008). We are grateful to John 
Graham, Campbell Harvey, and Shiva Rajgopal for providing us their CFO survey data. 
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that surveys analysts, of which 95 respondents are sell-side analysts. This study uses a 
less comprehensive questionnaire with a greater focus on analysts’ valuation 
techniques and inputs. Furthermore, by contrasting the preferences of sell-side 
analysts with the perceptions of CFOs of public firms, as derived from Graham, 
Harvey, and Rajgopal (2005), we are able to document discrepancies and similarities 
between the demand side and the supply side of corporate financial information.  
Against the general preference in finance studies for cash flows (Brealey, Myers, 
and Allen, 2006) and in line with accounting research focusing on earnings (Penman, 
2007), we find that, similar to CFOs, analysts believe that a firm’s earnings are the 
most important performance measure. Analysts view their own forecast as the most 
important earnings benchmark, while the consensus analyst forecast comes at the 
second place. In contrast to CFOs, they do not significantly care about absolute 
benchmarks, such as the same quarter last year EPS and reporting a profit. Meeting 
earnings benchmarks is important, as it has implications for analysts’ perceptions 
about the firm’s credibility, future growth opportunities, and potential difficulties. Our 
results also justify CFOs’ concern about their reputation in achieving earnings 
benchmarks.  
Given the implications of not meeting earnings benchmarks for firms as well as 
for the management team, firms can influence these benchmarks by means of earnings 
management. However, with the exception of share repurchases, analysts believe that 
firms destroy value by managing their earnings, though they view real actions as less 
value-destroying actions than within-GAAP accruals actions. This result is consistent 
with CFOs’ preference to take real actions. Apparently, the increased scrutiny after 
the major accounting scandals and the legal threat of the Sarbanes Oxley Act 
influence analysts’ and CFOs’ perceptions of the potential costs related to accruals 
management.  
Firms can also influence earnings benchmarks by means of smoothing earnings, 
as it makes it easier for analysts to predict a firm’s earnings. Other benefits of a 
smooth earnings path are lower perceived risk, a reduction in the risk premium, and 
the assurance of a stable business. Even though a smooth earnings path brings about 
benefits, only 13% of the analysts recommend firms to make a moderate to large 
value sacrifice to avoid a bumpy earnings path, while 61% of the CFOs are willing to 
make such a sacrifice. A possible explanation for this remarkable difference is that 
analysts are less positive about the benefits of a smooth earnings path than CFOs. In 
addition, CFOs’ concern about their personal reputation when missing earnings 
benchmarks may intensify their positive view leading to a greater difference in 
opinion between analysts and CFOs. 
  So, firms can influence the likelihood of meeting analyst earnings forecasts in 
different ways. However, these different choices could lead analysts to suspect hidden 
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problems at the firm and to believe that managers lack the ability to foresee future 
developments when missing an earnings benchmark. These perceptions might be a 
possible explanation for the severe share price declines after missing earnings 
benchmarks. Our results suggest that CFOs face a tradeoff, i.e., either experience a 
severe share price decline due to the general belief that firms manage earnings or 
sacrifice firm value to meet their earnings benchmarks. Although analysts seem to 
adopt a long-term view, CFOs’ short-term focus might be a result of analysts’ 
expectations. 
Apart from earnings management, firms could influence analysts’ expectations by 
voluntarily disclosing financial information. Analysts believe that, by voluntarily 
disclosing information, firms promote a reputation for transparent reporting, reduce 
the stock’s information risk, and provide additional information beyond mandatory 
disclosure. Analysts also deduce information about managers’ skill level from a firm’s 
voluntary disclosure, while CFOs do not show concerns about the perception of their 
skill level. This result markedly contrasts CFOs’ reputation concerns related to 
achieving earnings benchmarks.  
Overall, our survey provides more insight into the role of analysts as financial 
intermediaries. According to Healy and Palepu (2001), analysts can help to diminish 
information asymmetry problems as well as agency problems between firms and 
investors. Moreover, previous studies find that analyst forecasts and recommendations 
contain more timely information than time-series models (e.g., Brown and Rozeff, 
1978; Givoly, 1982; Brown, Griffin, Hagerman, and Zmijewski, 1987) and affect 
firms’ share prices (e.g., Givoly and Lakonishok, 1979; Francis and Soffer, 1997).56 
Our results indicate that analysts draw inferences on the firm’s performance and its 
management’s skills based on the firm’s corporate reporting practices, which can have 
a mitigating impact on the information asymmetries and agency problems between 
firms and investors. However, we also suggest that analysts can intensify the agency 
problems, as their demands and expectations might induce managers to make 
decisions with a short-term focus.  
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.2 discusses the 
survey design and summary statistics of our survey data. We describe analysts’ view 
on reported earnings and earnings benchmarks in section 5.3. Section 5.4 describes 
the consequences of a firm’s real and accounting actions to meet an earnings 
benchmark on firm value as perceived by analysts. Subsequently, we explore the 
perceived implications of a smooth earnings path and the recommended value 
sacrifice to avoid a bumpy earnings path in section 5.5. Section 5.6 deals with the 
reasons why firms should voluntarily disclose financial information. Section 5.7 
provides a summary of all the results and a conclusion.  
                                            
56 See Ramnath, Rock, and Shane (2008) for an overview of recent evidence.  
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5.2   Method and survey design 
 
 
5.2.1   Survey design 
 
In the period July until October 2007, we approached the Heads of Equity Research of 
eleven of the world’s 20 largest investment banks. All institutions were willing to 
participate after we guaranteed anonymity about the participating banks and sell-side 
analysts to the compliance departments. Heads of Equity Research encouraged their 
analysts to participate. Each institution provided us with the number of sell-side 
analysts that were approached. The total number is 638, with a median of 68. We offer 
respondents a copy of our results and donate $10 for each completed survey to a 
charity of the respondents’ choice. All responses with less than ten answers were 
automatically deleted. In the period July 18 until October 30, 2007 we received 306 
usable responses. Our response rate is 48%. 
Our goal is to collect the opinions of financial analysts that we can confront with 
the opinions of the US CFOs in Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal (2005). Therefore, our 
survey design is strongly influenced by their questionnaire. 
A relevant requirement of analysts for our study is that they follow at least one US 
firm. Therefore, we start with three questions concerning whether the analyst follows 
at least one firm with an official listing in the US, the number of firms that the analyst 
follows, and the number of years of experience as a financial analyst. The survey ends 
in the case the respondent indicates that she does not follow a US firm.  
In the case the analyst has at least one US firm in her portfolio, a screen emerges 
that states: “The goal of this survey is to compare your responses to that of CFOs of 
US companies. In order to allow such a comparison we like to ask you to answer all 
subsequent questions for a particular US firm. Please think of a randomly chosen US 
firm in your portfolio and answer the following questions for this specific firm. We 
will refer to this firm as the firm you follow.” This approach allows us to compare the 
analysts’ opinions with the responses of CFOs. After this note, the analyst goes 
through seven screens with questions about earnings measures, earnings benchmarks, 
earnings smoothing, and voluntary disclosure. The final screen requests general 
information about the firm chosen by the analyst. We ask for revenues, industry, 
number of analysts following this firm, earnings guidance, credit rating, price-
earnings ratio, and the number years the CEO has been in office. The questions in this 
final screen allow us analyze the data for subsamples and to compare our sample of 
firms followed by analysts with the Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal (2005) sample of 
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firms. We incorporate all questions in Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal (2005), except 
three questions.57 Our survey is available on www.rsm.nl/analyst.  
We test for non-response bias in the usual manner, i.e., by comparing the 
responses of early and late respondents. We find no evidence of a non-response bias.  
 
 
5.2.2   Summary statistics 
 
Table 5.1 panel A provides summary statistics of the analysts that filled out the survey. 
We find that 46.1% of the analysts have experience as financial analyst for four to 
nine years, while 34% has experience of at least ten years. The table also shows that 
77.8% of the analysts follow at least ten firms.  
Panel B of Table 5.1 provides summary statistics of the firms that these analysts 
had in mind when they filled out the survey. To investigate whether our analyst 
sample is representative for the public firms of the survey of Graham, Harvey, and 
Rajgopal (2005), we compare the firm characteristics with the firm characteristics of 
the CFO survey. This comparison shows that the distribution over the seven industry 
groups is very similar, except for a larger representation of manufacturing firms in the 
CFO sample. Although we have observations in each of the five size classes, our 
analysts have chosen larger firms, a result which is also displayed in the number of 
analysts following the firms. In our empirical analysis we control for size and industry 
effects. We further find that relatively few analysts indicate that their firm provides 
either no guidance (i.e., 7.6%) or a lot of guidance (i.e., 4.4%), while most analysts 
indicate that their firm provides moderate or more than moderate guidance (i.e., 
42.9% and 22.9%, respectively). This result is not surprising, as more disclosure leads 
to greater analyst following (Lang and Lundholm, 1996). The same effect could apply 
to earnings guidance. Finally, most CEOs have a tenure of four to nine years (i.e., 
44.4%), while CEO tenure of at least ten years occur least (i.e., 15.2%). 
We test whether the firms chosen by the responding analysts are representative for 
the universe of US listed firms. Obviously, we need to control for differences in 
number of analysts following firms. We downloaded the number of analyst following 
and sales for all firms with I/B/E/S and Compustat coverage as per September 2007 
and weight each firm in the Compustat file with the number of analysts that follow the 
firm. We compare the summary statistics of this sample with our survey data. We find 
that our survey has a slight overrepresentation of larger firms. The relatively larger 
                                            
57 The first omitted question is about motives to limit voluntary disclosure and is removed to shorten the 
survey. The second omitted question contains a hypothetical investment scenario, which cannot be answered 
by analysts. The third question is about the firm’s most important groups in setting the stock price, and 
included the analysts themselves. 
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Table 5.1 
Characteristics of surveyed analysts and the firm that they follow 
Panel A of this table provides the frequencies and the percentage of the total number of observations per group 
of analyst respondents. Panel B shows these characteristics for the firm that analysts kept in mind when filling 
out the survey. We also provide the corresponding statistics for the firms in the survey of Graham, Harvey, and 
Rajgopal (2005). We only consider non-missing values in the calculations.  
Panel A: Characteristics of surveyed analysts             
          
Number of years active as financial analyst  Number of firms you follow    
 N %    N %  
<4 years 61 19.9%   < 5 firms 20 6.5%   
4 - 9 years 141 46.1%   5 - 10 firms 48 15.7%   
10+ years 104 34.0%   10 - 15 firms 100 32.7%   
     > 15 firms 138 45.1%   
          
Panel B: Characteristics of the firms that the analyst follow         
                   
 Analysts CFOs   Analysts  CFOs 
Revenue N %  % Industry N %  %
<$100 million 5 1.8% 15.1%  Retail/Wholesale 30 10.8%  8.6%
$100 - 499 million 15 5.4% 22.0%  Tech (Software/Biotech) 51 18.4%  13.9%
$500 - 999 million 11 4.0% 12.8%  Bank/Finance/Insurance 38 13.7%  13.2%
$1 - 4.9 billion 83 30.1% 24.6%  Manufacturing 27 9.7%  30.7%
$5 billion + 162 58.7% 25.6%  Public Utility 8 2.9%  3.3%
     Transportation/Energy 27 9.7%  5.3%
Number of analysts    Other 36 13.0%  12.2%
None 0 0.0% 7.8%      
1 - 5 2 0.7% 39.9%  Guidance provided   
6 - 10 64 23.4% 21.6%  0. None 21 7.6%  19.3%
11 - 15 89 32.5% 14.1%  1. A little 28 10.2%  18.0%
16+ 116 42.3% 16.7%  2. 33 12.0%  8.5%
Don't know 3 1.1%   3. Moderate 118 42.9%  32.0%
    4. 63 22.9%  13.7%
CEO tenure     5. A lot 12 4.4%  8.5%
<4 years 109 39.4% 36.9%       
4 - 9 years 123 44.4% 33.0%       
10+ years 42 15.2% 30.1%       
Don't know 3 1.1%        
                     
 
firms indicate that our sample captures the bigger players that have the largest effect 
on the US economy.  
In our results sections we compare the average answers of our analyst survey with 
the averages in the CFO survey in two ways. First, we do a standard difference-of-
means t-test. Second, since the distribution of our sample firms differs among firm 
size and industry from the CFO sample, we regress the answer scores of both samples 
on an analyst dummy that equals one for observations from our analyst sample, the 
revenue classes, and the industry classes (see Table 5.1, panel B for the different 
classes). Because the answers are given in distinct categories, we use ordered logit 
regression models. The tables report the significance of the coefficient of the analyst 
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dummy, which represents the size and industry corrected difference between the CFO 
and analyst answers. 
 
 
5.3   Analysts’ demand for reported earnings 
 
In this section, we first discuss analysts’ view on the most important performance 
measures. We subsequently discuss analysts’ opinion on the most important earnings 
benchmarks and why firms should try to achieve these earnings benchmarks. We 
approach the latter question also from the opposing perspective by discussing 
analysts’ answers to the question why firms should avoid missing an earnings 
benchmark. We compare the analysts’ responses with the responses of CFOs of public 
firms, as derived from Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal (2005). 
 
 
5.3.1   Reported earnings 
 
The main focus on performance benchmarks differs between finance and accounting 
studies. In finance studies, cash flows seem to be the most accepted performance 
measure (Brealey, Myers, and Allen, 2006, p.113), while accounting studies generally 
focus on earnings (Penman, 2007, p.132). In terms of information content, earnings 
are superior to cash flows in explaining stock returns (e.g., Bowen, Burgstahler, and 
Daley, 1987; Dechow, 1994). The survey results of Block (1999) among sell-side and 
buy-side analysts are consistent with this preference. However, DeFond and Hung 
(2003) argue that cash flows can complement the information contained in earnings, 
because cash flows are less vulnerable to managers’ subjective estimates and 
opportunistic behavior. Cash flows are also a better measure for evaluating a firm’s 
viability in terms of solvency and liquidity. The authors find that analysts tend to 
supplement their earnings forecasts with operating cash flow forecasts, when firms 
have larger accruals, more heterogeneous accounting choices relative to industry 
peers, more volatile earnings, high capital intensity, and poor financial health. They 
also find that for firms with analysts that provide both cash flow forecasts and 
earnings forecasts the abnormal returns around earnings announcements are 
significantly associated with cash flow forecast errors and not with earnings forecast 
errors. Previts, Bricker, Robinson, and Young (1994) argue that analysts prefer cash 
flows to value firms that are highly levered.  
Table 5.2 panel A shows the top three rankings of importance that analysts attach 
to different performance measures. The results indicate that analysts view a firm’s 
earnings as the most important performance measure and a firm’s revenues as the 
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second most important performance measure. This result mirrors CFO preferences 
(Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal, 2005). Noteworthy is the difference in opinion on 
cash flows. Specifically, analysts attach significantly more importance to free cash 
flows, while CFOs attach more importance to cash flows from operations. Though 
Block (1999) finds that more than half of the buy-side and sell-side analysts view 
EVA as moderately important, we show that it does not belong to the sell-side 
analysts’ top-three list of performance measures. 
In addition to unconditional scores, panel B of Table 5.2 provides analysts’ 
preferences in terms of the average ranking conditional on their own and their firm’s 
characteristics. To facilitate a comparison with Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal (2005), 
we show the results of the conditional averages in a similar format as their tables. 
We find that analysts of firms with a credit rating below investment grade attach 
the greatest importance to free cash flows, while earnings is the most important 
performance measure for firms that have an investment grade credit rating. This result 
is in line with the notion that cash flows act as a measure for assessing a firm’s credit 
and bankruptcy risks (Beaver, 1966; Ohlson, 1980). It is also consistent with the 
expectation that analysts rely more on liquidity measures when the firm that they 
follow is more distressed (Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal, 2005). Another notable 
difference is the greater importance that analysts attach to revenues and pro forma 
earnings, when they follow high-tech firms. Since technology firms typically make 
large investments that only become profitable in the longer term and have more 
volatile earnings, pro forma earnings and revenues may serve as complementary 
information to interpret earnings. The other firm characteristics do not provide 
remarkable differences in average rankings.  
To check whether the answers of analysts differ in terms of their characteristics, 
we distinguish between analysts with long and short tenures and between a large and 
small portfolio of firms that they follow. Although the results indicate that analysts 
with a small portfolio tend to attach more importance to revenues than analyst with a 
large portfolio, both types of analysts have a high preference for earnings as 
performance measure.  
 
 
5.3.2   Earnings benchmarks 
 
Previous studies find that managers prioritize on earnings benchmarks (e.g., 
Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997; Degeorge, Patel, and Zeckhauser, 1999; Dechow, 
Richardson, and Tuna, 2003; Brown and Caylor, 2005; Graham, Harvey, and 
Rajgopal, 2005). Recent evidence shows that, even though CFOs posit that the same 
quarter last year EPS is the most important earnings benchmark for quarterly earnings 
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announcements (Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal, 2005), these CFOs act as if they try 
harder to meet analyst consensus forecasts of EPS for the current quarter (Brown and 
Caylor, 2005). In addition, ample evidence indicates that firms guide analysts’ 
earnings forecasts to increase the probability to meet or beat these forecasts (e.g., 
Bartov, Givoly, and Hayn, 2002; Matsumoto, 2002; Richardson, Teoh, and Wysocki, 
2004; Cotter, Tuna, and Wysocky, 2006; Brown and Pinello, 2007). Brown and 
Caylor (2005) find that the negative market response to missing a threshold is higher 
for analyst consensus forecasts than for the same quarter last year EPS and avoiding a 
loss. The authors suggest that CFOs focus on meeting consensus analyst forecasts 
because their wealth in terms of, for instance, stock, options, and job security greatly 
depends on reported earnings.  
We ask analysts for their opinion about the importance of several earnings 
benchmarks. In addition to the answers that Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal (2005) use 
in their survey, we ask the respondents for the importance of their own EPS forecasts. 
Table 5.3 provides the analysts’ responses in comparison with CFOs’ answers.  
The results indicate that analysts attach the greatest importance to their own 
forecast (i.e., 91.7% agree or strongly agree). This result seems trivial; however, it can 
have considerable implications for firms. Diether, Malloy, and Scherbina (2002) 
document a persistent relation between dispersion of analyst opinions and stock 
returns. If several analysts follow a firm and their forecasts are widely dispersed, both 
the firm and its investors might not know which value to use as a benchmark to 
evaluate the firm. Moreover, our results imply that especially these firms should 
prioritize on the most influential analyst forecasts. They could for instance focus on 
celebrity analysts or analysts with greater previous performance, as these analysts 
have a greater impact on a firm’s share price movements (e.g., Park and Stice, 2000; 
Gleason and Lee, 2003).  
The second most important evaluation benchmark is the analyst consensus 
forecast followed by the same quarter last year EPS. Remarkably, this third 
benchmark comes at the first place for CFOs. The difference in average rating for the 
importance of the same quarter last year EPS is statistically significant. The results 
further imply that CFOs find previous quarter EPS and reporting a profit significantly 
more important than analysts. We do not find significant results for the “previous 
quarter EPS” and “reporting a profit”.  
Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal (2005) suggest a positive relation between CFOs’ 
preference for consensus analyst forecasts and the number of analysts that follow their 
firm. The authors further suggest that the focus of academic studies on larger firms 
with greater analyst coverage might influence the general perception of the 
importance of consensus analyst forecasts. In panel B of Table 5.3, we find little
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support for this suggestion, as analysts of smaller firms and of firms that are followed 
by a few analysts 58  maintain their opinion about the importance of the analyst 
consensus forecasts.  
We find a greater importance of analyst consensus forecasts of EPS and a smaller 
importance of the same quarter last year EPS for analysts of the technology industry 
relative to analysts of other industries. Apparently, analysts depend more on forecasts 
of other analysts and on less static earnings benchmarks when firms are more difficult 
to value and experience more uncertainties. Ramnath, Rock, and Shane (2008) suggest 
that a potential reason for analysts’ herding behavior is uncertainty about a firm’s 
future performance. The greater reliance on consensus forecasts in the technology 
sector provides preliminary evidence of this behavior.  
The conditional averages also indicate that analysts with a longer tenure rely more 
on their personal EPS forecast than analysts with a tenure up to four years. This is in 
line with the argument that less experienced analysts are motivated to rely more on the 
consensus forecasts, as they are more likely to be fired for providing inaccurate 
forecasts (Hong, Kubik, and Solomon, 2000). Our results further indicate that, even 
though analysts with larger portfolios tend to make less accurate forecasts (Clement, 
1999), they rely more on their own forecast than analysts with a small portfolio of 
firms. Their greater reliance on the consensus forecasts may help them to provide 
more accurate forecasts.  
 
 
5.3.3   Meeting earnings benchmarks 
 
Accounting studies document several incentives for firms to target earnings 
benchmarks. Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal (2005) investigate incentives related to 
stock prices, stakeholders, employee bonuses, career concerns, and debt covenants, as 
derived from Healy and Wahlen (1999), Dechow and Skinner (2000), and Fields, Lys, 
and Vincent (2001). Their survey findings suggest that CFOs mainly consider stock 
price driven motivations to meet earnings benchmarks, followed by their reputation 
concerns and the firm’s stakeholders. Table 5.4 documents analysts’ answers to the 
question why the firms that they follow should try to meet earnings benchmarks.  
 
 
                                            
58 Note that we classify firms with a few analysts as firms with up to ten analysts, while the threshold for the 
results of Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal (2005) is up to five analysts. For our two observations of firms with 
up to five analysts, the analysts find the analyst consensus forecast strongly important for the assessment of the 
reported quarterly earnings of the firm that they follow.  
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5.3.3.1   Stock price driven motivations 
 
Previous studies suggest that the market views meeting and beating earnings 
benchmarks to be important. Investors reward firms that meet and beat earnings 
benchmarks, while they punish firms that fall short of earnings benchmarks (e.g., 
Skinner and Sloan, 2002; Athanasakou, Strong, and Walker; 2007). In addition, firms 
that achieve earnings benchmarks consistently over time are priced at a premium 
(Barth, Elliott, and Finn, 1999; Kasznik and McNichols, 2002). The market also 
values firms that beat earnings benchmarks in the form of analyst forecasts at a 
premium, when this premium is an indicator for future performance (Bartov, Givoly, 
and Hayn, 2002; Kasznik and McNichols, 2002; Athanasakou, Strong, and Walker; 
2007). However, this market premium is lower or even absent for firms that meet or 
beat analyst forecasts as a result of earnings or expectations management (Bartov, 
Givoly, and Hayn, 2002; Athanasakou, Strong, and Walker; 2007). Skinner and Sloan 
(2002) show that growth firms get more severely punished when they miss analyst 
forecasts than value firms. 
The analyst survey results in Table 5.4 support the importance of stock price 
related motivations for meeting earnings benchmarks, which appear on the top of the 
analysts’ list. That is, 88.2% of the analysts believe that meeting earnings benchmarks 
helps firms to build credibility with capital markets. A high majority of the analysts 
(i.e., 87.5%) also believe that it helps to convey the firm’s future growth prospects to 
investors. Finally, analysts agree on the argument that it helps to maintain or increase 
the stock price (i.e., 77.1%) and reduce stock price volatility (57.8%). Analysts and 
CFOs broadly agree on the information content of meeting and beating earnings 
benchmarks. 
 
 
5.3.3.2   Stakeholder motivations 
 
Bowen, DuCharme, and Shores (1995) and Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) argue that 
firms can get better terms of trade with stakeholders, such as customers, suppliers, and 
lenders, when showing higher earnings, since higher earnings can enhance their 
reputation for fulfilling the claims with their stakeholders. Meeting earnings 
benchmarks can have the same implication. Our results show that 41.2% of the 
analysts view the assurance of a stable business to customers and suppliers as a 
meaningful reason to meet earnings benchmarks. This percentage increases to 60.8% 
for firms that operate in the technology industry. Relative to CFOs, the average 
ratings indicate that CFOs attach more importance to the stakeholder motivation to 
meet earnings benchmarks than analysts suggest CFOs should do.  
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5.3.3.3   Employee bonuses 
 
Following Healy (1985), there is considerable evidence that managers exercise 
discretion in their accounting choices to increase their compensation.59 In relation to 
earnings benchmarks, Matsunaga and Park (2001) show that executives are more 
likely to experience a reduction in their bonus compensation after their firm fails to 
meet analyst earnings forecasts or after a decrease in quarterly EPS relative to the 
previous year EPS two times in a row. However, according to Graham, Harvey, and 
Rajgopal (2005), CFOs do not find their bonus to be a major consideration for 
achieving an earnings benchmark. The authors derive two explanations from their 
interviews with CFOs. First, most CFOs do not necessarily receive a bonus after 
meeting earnings benchmarks due to the frequent use of internal targets or internal 
“stretch goals” to receive bonuses, which are normally higher than earnings 
benchmarks. Second, CFOs mentioned that their bonus is not as important as their 
standard salary and stock remuneration that typically are of much higher value. 
Another possible issue why CFOs might posit the unimportance of achieving bonuses 
as a reason to achieve earnings benchmarks is a tendency to provide socially desirable 
answers. In line with this reasoning, our results show that analysts do not agree with 
the argument that firms should try to meet earnings benchmarks for employees to 
achieve bonuses. 
 
 
5.3.3.4   Career concerns 
 
Career concerns can be a major reason for achieving earnings benchmarks. Previous 
studies show that executives are more likely to be replaced when their firm does not 
achieve analyst forecasts (e.g., Puffer and Weintrop, 1991; DeFond and Park, 1999; 
Farrell and Whidbee, 2003). These executives should be concerned about being 
dismissed, as their subsequent job is often significantly inferior to their previous 
position (Fee and Hadlock, 2004). Moreover, executives that meet or slightly beat 
analyst forecasts can enhance their reputation (Feng, 2004). The CFO survey results 
of Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal (2005) show that CFOs posit their external 
reputation as one of the most important reasons to hit earnings benchmarks. Our 
analyst results justify CFOs’ position. Specifically, 82.2% of the analysts agree that 
firms should achieve earnings benchmarks for the external reputation of the firm’s 
management team.  
 
 
                                            
59 See Fields, Lys, and Vincent (2001) for an overview. 
146 Chapter 5
159
 
 
5.3.3.5   Debt covenants 
 
A possible reason for managing earnings is to reduce the probability of violating debt 
covenants, thereby reducing the expected costs of debt (Watts and Zimmerman, 1990). 
In line with this reason, DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994), for instance, show that in the 
year prior to covenant violation, firms report positive abnormal accruals. Dechow and 
Skinner (2000) are rather sceptical about the importance of the violation of debt 
covenants to practitioners. Our analyst survey results as well as the CFO survey 
results (Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal, 2005) are consistent with the unimportance of 
earnings benchmarks regarding debt covenants. The average rating for the debt 
covenant argument is not significant and equals -0.06. 
 
 
5.3.4   Missing earnings benchmarks 
 
Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal (2005) ask CFOs why their company tries to avoid 
missing an earnings benchmark. CFOs’ two main concerns are that it creates 
uncertainty about the firm’s future prospects and that it is an indication of previously 
unknown problems in the firm. The authors explain their results by means of their 
subsequent interviews with CFOs. Most of the CFOs’ answers relate to the market’s 
perception of why the firm is not being able to meet the earnings targets. In particular, 
they state that the market generally expects that well-managed and stable firms should 
be able to find the money to achieve the earnings benchmarks, also when these firms 
operate in down periods. Especially when the firm has previously guided analysts to 
an earnings target, not meeting this benchmark signals poor management. Clearly 
from CFOs’ perspective, financial markets are ill-informed and analysts are important 
in the interpretation and dissemination of firm information. 
To examine how analysts, as participants of the market, do evaluate firms that 
miss earnings benchmarks, we ask them why the firms that they follow should try to 
avoid missing an earnings benchmark. Table 5.5 shows that their view mainly 
confirms CFOs’ survey answers and interview statements. In particular, 88.5% of the 
analysts agree with the statements that missing earnings benchmarks creates 
uncertainty about the firm’s future prospects. This percentage becomes even 98% for 
analysts that follow firms in the technology sector. Almost 80% of the analysts 
believe that firm that fail to meat earnings benchmarks may have previously unknown 
problems.  
Though CFOs refer in interviews explicitly to the role of analysts in that these 
analysts might doubt the underlying assumptions of their model if their firm fails to
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achieve an earnings benchmark (Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal, 2005), they do not 
believe that it leads to increased scrutiny of all aspects of the firm’s earnings releases 
(average rating equals 0.07). On the contrary, more than 50% of the analysts believe 
that missing earnings benchmarks leads to increased scrutiny (average rating equals 
0.48). In addition, 42% suspects a lack of flexibility to meet the benchmark, while the 
average surveyed CFO does not agree with that statement.  
Firms can experience a sharp share price decline after missing an earnings 
benchmark (e.g., Skinner and Sloan, 2002) and such share price declines around 
earnings announcements can lead to increased litigation threat (Skinner, 1994; 
Kasznik and Lev, 1995). Therefore, we would expect that the increase in the 
possibility of lawsuits would be an important reason for not missing an earnings 
benchmark. However, neither analysts nor CFOs agree with this statement.  
 
 
5.4   Value implications of a firm’s actions to avoid 
missing earnings benchmarks 
 
The previous section discussed the importance of earnings benchmarks and the most 
important reasons why firms should try to meet or beat these benchmarks. Given this 
importance, firms can take either accounting or real actions to reduce the probability 
of missing earnings benchmarks. Firms that engage in accounting actions manipulate 
accruals without an impact on cash flows. Several papers provide evidence that firms 
engage in accruals management (see Healy and Wahlen, 1999; Dechow and Skinner, 
2000; Beneish, 2001; and Fields, Lys, and Vincent, 2001 for surveys), though more 
recent evidence shows a decrease in this type of earnings management, as it is 
associated with huge accounting scandals (e.g., Enron and Worldcom) and the 
introduction of the 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) (e.g., Bartov and Cohen, 2007; 
Koh, Matsumoto, and Rajgopal 2007).  
Firms that engage in real actions to manage earnings mainly affect cash flows. 
Some papers provide evidence that firms take real actions to meet or beat earnings 
benchmarks. For instance, firms often reduce R&D expenditures to meet earnings 
benchmarks (e.g., Baber, Fairfield, and Haggard, 1991; Dechow and Sloan, 1991; 
Bushee, 1998). Another example is the timing of asset sales during periods in which 
firms would have to report a decline in earnings (Bartov, 1993). Roychowdhury 
(2006) suggests that firms are more likely to overproduce, reduce discretionary 
expenditures, or manipulate sales to improve reported margins and thereby avoid 
reporting losses or missing analyst forecasts. Another real action that firms take to 
achieve analyst earnings forecasts is repurchasing shares. Hribar, Jenkins, and 
Johnson (2006) find a higher than expected number of EPS-increasing stock 
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repurchases for firms with pre-repurchase earnings numbers that are slightly lower 
than analyst forecasts, while they find a lower than expected number of EPS-
increasing stock repurchases for firms with pre-repurchase earnings number that are 
slightly higher than analyst forecasts. In addition, Myers, Myers, and Skinner (2006) 
show that firms strategically time share repurchases to maintain reporting a string of 
earnings increases. 
Some real actions may be optimal, while other real actions might destroy value as 
it could have a negative impact on future cash flows (Roychowdhury, 2006). Accruals 
management can also be costly. Previous studies find that accruals management prior 
to secondary equity offerings and stock-for-stock mergers is negatively related with 
post-transaction stock returns and positively related with the incidence of post-
transaction lawsuits (DuCharme, Malatesta, and Sefcik, 2004; Gong, Louis, and Sun, 
2008. Bartov and Cohen (2007) argue that managers could perceive accruals 
management as more costly due to the increased scrutiny for earnings management 
after the accounting scandals and the stricter requirements and legal consequences as 
introduced by SOX. The authors show a decrease in both expectations management 
and accruals management and an increase in real earnings management in the Post-
SOX Period relative to the Pre-SOX Period. In a related study, Koh, Matsumoto, and 
Rajgopal (2007) show that managers use expectations management as a substitute for 
accruals management in the Post-SOX Period. We ask for analysts’ opinion about the 
value implications of actions that firms can take to avoid missing earnings 
benchmarks and relate these results to CFOs’ willingness to take these actions as 
derived from Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal (2005). Table 5.6 displays the results. 
In line with greater scrutiny and potential legal liability costs of accruals 
management in the Post-SOX Period, our results indicate that analysts view real 
actions to meet the desired earnings target as most value enhancing or least value 
destroying relative to the accruals actions. In particular, the top four of most value-
creating/least value-destroying choices are repurchasing common shares (i.e., number 
1), decreasing discretionary spending (i.e., number 2), providing incentives for 
customers to buy more products this quarter (i.e., number 3), and delaying starting a 
new project, even if this entails a small sacrifice in value (i.e., number 4), which are 
all real actions. Except for the decision to sell investments or assets to recognize gains 
this quarter (i.e., number 7), the bottom of the list contains accruals actions. When 
relating analysts’ view on the value implications of the different choices, CFOs’ 
preferences generally go in the direction of the least value-decreasing actions. 
Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal’s (2005) interviews with CFOs corroborate CFOs’ 
fear for legal actions when regulators suspect earnings management. Real actions to 
manage earnings are less apparent to regulators and thereby relatively less costly.  
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One choice where analysts and CFOs do not agree on is share repurchases. Share 
repurchases could have an impact on firm value in two ways. On the one hand, share 
repurchases can be value decreasing, because the costs of external financing can lead 
firms that use cash to repurchase shares to pass up value-enhancing investment 
projects (Myers, 1984). On the other hand, share repurchases can be value enhancing 
due to the reduction in agency costs associated with the otherwise retained earnings 
(Jensen, 1986). In relation to meeting earnings benchmarks, Hribar, Jenkins, and 
Johnson (2006) show that investors put a discount on firms that meet or beat analyst 
earnings forecasts due to share repurchases, though it helps to avoid an extreme share 
price decline. Our results indicate that analysts view a share repurchase as the most 
value-enhancing action that firms could take to meet their earnings target (average 
rating equals 0.55), while CFOs posit that they are not willing to choose this option to 
reach an earnings target (average rating equals -1.02).60 A possible explanation for this 
result is that analysts may view share repurchases as a reduction in agency costs, 
regardless of the purpose of the share repurchase.  
The conditional results in panel B suggest that analysts that follow high-tech firms 
have a significantly less pessimistic view on several real actions that firms can take 
(see number 2, 3, and 4). Given that 98% of analysts following high-tech firms agrees 
with the statement that missing an earnings benchmark creates uncertainty about the 
firm’s future prospects (see Table 5.5), they might perceive greater benefits of 
meeting earnings targets and lower costs of real actions to meet these targets than 
analysts of firms that operate in other industries. The conditional analyses further 
suggest that analysts who follow firms with a smooth earnings path believe that 
providing incentives to buy more products this quarter and delaying starting a new 
project is less value destroying than analysts that follow firms with a bumpy earnings 
path. 
 
 
5.5   Smooth earnings paths 
 
Smoothing earnings is a specific form of earnings management, where firms aim to 
diminish the fluctuations in their reported earnings. This section discusses how 
analysts perceive the consequences of earnings smoothing and whether they 
recommend firms to sacrifice value to accomplish a smooth earnings path. 
 
 
                                            
60 However, in another survey, about three quarters of the CFOs maintain that an increase in EPS is important 
for their share-repurchase decisions (Brav, Graham, Harvey, and Michaely, 2005). In addition, 69% of the 
CFOs of firms that had seriously considered an equity issue view EPS dilution as an important factor that 
influences their equity issue decision (Graham and Harvey, 2005).  
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5.5.1   The consequences for firms that smooth their earnings path 
 
According to Previts, Bricker, Robinson, and Young (1994), analysts prefer to follow 
firms with a smooth earnings path. The authors argue that smooth earnings bring 
about a “low-risk earnings platform” for making forecasts and recommendations. 
From a firm’s perspective, Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal (2005) show that 96.9% of 
their surveyed CFOs have a preference for a smooth earnings path. There is 
considerable evidence that many firms put this preference into practice by actually 
smoothing their earnings path (e.g., Beidleman, 1973; Ronen and Sadan, 1981; Hand, 
1989; Barth, Elliot, and Finn, 1999; Myers, Myers, and Skinner, 2006). Managers 
have incentives to smooth their earnings, as it can lead to higher share prices (e.g., 
Ronen and Sadan, 1981; Myers, Myers, and Skinners, 2006) and to a lower cost of 
equity (Francis, LaFond, Olsson, and Schipper, 2004). Firms also smooth their 
earnings to reduce their cost of debt and to get better trade terms with suppliers and 
customers (Trueman and Titman, 1988). A more personal reason for managers is to 
achieve their bonus targets (Healy, 1985) or to protect their job (Fudenberg and 
Tirole, 1995). Goel and Thakor (2003) argue that firms smooth earnings for 
uninformed investors that need to trade for liquidity reasons and can experience large 
losses if the firm’s earnings were more volatile. 
Since one of the major tasks for analysts is to predict a firm’s future performance, 
we inquire about the consequences of earnings smoothing for the firm that they 
follow. Table 5.7 provides the results. The results show a high agreement among 
analysts who view earnings as easier to predict for smoothing firms (i.e., 83% agree). 
Moreover, the non-significant difference between the average ratings of analysts and 
CFOs (i.e., 1.01 vs. 0.99, respectively) suggests that CFOs share this view. A majority 
of the analysts further consider smooth earnings to be less risky (i.e., 56.7% agree) 
and that demand a lower return (i.e., 42.2% agree). CFOs seem to share this opinion, 
though they are more optimistic about the risk and return consequences.  
In line with the better trade terms with customers and suppliers as theorized by 
Trueman and Titman (1988), 43.8% of the analysts agree that a smooth earnings path 
would assure customer and suppliers that the business is stable. Trueman and Titman 
(1988) also argue that smooth earnings could decrease the cost of debt. However, 
analysts vary in their opinion about the consequences of earnings smoothing for a 
firm’s desired credit rating. In particular, 34.2% agrees on a positive impact on a 
firm’s desired credit rating, while 20.6% disagrees. The conditional analyses in panel 
B suggest that the positive impact is mainly important for firms with a credit rating 
below investment grade. 
Previous studies argue that managers smooth earnings to reveal their private 
information about future earnings (e.g., Ronen and Sadan, 1981; Kirschenheiter and
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Melumad, 2002). In addition, Tucker and Zarowin (2006) empirically show that the 
stock price of firms that smooth their earnings reflects more information on future 
earnings than that of firms that do not smooth their earnings. In contrast to these 
studies, we find that analysts do not perceive a smooth earnings path as being 
informative about the firm’s growth prospects (i.e., average rating equals -0.22). Yet, 
CFOs posit that a smooth earnings path reveals information about the firm’s growth 
prospects (i.e., average rating equals 0.42). Interestingly, there is a discrepancy 
between analysts and CFOs. CFOs smoothen their earnings to signal their future 
expectations, while analysts do not pick up the signal. This conjecture is in line with 
analysts’ disbelieve that smooth earnings clarify true economic performance (i.e., 
average rating equals -0.32). However, though more CFOs agree that a smooth 
earnings path would reveal true economic performance, the average rating remains 
negative (i.e., average rating equals -0.05).  
About one third of the analysts agrees with the statement that earnings smoothing 
promotes the firm’s reputation for transparent and accurate reporting, while one third 
disagrees, leading to an average rating of -0.06. With an average rating of 0.32, CFOs 
seem to have a more optimistic view on the implications for their firm’s reputation. 
This finding together with our finding on the revelation of the future growth prospects 
suggests that CFOs have different reasons to smoothen earnings that are not 
significantly recognized by analysts. 
The conditional analyses in panel B indicate that analysts are more positive about 
the consequences of a smooth earnings path for the high-tech industry. Relative to 
analysts of other industries, more analysts of high-tech firms believe that a smooth 
earnings path makes it easier to predict the firm’s future earnings, makes the firm less 
risky, assures that the firm’s business is stable, promotes the firm’s reputation for 
transparent and accurate reporting, and reveals more information about the firm’s 
future growth prospects and true economic performance. Overall, the difficulty to 
value technology firms and the uncertainty about these firms’ future performance may 
make the role of a smooth earnings path more important for analysts. 
 
 
5.5.2   Value sacrifice to avoid bumpy earnings path 
 
As discussed in the previous section, a smooth earnings path can bring about 
advantages for the firm’s value as well as for its managers. Graham, Harvey, and 
Rajgopal (2005) ask CFOs how much value they are willing to sacrifice to avoid a 
bumpy earnings path. We contrast CFOs answers with analysts’ answers to the 
question how much value a firm should sacrifice to avoid a bumpy earnings path. 
Table 5.8 displays the results. Panel A shows the results for the separate groups of 
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value sacrifice. Panel B also displays the value sacrifice, but in an aggregated format. 
For instance, instead of reporting the percentage of respondents that recommends a 
moderate sacrifice, panel B shows the percentage of respondents that recommends at 
least a moderate sacrifice. Panel C displays the conditional averages. 
The results imply remarkable differences. Analysts recommend firms to sacrifice 
much less value than CFOs are willing to do. Of all analyst respondents, only 13.2% 
(i.e., 12.1% plus 1.1%) believe that firms should make a moderate to large sacrifice to 
avoid a bumpy earnings path. This percentage highly contrasts the 60.9% of CFOs 
(i.e., 46.9% plus 14%) that are willing to make a moderate to large sacrifice. CFOs 
claim that “the market hates uncertainty” (Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal, 2005, p.47) 
and provide share-price related arguments to give up value for a smooth earnings path. 
The authors relate CFOs’ arguments to the risk premium that investors demand as a 
result of estimation risk in expected returns (e.g., Klein and Bawa, 1976; Xia, 2001), 
the firm’s cost of capital (e.g., Miller, 1977; Anderson, Ghysels, and Juergens, 2005), 
idiosyncratic return volatility (e.g., Goyal and Santa-Clara, 2003), and information 
asymmetry (e.g., Barry and Brown, 1985, 1986; Merton 1987). 
Though analysts recognize some advantages of a smooth earnings path, they seem 
to be much more focused on the long-term value of the firm. About one third of the 
analysts believe that firms should not sacrifice value and about half of the analysts 
believe that firms should sacrifice only a small amount of money to avoid a bumpy 
earnings path. Given CFOs’ more optimistic view about the implications of a smooth 
earnings path compared to analysts, CFOs might myopically be willing to give up too 
much value relative to what analysts and other market participants demand. 
The conditional analysis in panel C shows that a higher proportion of analysts 
believe that high-tech firms should sacrifice small (i.e., 63.3%) or moderate value 
(i.e., 22.4%) to avoid a bumpy earnings path, suggesting that these firms enjoy greater 
benefits with a smooth earnings path. Furthermore, though neither analysts with a 
short or a long tenure favor a moderate or large sacrifice in value to avoid a bumpy 
earnings path, a significantly smaller proportion of analysts with a long tenure believe 
that firms should not sacrifice value at all (i.e., 28.5% vs. 54.9%). 
 
 
5.6   The reasons to voluntarily disclose information 
 
In addition to mandatory financial disclosure, firms can communicate information to 
the market on a voluntarily basis. Press releases, investors and analyst meetings, 
conference calls, newsletters, field visits with institutional investors, and disclosure in 
regulatory filings beyond the mandatory disclosure are channels for voluntary 
information disclosure. Analysts have a preference to follow firms that provide more
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extensive financial information (e.g., Lang and Lundholm, 1996; Botosan and Harris, 
2000) and strongly rely on information that they receive from the management team 
(e.g., Previts, Bricker, Robinson, and Young, 1994). In our survey, we ask analysts 
why firms should voluntarily disclose financial information and group the different 
reasons into information asymmetry, analyst coverage, stock compensation, 
management talent, and limits to mandatory disclosure. 61  Table 5.9 provides the 
results. 
 
 
5.6.1   Information asymmetry 
 
Investors demand a risk premium for bearing information risk as a result of 
information asymmetry between firms and investors (Barry and Brown, 1985, 1986; 
Merton, 1987). By voluntarily disclosing information, firms reduce this information 
asymmetry, which on its turn decreases their cost of capital. Another effect of 
voluntary disclosure is that firms reduce the information asymmetry between 
informed and uninformed investors and thereby increase their stock’s liquidity 
(Diamond and Verrecchia, 1991; Kim and Verrecchia, 1994). 
We ask analysts whether firms should voluntarily disclose information for reasons 
related to a reduction in information asymmetry. Accordingly, 87% of the analysts 
believe that voluntarily communicating information would reduce the “information 
risk” that investors assign to the firm’s stock. Although information risk is related to 
the firm’s cost of capital, just 43.3% of analysts believe that voluntary disclosure 
reduces a firm’s cost of capital. Another motive that is closely related to the firm’s 
cost of capital is the firm’s P/E ratio. More than half of the analysts believe that 
voluntary disclosure increases the firm’s P/E (i.e., 51.6%). Furthermore, 78.2% 
believes that voluntary communication increases the predictability of the firm’s future 
prospects, 51.5% of the analysts agrees that it corrects the firm’s under-valued stock 
price, and 43% believes that it increases the overall liquidity of the firm’s stock. The 
comparison with CFOs indicates that analysts and CFOs share their view on the 
information-asymmetry-related consequences of corporate disclosure.  
According to Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal (2005), 92.1% of the CFOs agree 
with the statement that they disclose financial information voluntarily to promote the 
firm’s reputation for transparent and accurate reporting. These CFOs have a reason to 
do so, as analysts believe that this is the main reason to voluntarily disclose financial 
information. Although the CFOs’ average rating is higher (i.e., 1.39), the average 
rating for analysts still equals 1.27 with 89.9% of analysts agreeing with the 
statement.   
                                            
61 See Healy and Palepu (2001) for a survey. 
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The conditional averages in panel B indicate that the reputation argument matters 
more for analysts of low P/E firms. A reduction in the cost of capital is more 
important for firms with a bumpy earnings path and increased liquidity is more 
important for firms with a lower credit rating. Analysts of non-high-tech firms and 
analysts of firms with longer-tenured CEOs care more about the information risk 
motivation. The predictability of the firm’s future earnings is more important for the 
less experienced analysts and for analysts that follow firms that provide more 
guidance. A possible explanation for the latter result is that analysts select guiding 
firms to decrease the likelihood of making inaccurate predictions and analyses.  
 
 
5.6.2   Analyst coverage 
 
Previous studies argue that mandatory disclosure is not sufficient for the 
communication of a manager’s private information (e.g., Bhushan, 1989a, 1989b; 
Lang and Lundholm, 1996). Analysts play an important role in information 
acquisition for investors. According to Lang and Lundholm (1996), more transparent 
disclosure can result in more valuable reports that analysts can sell and in a lower cost 
of information acquisition, leading to an increase in analyst coverage. Our results 
show that 50% of the analysts agrees with the statement that voluntarily 
communicating financial information attracts more financial analysts to follow the 
firm’s stock, while 16.5% does not agree. We find no significant difference between 
CFOs’ and analysts’ answers. The conditional averages suggest that analysts of firms 
that provide more earnings guidance agree more on the argument of increased 
disclosure. 
 
 
5.6.3   Stock compensation 
 
Firms can have stock-compensation related reasons to voluntarily release financial 
information, as previous studies find voluntary disclosure to be associated with insider 
trading (Noe, 1999) and share-based compensation (Aboody and Kasznik, 2000; 
Nagar, Nanda, and Wysocki, 2003). According to Healy and Palepu (2001), firms can 
reduce the contracting costs that go hand in hand with stock compensation of new 
employees by releasing financial information voluntarily. The underlying reason for a 
reduction in contracting costs is that new employees will demand a risk premium for 
facing the risk of mispriced stock. The CFO respondents of Graham, Harvey, and 
Rajgopal (2005) do not view the demand for a risk premium of the firm’s employees 
as a reason to voluntarily communicate financial information (i.e., average rating 
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equals -0.57). Though the average rating of 0.09 from analysts is significantly 
different from zero, they do not show much agreement on this argument either (i.e., 
30.1% of the analysts agrees vs. 23.2% disagrees).  
 
 
5.6.4   Management talent signalling 
 
Because managers cannot directly communicate their ability to the market, they can 
signal their type by voluntarily disclosing financial information (Trueman, 1986). 
Consistent with this theory, our results show that 54.2% of the analysts believes that 
voluntarily communicating financial information reveals the skill level of the 
managers. However, CFOs posit that their skill level is not their main concern when 
voluntarily disclosing information (Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal, 2005). The 
average ratings of analysts’ and CFOs’ answers are significantly different. This result 
is remarkable, especially given our earlier findings on the importance of achieving 
earnings benchmarks for CFOs’ external reputation. Apparently, analysts deduce 
more information on managers’ skills from voluntary disclosures than CFOs are 
aware of. 
 
 
5.6.5   Limitations of mandatory disclosures 
 
Less informative mandatory disclosure can be a motivation for firms to voluntarily 
communicate financial information (e.g., Tasker, 1998; Bushee, Matsumoto, and 
Miller, 2003; Jones, 2007). Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal (2005) show that 72.1% of 
the CFOs agrees with this statement. From an analyst’s point of view, previous studies 
suggest that disclosure beyond that required is informative, as it improves analysts’ 
forecast accuracy (Bowen, Davis, and Matsumoto, 2002; Jones, 2007). We find that 
analysts care about voluntary disclosure due to deficiencies of required financial 
disclosure. We show that 81% of the analysts believe that voluntarily communicating 
information provides important information that is not included in the firm’s 
mandatory financial disclosure, and thus agree with the CFO point of view. 
 
 
5.7   Summary and conclusions 
 
In this chapter, we examine analysts’ views on a corporate financial reporting 
practices concerning earnings benchmarks, earnings smoothing, and voluntary 
disclosure. We conduct a survey among 306 analysts and compare these analysts’ 
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preferences with the preferences and actions of CFOs from public firms, which we 
derive from the survey data used by Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal (2005). Since 
analysts play a key role in reporting and disclosure practices (Brennan and 
Tamarowski, 2000; Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal, 2005), this comparison provides a 
unique view on the similarities and discrepancies between the supply and demand side 
of financial information. Our findings suggest that CFOs and analysts share their 
opinion on many reporting issues, but they also have dissenting views on some 
fundamental issues.  
An important finding is that not only CFOs, but also analysts view earnings as the 
most important performance measure. This finding is in line with accounting studies 
who find that, for the average firm, earnings have superior information content 
relative to cash flows. However, it goes against finance studies, who view cash flows 
as the most important performance measure. We further find that analysts view their 
own EPS forecast as the most important one, which is important for firms with highly 
dispersed analyst earnings forecasts. The result implies that these firms might have to 
prioritize on the most influential analyst forecasts. The results also indicate that 
analysts prioritize earnings benchmarks in a different way than CFOs do. Analysts 
mainly focus on benchmarks that take into account future earnings, while CFOs also 
heavily focus on absolute benchmarks, such as the same quarter last year EPS and 
reporting a profit.  
Analysts believe that the main reasons why firms should meet their earnings 
benchmarks are that it helps (1) firms to build credibility with the capital market; (2) 
firms to convey their future growth prospects to investors; (3) the external reputation 
of these firms’ management teams; and (4) firms to maintain or increase their stock 
price. CFOs posit the same reasons why they try to meet earnings benchmarks. The 
top two reasons for both analysts and CFOs to avoid missing an earnings benchmark 
are the increased uncertainty about the firm’s future prospects and the market’s 
suspicion that the firm experienced previously unknown difficulties. Surprisingly, 
CFOs are not concerned about the increased scrutiny of their firm’s earnings releases, 
while most analysts become suspicious and expect an increase in scrutiny. Also, 
analysts seem to suspect a lack of flexibility if firms fail to hit earnings benchmarks, 
while CFOs posit that a lack of earnings flexibility is not a reason to avoid missing an 
earnings benchmark. This difference in opinion might be caused by analysts’ common 
belief that firms manage earnings to hit earnings benchmarks. 
Given the importance of hitting earnings benchmarks, firms can take accounting 
and real actions to meet formalized expectations. We find that, except for share 
repurchases, the average analyst perceives all surveyed actions as value destroying, 
suggesting that they do not believe the benefits of earnings management to outweigh 
its costs. Remarkably, CFOs are very reluctant to repurchase shares to achieve their 
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desired earnings target, while analysts perceive this as the only value-enhancing 
action. Surprisingly, CFOs maintain to take real actions, such as decreasing 
discretionary spending or delaying a new project, rather than employing within-
GAAP accounting actions. However, in line with CFOs’ preference, analysts view 
real actions as the least value-destroying actions, suggesting that also analysts attach 
greater costs to accounting discretion. It is likely that the greater scrutiny and risk of 
legal actions associated with the accounting scandals and the Sarbanes Oxley Act play 
an important role here. 
A smooth earnings path could help CFOs to achieve earnings benchmarks in the 
form of analyst forecasts, as analysts perceive the earnings of firms with a smooth 
earnings path as more predictable. However, the results also indicate that CFOs have a 
different intention to smooth earnings than perceived by analysts. In particular, CFOs 
posit that a smooth earnings path enhances the information about a firm’s growth 
prospects, while analysts do not deduct this information from smooth earnings. Both 
analysts and CFOs believe that a smooth earnings path makes a firm less risky, 
reduces a firm’s risk premium, and assures a stable business, though CFOs are more 
optimistic about these benefits. CFOs’ willingness to sacrifice value reflects this more 
optimistic view, as 61% is willing to make a moderate to large sacrifice in value, 
while just 13% of the analysts recommends such a value sacrifice.  
Instead of earnings management or earnings smoothing, firms can voluntarily 
disclose financial information to influence analyst forecasts. Our results indicate that 
voluntary disclosure has added value for analysts. Analysts and CFOs have the same 
top three list of reasons why firms voluntarily disclose financial information, i.e., (1) 
to promote a reputation for transparent reporting; (2) to reduce the stock’s information 
risk; and (3) to provide information beyond that mandatory to provide additional 
clarification. We further find a surprising difference that analysts derive information 
about the management teams’ skill level, while CFOs do not show much concern 
about their perceived skills. This result highly contrasts with their career concerns 
associated with meeting earnings benchmarks. 
Overall, our results on the analysts’ views on financial reporting complement the 
CFO results of Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal (2005) well. Our survey provides 
insight into what the market expects from firms and what drives managers to have 
such a short-term focus. We show that analysts have a greater tendency to adopt the 
long-term view. In particular, their most important performance measures contain 
future earnings expectations, they view accounting and real earnings management 
actions as value destroying, and they suggest not to sacrifice value or to make a small 
sacrifice to avoid a bumpy earnings path.  
However, even though analysts have a focus on the longer term, their demands 
and expectations might motivate CFOs to take actions with more short-term 
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consequences. First, these actions can be caused by analysts’ notion of the underlying 
implications (a) when a firm does not meet an earnings benchmark, such as the 
uncertainty about the firm’s future prospects or the suspicion of hidden problems 
within the firm; and (b) when a firm has a bumpy earnings path, such as more risk and 
a higher cost of capital. Second, meeting earnings benchmarks and voluntarily 
disclosing news influence analysts’ view on the management’s reputation. In the case 
managers think they cannot fulfill analysts’ expectations, they might take short-term 
actions to positively influence analysts’ perception. 
Academic studies view the role of analysts not only as a financial intermediary, 
but also as the provider of additional scrutiny on a firm’s reporting practices leading 
to lower agency costs. Though analysts, as financial experts, are an obvious group for 
providing such scrutiny, we also find some limitations. For instance, analysts reckon 
the benefits of a smooth earnings path and thereby suggest firms to sacrifice value, yet 
to a much lesser extent than managers opt for. Besides, analysts are on the same line 
as CFOs in that they view real actions to manage earnings as the least value-
destroying ones relative to within-GAAP accounting actions. Our results suggest that 
if analysts’ scrutiny can result in a reduction in agency problems, their role needs to 
be taken into account, for instance, when considering regulation changes. As long as 
firms and analysts are on the same line on issues that do not support value-
maximizing behavior, analysts’ influence on firms’ reporting practices might result in 
no change in behavior.  
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Nederlandse samenvatting  
(Summary in Dutch) 
 
Dit proefschrift bestaat uit vier empirische studies, waarvan de eerste twee studies 
zich richten op het deelgebied ondernemingsfinanciering en de laatste twee studies 
zich richten op externe verslaggeving. De eerste studie analyseert de invloed van 
persoonlijke kenmerken van topbestuurders op hun beslissingen om onderdelen van 
hun onderneming af te stoten. In de tweede studie wordt de selectie van financiële 
adviseurs door ondernemingen die een buitenlandse acquisitie plegen bestudeerd. 
Vervolgens richt de derde studie zich op winstvoorspellingen van Nederlandse 
beursgenoteerde ondernemingen. De laatste studie analyseert de voorkeuren van 
analisten op het gebied van de externe verslaggeving door ondernemingen die zij 
volgen. Hierna volgt een korte samenvatting van deze vier empirische studies. 
Na de introductie, wordt in Hoofdstuk 2 onderzocht in hoeverre de achtergrond 
van topbestuurders van invloed is op hun beslissingen omtrent het afstoten van 
bedrijfsonderdelen. Hoewel persoonlijke kenmerken van managers een belangrijke rol 
spelen op het gebied van financiële en strategische beslissingen (Bertrand en Schoar, 
2003), bestaan relatief weinig studies op het gebied van ondernemingsfinanciering die 
deze beslissingen vanuit het perspectief van de managers onderzoeken (Baker, 
Ruback, en Wurgler, 2004). Dit hoofdstuk richt zich op topbestuurders van 
ondernemingen met meerdere bedrijfssegmenten en onderzoekt in hoeverre deze 
topbestuurders geneigd zijn om minder snel onderdelen af te stoten van segmenten 
waar zij bekend mee zijn dan andere, voor hen minder bekende segmenten. 
Topbestuurders zijn bekend met de bedrijfssegmenten van hun onderneming door hun 
werkervaring voordat zij als topbestuurder worden benoemd.  
Er worden drie argumenten gegeven voor het bovengenoemde bekendheidseffect. 
Ten eerste wordt beargumenteerd dat topbestuurders minder snel van hun bekende 
segmenten desinvesteren doordat hun kennis van deze segmenten veel meer 
omvattend en diepgaander is dan van de segmenten waar zij geen werkervaring in 
hebben. Het tweede argument stelt dat meer bekendheid met segmenten leidt tot een 
grotere illusie van het hebben van controle over deze segmenten, met als gevolg dat 
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topbestuurders de rendementen van bekende segmenten overschatten en de risico’s 
hiervan onderschatten. Als laatste argument wordt gesuggereerd dat topbestuurders 
meer macht binnen de onderneming krijgen en moeilijker zijn te ontslaan door het 
relatieve aandeel van bekende segmenten te vergroten. Dit doen zij door onbekende 
onderdelen af te stoten. 
In het hoofdstuk wordt verder beredeneerd dat afstotingsbeslissingen onderdeel 
zijn van een onderhandelingsproces tussen topbestuurders en de segmentmanagers in 
een interne kapitaalmarkt. Omdat segmentmanagers de voorkeur hebben voor het 
managen van zo groot mogelijke segmenten, zijn zij geneigd om tegen elke poging 
van afstoting(en) te onderhandelen. Zij ontlenen hun onderhandelingsmacht aan hun 
private informatie over het segment dat zij managen en aan hun persoonlijke 
vaardigheden en connecties. Deze onderhandelingsmacht is het sterkst voor managers 
van segmenten waar topbestuurders niet bekend mee zijn, terwijl dit juist de 
segmenten zijn waar topbestuurders bij voorkeur onderdelen van afstoten. Voorts 
wordt verwacht dat de afhankelijkheid van informatie en persoonlijke vaardigheden 
minder worden als de topbestuurders hun huidige functie een aantal jaren bekleden, 
waardoor zij hun voorkeur voor het afstoten van onbekende segmenten pas later 
tijdens hun ambtstermijn tonen. 
Uit een analyse van afstotingen van 1,182 bedrijfssegmenten van Amerikaanse 
ondernemingen in de periode van 1996 tot en met 2004 blijkt, dat topbestuurders met 
een ambtstermijn van minimaal drie jaar half zo vaak onderdelen van bekende 
segmenten afstoten dan van onbekende segmenten. De resultaten ondersteunen de 
argumenten dat topbestuurders minder snel onderdelen van bekende segmenten 
afstoten door hun superieure kennis van deze segmenten en door hun illusie dat ze 
controle hebben over de gebeurtenissen in deze segmenten. De bevindingen 
bevestigen tevens dat afstotingsbeslissingen onderdeel uitmaken van een 
onderhandelingsproces, waarbij segmentmanagers met een sterkere 
onderhandelingspositie het voor elkaar krijgen om geen onderdelen af te stoten. Naast 
de kans op afstoting bestudeert het hoofdstuk ook de waarde-effecten voor 
aandeelhouders rond de dagen dat de onderneming de afstoting aankondigt. Uit de 
resultaten komt naar voren dat het bekendheidseffect kostbaar kan zijn, aangezien 
afstotingen van bekende segmenten door topbestuurders die minimaal drie jaar hun 
huidige positie bekleden de hoogste rendementen opleveren. Kortom, de achtergrond 
van topbestuurders is van invloed op hun beslissingen, die negatieve gevolgen kan 
hebben voor de waarde van hun onderneming. 
In Hoofdstuk 3 wordt onderzocht hoe ondernemingen die een 
grensoverschrijdende acquisitie plegen hun financiële adviseurs selecteren. Deze 
selectie is vooral belangrijk voor de waardecreatie bij buitenlandse acquisities, omdat 
de overnemende partij de ervaringen en vaardigheden van hun adviseurs nodig hebben 
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om hen wegwijs te maken met de buitenlandse economische en juridische gewoontes 
en condities. Er worden drie selectiestappen in aanmerking genomen. Ondernemingen 
beslissen eerst in hoeverre zij een adviseur inhuren. Als ze een adviseur inhuren, dan 
selecteren zij de nationaliteit van hun adviseur. De nationaliteitskeuze bestaat uit het 
land van de onderneming zelf, het land van de over te nemen partij of een derde land. 
Afhankelijk van de nationaliteitskeuze van de adviseur, maken zij vervolgens hun 
selectie op basis van de ervaring van adviseurs, dat wil zeggen wereldwijde ervaring 
en/of ervaring in het land van het over te nemen bedrijf.  
De dataset die in dit hoofdstuk onderzocht wordt, bestaat uit 3,537 buitenlandse 
acquisities die plaatsvinden in de periode van 1995 tot en met 2005. In deze dataset 
komen de overnemende partijen uit 46 verschillende landen en de overgenomen 
partijen uit 92 verschillende landen. De uitkomsten van de eerste stap, waarin 
onderzocht wordt in hoeverre ondernemingen een adviseur inhuren, onderschrijven 
eerdere bevindingen van studies die de adviseurkeuze van binnenlandse acquisities 
onderzoeken. Zo huren ondernemingen eerder een adviseur in als de over te nemen 
partij zelf een adviseur inhuurt, de over te nemen partij beursgenoteerd is, de 
onderneming zelf minder acquisitie-ervaring heeft, de transactiewaarde hoger is, de 
acquisitie met aandelen wordt betaald en als er juridische goedkeuring verleend dient 
te worden.  
Bij de keuze van de nationaliteit komt in de resultaten naar voren dat 
landkenmerken van zowel de overnemende als van de over te nemen partij van 
invloed zijn. Zo huren ondernemingen bij voorkeur adviseurs in het land met de 
hoogste ontwikkelingsgraad van de financiële markten en met het grootste aantal 
juridische procedures binnen het rechtssysteem. Daarnaast huren ondernemingen bij 
voorkeur adviseurs uit eigen land in als hun eigen land of het land van het over te 
nemen bedrijf een betere bescherming van de aandeelhouders kent. Tevens zijn 
ondernemingen geneigd om een adviseur in het land van de over te nemen partij in te 
huren als dit land minder open staat voor buitenlandse acquisities. De resultaten tonen 
verder aan dat zowel de wereldwijde ervaring van adviseurs als de specifieke ervaring 
van adviseurs in het land van de over te nemen partij als substituut kunnen dienen 
voor de buitenlandse acquisitie-ervaring van een onderneming. Echter, adviseurs uit 
eigen land evenals het land van de over te nemen partij creëren de meeste waarde bij 
buitenlandse acquisities, zelfs als deze adviseurs minder ervaring hebben.  
Hoofdstuk 4 analyseert de kenmerken van winstvoorspellingen die door het 
management van Nederlandse ondernemingen met een beursnotering aan Euronext 
Amsterdam worden afgegeven en in hoeverre een additionele beurnotering in de 
Verenigde Staten of het Verenigd Koningrijk deze kenmerken beïnvloeden. Hierbij 
ligt de nadruk op de specificiteit en nauwkeurigheid van de winstvoorspellingen. 
Relatief gezien hebben veel Nederlandse ondernemingen een additionele 
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beursnotering in de Verenigde Staten of het Verenigd Koningrijk. Een dergelijk 
additionele beursnotering kan bestaan uit een beursnotering op een officiële beurs of 
uit een notering op de zogenaamde “over the counter” (OTC) markt. Ondernemingen 
met een additionele officiële beursnotering in één van beide landen stellen zich aldus 
bloot aan strengere wet- en regelgeving. Daarnaast brengen beide typen additionele 
beursnoteringen strenger toezicht van onder andere analisten en investeerders met zich 
mee. Deze implicaties maakt het mogelijk om te onderzoeken in hoeverre het 
vrijwillig committeren aan een grotere dreiging van juridische vervolging en grotere 
potentiële reputatieschade, zoals beschreven door Coffee Jr. (1999; 2002), van invloed 
is op het vrijwillig communiceren van informatie naar de markt. 
Deze vraagstelling wordt empirisch onderzocht door middel van 1,896 
persberichten waarin winstvoorspellingen van Nederlands beursgenoteerde 
ondernemingen voorkomen. Uit de resultaten komt naar voren dat ondernemingen met 
een additionele beursnotering in de Verenigde Staten of het Verenigd Koningrijk 
minder specifieke voorspellingen afgeven dan ondernemingen zonder een dergelijke 
beursnotering. Een vergelijking van de voorspellingen met de gerealiseerde winsten 
toont aan dat ondernemingen met een additionele beursnotering nauwkeurigere en 
minder optimistische winstvoorspellingen publiceren. Deze bevindingen zijn 
consistent voor beide typen beursnoteringen (d.w.z., officiële en OTC noteringen). 
Kortom, de resultaten suggereren dat strengere wet- en regelgeving en strenger 
toezicht de inhoud van de informatie die ondernemingen vrijwillig communiceren 
naar de markt beïnvloeden. 
Hoofdstuk 5 analyseert voorkeuren van analisten voor de externe verslaggeving 
van ondernemingen door middel van een vragenlijst die is beantwoord door 306 
analisten die ondernemingen in de Verenigde Staten volgen. In het hoofdstuk worden 
de voorkeuren van de analisten vergeleken met de percepties en acties van de 
financiële topbestuurders van ondernemingen uit de Verenigde Staten, die 
ondervraagd zijn door Graham, Harvey en Rajgopal (2005). Aangezien analisten bij 
financiële verslaggeving een belangrijke rol spelen voor ondernemingen (Brennan en 
Tamarowski, 2000; Graham, Harvey en Rajgopal, 2005), creëert deze vergelijking 
meer inzicht in de gelijkenissen en verschillen tussen de vraag naar en het aanbod van 
financiële informatie van ondernemingen. 
De bevindingen tonen aan dat analisten en financiële topbestuurders op veel 
punten op één lijn zitten. Echter, er zijn er ook aantoonbare verschillen aan te duiden. 
Zo suggereren de resultaten dat analisten zich meer op de lange termijn richten, terwijl 
financiële topbestuurders de neiging hebben om beslissingen op het gebied van 
financiële verslaggeving evenals gerelateerde investerings- en 
financieringsbeslissingen te nemen met korte termijn consequenties. Slechts 13% van 
de analisten geeft aan dat ondernemingen middelmatig tot veel waarde dienen te 
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vernietigen om een gelijkmatige winstontwikkeling ten opzichte van voorgaande jaren 
te kunnen rapporteren. Echter, dit percentage is 61% voor de financiële topbestuurders. 
Daarnaast geven analisten aan dat ondernemingen waarde creëren door eigen aandelen 
in te kopen op het moment dat zij hun beoogde winstdoel niet kunnen halen, terwijl 
financiële topbestuurders deze optie niet in ogenschouw nemen.   
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This thesis consists of four studies in the areas of corporate finance and financial
reporting. The first study in the area of corporate finance analyzes CEOs’ familiarity with
business segments and how that familiarity affects their divestiture decisions. Though
managers’ characteristics play an important role in the areas of investment, financial, and
organizational practices, relatively few (behavioral) corporate finance studies examine the
CEO’s perspective. This chapter aims to fill this gap by making the connection between
CEOs’ working experiences with firms’ divestment decisions. The subsequent corporate
finance study empirically examines a firm’s selection procedure of financial advisors,
including the choice of advisor nationality and experience, when making a cross-border
acquisition. The selection of a financial advisor is an important determinant of the value
created in cross-border deals, particularly in case acquirers need the experience and skills
of their advisors to navigate the foreign economic and regulatory practices and conditions.
In the area of financial reporting, the first study investigates the impact of a cross listing in
the United States or United Kingdom on managers’ forecast specificity choice and the ex
post forecast errors of management earnings forecasts disclosed by Dutch firms. A
relatively large number of Dutch firms have a cross listing in the United States or United
Kingdom, which brings about greater legal exposure and greater scrutiny by regulators,
analysts, and investors. This setting provides an opportunity to investigate whether legal
and reputational bonding have an impact on a firm’s voluntary information disclosure. The
final chapter investigates analysts’ preferences for firms’ corporate financial reporting
practices by means of a survey. Analysts’ preferences are confronted with the perceptions
and actions of CFOs. Since analysts play a key role in a firm’s reporting and disclosure
practices, this comparison provides more insight in the similarities and discrepancies
between the demand side and supply side of corporate financial information.
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participants of ERIM are Rotterdam School of Management, Erasmus University, and the
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